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Unattended ~ound sensors (UGS) are devices that automatically gather sensor 
data on a remote target, interpret the data and communicate information back to a receiver 
without interaction with a human operator. The obiective of this thesis is to determine 
how unattended ground sensor technologies might support precision engagement. 
Comparative case anal~s of the use of sensors in Vietnam, the Sinai and Iraq is used to 
develop principles that UGS must meet to support precision engagement. This study finds 
that precision eng!l,~~ent req1lires lon~endurance llGS to be delivered covertly to 
discriminate between targets, interrogate them for emissions, while disseminating a fused 
picture of the tarK~. This study details roles and missions which UGS can :fill as well as 
their costs, benefits and unintended consequences. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) are devices that 
automatically gather sensor data on a remote target, 
inter~ret the data and communicate information back to a 
receiver without interaction with a human operator. 
Historically, UGS technology consisted of sensors which had 
a short range, operated on a continuous basis, focused on 
acoustic or seismic detection and had a short operational 
life span. These technological constraints led to.the 
development of a defensive paradigm. Currently the US 
military is exploring the use of UGS technology in the 
offense, as Rart of its revolution in military affairs 
(~). A key element of the RMA is the pursuit of precision 
engagement. This term summarizes the US military's goal of 
leveraging information technologies to improve its ability 
to detect and destroy enemy forces. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine 
how unattended ground sensor technologies and tactics might 
support precision engagement. The study begins by defining 
the reqgirements of 2~ecision en~a~ement. These requirements 
are targeting, command and control (C2) , achieving a desired 
effect, bomb damage assessment (BDA) and the ability to re-
engage. These five requirements when applied to historical 
xi 
case studies are used to develop principles which sensors 
must meet to satisfy precision engagement. 
This study finds that precision engagement, requires 
long endurance sensors to be delivered covertly to 
discri~nate between targets, interrogate them for 
emissions, while disseminating a fused picture of the 
target. This examination uses these principles as benchmarks 
from which to compare and analy~e the abilit~ of any sensors 












Precision engagement, requires long endurance sensors 
to Be deIiveredcover~Iy to discri~nate between 
targets, interrogate them for emissions, while 
disseminating a fused picture of the target 
A methodolo~of comQarative case analysis of UGS in 
Vietnam and the Sinai is used to evaluate the principles. 
A Desert Storm case study of air and s2ace sensors is then 
used as a "tough test" to define the gap between what air 
xi i 
and space sensors can provide, what is needed for precision 
engag~mentl and how UGS can fill the "sensor gap." 
This study details roles and missions which UGS can 
fill as well as the costs L benefits and unintended 
consequences of their use. The results indicate two roles 
for ground sensors. First, UGS may_substitute for other 
systems. This could achieve an economy of force enabling a 
high-cost or limited air or sp-ace sensor to focus on other 
missions. UGS may also be used as a substitute for highly 
classified sensors enablin~sensor information and 
technology to be shared with a coalition partner. A second 
role for UGS is as a comp;ement to other systems. In this 
role UGS would be used to provide a capability air and space 
sensors cannot or as a force multi~lier to augme~t other 
sensors. This would support specialized missions requiring 
specific intelli~nce, an ability to sp_eed detection and 
targeting, or to enable force projection of a tactical 
military intelli~ence cap_abilit~ However l the use of UGS to 
redUce the "fog of war" may enable even greater benefits to 
be achieved. These benefits are "tailor to task" forces and 
reduced basing requirements. 
The greatest cost of using __ UGS is not defined by 
monetary concerns or research and development. Instead, the 
cost of UGS is measured by the risk of casualties and 
mission compromise. While artillery and UAV delivery methods 
xiii 
are being developed for UGS, this study finds them to be 
ineffective in su~ortinq the deeQ battle. This study finds 
that' UGS delivery can be best accomplished by Special 
Op_erations Forces. 
A detailed examination of unintended consequences is 
included to address the dangers and risks associated with 
UGS and how to mitiqate these Qroblems. Unintended 
consequences such as a "technological My Lai," bandwidth 
overload, "Privates War," spoofing, EMP weapons and others 
are addressed .. This study concludes with a prescription for 




What enables the. wise ~vereigt! and the ~od ~eneral. to strike ~d 
conquer, and achieve things beyond the teach of ordinary men, IS 
for~knowledge. 
-Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) are devices which, when 
placed on the ground, automatically gather sensor data on a 
remote "target," interpret the data, and communicate 
information back to a receiver. UGS ~ather and interpret 
data without interaction from a human operator or physical 
contact with a target .. Instead, UGS "sense" targets by 
monitoring their emissions. Types of emissions include 
acoustic L seismic, electro~ma~netic waves (optical, 
infrared, ultraviolet), electro-magnetic fields, chemical 
and nuclear radiation. 1 HistoricallYJ UGS technology 
consisted of sensors which had a short range, operated on a 
continuous basis,- focused on seismic or acoustic detection, 
and had a short operational life span. These sensors 
required air delivery or emplacement by hand and frequent 
replacement due to the short life span of their battery 
power. These technological constraints resulted in the 
1Hamrick, R., Peglow, S., Sleefe, G. (1997). Application of 
Unattended Ground Sensors to Stationary Targets. In G. Yonas 
(Ed.), Peace and Wartime Applications and Technical Issues 
for Unattended Ground Sensors. Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 
3081, 21-29. 
L 
development of a defensive paradigm in which UGS were 
associated strictly with defensive o2erations. In this 
capacity, sensors were typically used to monitor the "front 
lines" or the p-erimeter of friendlY.2ositions to obtain 
early warning of an attack. 
Currently, the US military is eXQ_Iorin~ the use of UGS 
technology as part of its, "Revolution in Military Affairs. "2 
This revolution relies on information technologies to 
support warfighting. "Precision Engagement" is the term that 
summarizes the us military's qoal of levera~ing information 
technologies to dramatically improve its ability to detect 
and destroy enemy forces. Joint Vision 2010 defines 
precision engagement as a "system of systems" that will 
enable US Military forces to "locate an obiective or target, 
provide responsive command and control, generate [a] desired 
effect, assess lthel level of success L [while] retaining the 
flexibility to reengage with precision when required." 3 
When the definition of Qrecision en~qement is dissected 
into its component parts, five requirements emerge. These 
requirements are tar~etin9Lcommand and control (C2), 
2 Michael Roberts, a Swedish military historian coined the 
term in the 1950s. He writes that a revolution in military 
affairs is defined by changes in force structure, changes in 
the compJexityof tactics,. chan~s in strategy, and the 
impact of military technology on social, political, and 
economic factors. 
2 
achieving a desired effect, bomb damage assessment (BDA) and 
the ability to re-engage. 
With these five requirements in mind, what criteria 
must a sensor meet in order to sU220rt 2recision engagement? 
For targeting, sensors must be delivered to a location where 
they can sense the target. They must be covert to prevent 
the enemy from innovating around the sensor or destroying 
them. Sensors must also be ca2able of discriminating between 
a variety of targets to support different types of 
operations while developing a coherent picture of enemy 
forces on the battlefield. (See Figure 1.1) 
The second reqpirement is command and control (C2). 
Command and control has only one criteria: dissemination. 
Commanders must manage a large and diverse amount "of 
information. The ability to disseminate it in real time to 
the ri~ht commander or force is essential to the conduct of 
a mission. 
Third is the ability to achieve a desired effect. This 
is not restricted to the sensor itself but encompasses 
accurate targ~tin~ the size and tY2e of force allocated to 
the mission, and the type and "quantity of munitions expended 
against a target. In order to facilitate these requirements, 
various types of sensor data must be fused together to 
3 Department of Defense (1997). Joint Vision 2010. GPO, 
Washington, DC. p21 
3 .. 
provide a complete picture of the target and the 
battlefield. 
The fourth re~irement is bomb damaqe assessment. Was 
the desired effect achieved? Sensors support BDA"by 
interrogating the target for indications of life or death. 
This can be accomplished by observing the targets actions or 
signature relative to a functioninq target or previous 
sensing of-the same target. 
The final requirement is the ability to re-engage when 
required. Invariably some targets will have escaped 
destruction or have sustained incremental damage, which 
allows them to continue operating. This necessitates the 
ability to conduct a follow on strike of the same target. 
Central to this requirement is the endurance of a particular 
sensor. If it can operate 24 hours a day, every day, then it 
can support targeting, command and control, and BDA for a 
second strike. 
SENSORS 









Precision Engagement in short, requires long endurance 
sensors to be delivered covertly to discrimdnate between 
targets, interrogate them for emissions, while dissemdnating 
a fused Qicture of the tar~et. This study uses these 
criteria as benchmarks from which to compare and analyze the 
ability of any sensors (air,. g,round or space based) to 
support precision engagement. 
A. PURPOSE 
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine 
how unattended ground sensor technologies and tactics might 
supp-ort Qrecision en~a~ement. A secondary_purpose is to 
acquaint the reader with the rapid advancements occurring in 
UGS technologies. UGS are increasingly approaching the 
condition described by "Moore's Law." 4 Just as computers 
double their comQutin<1- Qower every two y-ears at the same 
cost, so will the capabilities 'of UGS. This study will 
demonstrate that with the increase in UGS capabilities, they 
can effectively support the conduct of precision engagement. 
This study will detail roles and missions which UGS can fill 
4 Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, accurately predicted in 
1965 that every 18-24 months, a new computer memory chip 
would be invented which would have double the processing 
caQdcity of its Qredecessor at the same cost. 
and their associated costs, benefits and unintended 
consequences. 
B. RELEVANCE 
In the wake of Desert Storm, the us military has begun 
to recognize that its air and space-based sensors are not 
adequate to su~ort "detection, identification, targeting, 
and post-strike assessments of time-critical (including 
mobile) and underground targets."S In response, the us 
military has begun to study the use of unattended ground 
sensors to mitigate these deficiencies. Use of sensors in 
this role is gaining attention due to advancements in sensor 
technolo9YL which have ~roduced "sensors that are smaller, 
stealthier, cheaper, sm~rter, more power efficient and more 
communicative." 6 Recogpition that sensors have the 
potential to act as a substitute for high cost and limited 
air and sPflce assets is also a factor in their popularity. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This study will use com~arative case analysis of the 
use of unattended ground sensors in Vietnam and the Sinai. 
These cases were selected because they demonstrate the use 
of UGS in both war and peace, as well as protracted and 
5 Yonas,G. (Ed.) (1997). Peace and Wartime Applications and 
Technical Issues for Unattended Ground Sensors. Proceedings 
of SPIE Vol. 3081, ix. 
6 b'd ' I 1 ., p. lX. 
6._ 
contingency applications. Other cases involving the use of 
UGS were available but were not selected for this study. The 
use of UGS by the US Border Patrol along the northern and 
southern borders of the United States and the use of UGS by 
the US Army in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea are 
examples. These cases are not addressed because the lessons 
that these cases would provide are clearly evident in 
Viet~~ the Sinai. Addition of these ~ases would have 
added greater corroboration but not greater explanatory 
power. 
While the Vietnam and Sinai cases contain a wealth of 
information about the successes and failures of ground 
sensor tactics and technologyL the Desert Storm case study 
is concerned with air and space based sensors. This case 
study is critical to an examination of ground sensors 
because it acts as a "tough test." This case study 
demonstrates that the US Armed Forces failed to achieve 
precision engagement because of the.limitations of air and 
space. sensors. These limitations resulted in a "gap" between 
what was available and what was desired to acheive precision 
engagement. The touqh test is to determine whether UGS could 
have filled this "sensor gap." 
The data and lessons learned from the historical use of 
UGS, emerging concepts of precision engagement and the 
"sensor q.aQ" will be inteqrated in the final chapter. This 
7 
will culminate in a prescription for future development and 
employment of UGS. 
One might ask, why is this study based entirely on US 
cases? The answer is simple. During my research only one 
other case involvin~ UGS a2Peared. This case involved the 
use of UGS by British forces to monitor the partitioning of 
Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. Little if any 
information was available and what I did find was a mirror 
imag~ of the use of UGS b~ the US Border Patrol. 
Finally, this study is based entirely on unclassified 
sources and informat,ion. I obtained my information from 
newspaper articles, books, unpublished papers, speeches and 
rep9rts bY,the.£c;trtici12..ants of oI2.erations in Vietnam and the 
Sinai, many of which were obtained from the National 
Archives. In each case, I attempted to find a first person 
source for my information or to find at least three sources 
which were in a~reement on the same point. This was 
especially difficult when developing the'Desert Storm case 
study. Extremely little information is available concerning 
satellite capabilities and technology due to their 
classified status. In this case I based my study on open 
source books and publications which are considered to be 
accurate enough to be used as textbooks at military 
universities and military intelligence courses. I believe 
that based on an open source research and analysis, the case 
8. 
studies of Vietnam and the Sinai are extremely accurate and 
the Desert Storm case is sufficiently accurate to enable a 
worthwhile comparison without compromising any technological 
capability. 
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study will not attemJ2t to examine commercial uses 
of UGS. An analysis of this type would require a separate 
examination to study this issue ade~ately. However, this 
thesis will address air and space sensors. This will be done 
to demonstrate the difference in roles and capabilities of 
UGS and other sensors. It will also demonstrate that there 
is currently a ~a2 between what air and s~ce sensors can 
provide and what is required for precision engagement. 
Analysis of air and sJ2ftce sensors is also important because 
they have a symbiotic relationship with UGS. Many UGS rely 
on satellite or airborne platforms to receive, analyze, or 
retransmit data to another station. Finally, this 
comparison will show how UGS J2rovide a capability that 
enables them to complement or substitute for air and space 
sensors. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Figure 1.2 is a visual flowchart of the research design 
of this thesis. This flowchart depicts the relationship 
between the central themes of the study and subordinate 
9 
hypotheses. The design of this research is based on the 
assum2tion that few readers have been exposed to UGS 
technologies and their tactics. 
Chapter I-Introduction 
What.is-precision-engagement? 
Why-tlnattel1ded ground sensors? 
~, 
Chapter II-Vietnam Chapter IV-Iraq 
Chapter IU-Sinai--
.. 
- Defining the- "sensor gap" with a 
Comparativeal1alysis-oflJGS ... tough test for sensors 
sensor tecnnorogy and facfics 
.f 
Chapter V-Reseal eh ellestions 
f. Wf1af rore can UGSfilTTn precision 
en9-aQ..ement? 
t C-onctuslons ... 2. Whalare.the costs, benefits and unintended r" eoflsequeflees?-
FIGURE 1. 2 RESEARCH DESIGN SCHEMATIC 
1. Chapter I Introduction 
The ~u~ose of this cha2ter is to introduce the 
information warfare concept. of precision engagement (PE) and 
explain the value of integrating PE and ground sensor 
technology. Principles of PE and UGS are defined to 
establish benchmarks for com2arinqhistorical uses of UGS 
tactics and technology, their connection to PE and how they 
are different from air and space sensors. This chapter also 
10 
explains the methodological underpinnings of the study and a 
~eneral road ma~ of the research process. 
2. Chapter II Low Intensity Conflict 
Vietnam is a study in the develo~ment of sensors on the 
automated battlefield. It demonstrates the use of sensors in 
low intensity conflict and also marks the first use of 
sensors in combat by ground forces. Before Vietnam, sensors 
had been successfully used by the US Navy in anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW). Unattended ground sensors had also been 
developed as 2art of what was then a t02 secret operation 
called TACIT in Korea. However, the sensors arrived in Korea 
in 1954, jpst after the cessation of hostilities. The Navy 
and TACIT sensors provided the start point in Vietnam. The 
use of UGS in Vietnam is also significant because it nearly 
achieved a revolution in military affairs (RMA). It did not 
achieve a complete revolution because the proponents of 
sensor warfare overestimated the pace of technological 
change that would enable sensors to become more efficient, 
and more cost effective. However, Vietnam does serve as a 
treasure trove of ideas and lessons about sensors, precision 
engagement, and information warfare. Many of these lessons 
are still relevant today. 
3. Chapter III Regional Confidence Building 
A study of the Sinai demonstrates the value of sensors 
in promoting peace. While sensors in Vietnam were used by 
• 
II 
military forces for precision engagement, sensors in the 
Sinai were used by the US State De2artment for peacekeeping. 
Many of the same lessons learned from Vietnam are also 
present in the Sinai corroboratin~ the value and relevance 
of previously learned lessons. While the Sinai did not 
return to ·open warfare, the sensors did provide precise 
locations of activity within the confines of the 
Disengagement A~reement. While the current military concept 
of sensors and Information Warfare focuses on attacking and 
destroying tarqets, this case study demonstrates their use 
in M21itary Operations other than War (MOOTW). 
4. Chapter IV Hi~h Intensity Conflict 
In the Gulf War, there was a great deal of remote 
sensing and 12recision enqagement conducted. However, it was 
conducted in the absence of unattended ground sensors. 
Sensing was conducted 2rimarily by satellite and air 
surveillance aircraft. My purpose in this chapter is to 
identify what failures occurred because of an over-reliance 
on air and space based sensors. From these failures I will 
then identify what ~a12s in 12recision enqaqement could have 
been filled by UGS. 
5. Chapter V Research Questions 
The purpose of this chapter is to integrate historical 
lessons learned and the conce12t of 12recision engagement to 
identify what roles and missions UGS can fill. This chapter 
12 
will provide an analysis of the costs, benefits and 
unintended conseqpences of makin~ these changes. This will 




It is pardonable to be defeated, but never surprised 
-Frederick the Great 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Vietnam is a study in the development of sensors on the 
automated battlefield. It demonstrates the use of sensors in 
Low Intensity Conflict and marks the first use of Unattended 
Ground Sensors in Combat. The use of sensors in Vietnam did 
not achieve a revolution in military affairs because it did 
not achieve the success necessary to alter the way in which 
the US military or other nations conduct war. This is 
primarily because. the proponents of the sensors over-
estimated the pace at which technology would advance. 
However, it does provide a wealth of lessons about sensors 
and precision engagement. It also provides many insights 
into the costs, benefits, and unintended consequences that 
may develop as a result of sensor-based warfare. These 
lessons have largely been forgotten despite their relevance 
today 
B. BACKGROUND 
In the mid-1960s the United States Air Force was 
heavily engaged in a protracted bombing campaign against 
North Vietnam. Its pUrQose was to coerce or compel the North 
Vietnamese government to end their support for the 
insur~ency in South Vietnam. By early 1966£ it was apparent 
to Secretary of Defepse McNamara that the strategic bombing 
campaign was having little effect on North Vietnam. The Ho 
Chi Minh Trail, which was used by the North Vietnamese 
to funnel sUP2lies and soldiers into South Vietnam, 
continued to be used despite the bombing. In fact, the pace 
of infiltration and the ~antity of supplies were 
increasing. This led a number of military planners to seek 
an alternative solution. One of the more 2rominent ideas was 
borrowed from the French experience in Algeria. In the late 
1950s, the French had achieved some success in blocking 
Tunisian infiltration into Algeria using a barrier. 7 The 
barrier consisted of barbed wire, land mines and a variety 
of listening devices. The idea of creating a barrier between 
North and South Vietnam was often studied by US military 
planners but never implemented. It was assumed that 
communist infiltration could be stoP2ed through strategic 
bombing. 
In January 1966, Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School 
sent a memo to Assistant Secretary of Defense John 
7 Baldwin, H. (1967, July 21). US Adding 12 Miles to Vietnam 
Barrier Stri2. New York Times, p. 2. 
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McNaughton advocating the establishment of a barrier. 8 
While this was not a new idea, its timin~ was perfect as 
many in the Defense Department were searching for 
alternatives to strategic bombing. Fisher's particular 
concept envisioned a barrier "about 10 miles wide and 160 
miles long' [thatl would be flanked on either side by a wide 
defoliated free-fire zone." 9 McNaughton passed the memo to 
secretary of Defense McNamara. McNamara showed great 
interest in the idea and requested input from his field 
commanders, one of whom was Admiral u.s. Grant Sharp, the 
commander-in-chief of Pacific Command. Admiral Sharp was 
opposed to the idea for a number of reasons. He believed 
that the barrier "would take up to four years to create, tie 
up seven or eight United States Divisions, strain the supply 
system, and probably not work after all." 10 Despite 
significant opposition to the idea, McNamara directed the 
army to continue studying the plan and to develop devices 
that would support it. At rouqhly the same time McNamara was 
asked by scientists from MIT and Harvard (known as the 
Jasons) if he would be interested in having them study a 
8 Senator Gravel. (1971-72). The Pentagon Papers: The 
Department of Defense History of United States Decision 
Making on Vietnam. Boston, Beacon Press. p. 112. 
9 Dickson, P. (19761. The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p 21. 
10 Ibid, p. 21. 
17 
variety of technological issues relating to the War in 
Vietnam. Given the desire to develop alternative solutions, 
McNamara readily accepted their offer. 
1. JASONS 
The Jasons were org~nized in 1959 by the Institute for 
Defense Analysis (IDA), which served as a strategic military 
think-tank. Their initial role had been concerned primarily 
with the study and development of nuclear weapons. The Jason 
Division or "Jasons", while associated with the IDA, "were 
primarily non-IDA scholars. "11 They consisted of 
approximately 45 of the best scientists that America's 
universities had to offer. The Jasons even boasted that 
their organization included several former Nobel Laureates. 
The Jasons were not a standing organization. Inst.ead, they 
operated in an adhoc fashion, coming together each summer to 
study select problems related to military technology and 
national security. In the mid-1960s, these scientists would 
act as Secretary of Defense McNamara's leading scientific 
advisors. 
The Jasons were first called into action concerning 
Vietnam to assess the effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder 
campaign in which the Air Force was conducting strategic 
bombing against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Jasons were asked 
11 Senator Gravel. (1971-72). The Pentagon Papers: The 
Defense Department History of United states Decision Making 
on Vietnam. Boston, Beacon Press. p. 115. 
18 
by McNamara to prepare a report detailing "technical 
possibilities in relation to our military operations in 
Vietnam" as their summer of 1966 project. 12 On April 26, 
McNamara amended his re~est and directed that the group 
also examine the development of a barrier. This barrier 
would be "[al fence across the infiltration trails, warning 
systems, reconnaissance (especially night) methods, night 
vision devices, defoliation techni~es, and area-denial 
weapons. "13 
In their report, the Jasons concluded that the 
strategic bombing campaign in Vietnam was largely a failure. 
It had not reduced the rate of infiltration. In fact, the 
Jasons argued that it might have serve~ to strengthen the 
moral resolve and resistance of the North Vietnamese people 
to the United States. The bombing failed because North 
Vietnam was a country based on a subsistence economy. There 
was little industry to attack; instead, it was largely an 
agrarian society. Because of -the inability of the US Air 
Force to destroy large economic, industrial and military 
targets, what damage was done could easily be absorbed by 
the economic support that North Vietnam was receiving from 
China and the USSR. This economic support combined with a 
high civilian death toll actually caused the North 
12 Ibid, p. 115 
13 Ibid, p. 115 
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Vietnamese population to become more supportive politically 
and more de2endent economically on their government. 
True to McNamara's request, the Jasons proposed an 
alternative solution in the form of a barrier separating 
North and South Vietnam. The barrier "would have two 
separate components: an antipersonnel barrier about 20 by 
100 kilometers running across the southern edge of the DMZ 
and into the Laotian panhandle, and an anti-vehicular 
barrier that would be twice as wide but just as long." 14 
Central to the pro2osed barrier was the inclusion of a wide 
array of advanced sensors, which would pinpoint attempts by 
the North Vietnamese to infiltrate through the barrier. 
These sensors would "provide for ground troops the kind of 
early warning systems that we long have provided in anti-
submarine warfare and in air defense." 15 
The Jasons delivered their report criticizing the 
Rolling Thunder campaign and proposing a barrier to 
McNamara. This indictment of the current military campaign 
and its proposal for new tactics and technology was viewed 
as highly sensitive and classified. Within seven days of 
receiving the report, McNamara began discussions with the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior leadership in Vietnam. 
14 Dickson, P. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p. 26 
15 Beecher, W. (1970, February 13). Sensor Seal Around 
Vietnam Studied. New York Times, p. 10. 
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A majority in favor of the barrier was achieved despite 
Admiral Sharp's objections. 
2. Defense Communications Planning Group 
In September of 1966, McNamara appointed General Alfred 
Starbird as the action officer for the barrier. McNamara 
identified General Starbird, a former manag~r of the atomic 
energy test program as the best choice to develop a barrier 
that required both innovative technology and tactics. 
General Starbird was instructed to maintain a direct line of 
communications with Secretary McNamara on the progress of 
the barrier. The organization of the barrier team was 
called Joint Task Force 728 and was later given a non-
descriptname titled the Defense Communications Planning 
Group (DCPG). The name was intended to sound mundane and 
unimportant to discourage the enemy from taking an interest 
in it. 16 The group was headquartered on the grounds of the 
US Naval Observatory in Washington D.C. and was staffed with 
170 personnel. The organization was created outside of the 
normal military chain of command but was given the authority 
to task the Joint Chiefs and other government departments to 
accomplish its mission. 
16 During the Vietnam War, other organizations with highly 
classified missions were given similar non-descript names. 
The Army Special Forces elements that infiltrated North 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia~ used the title of the Studies 
and Observations Group to shield their activities. 
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The Defense Communications Planning Group operated 
successfully for a 2eriod of five years before being 
disbanded near the close of the Vietnam War. It enjoyed 
billions of dollars in funds and had sponsorship from the 
highest levels of the United States Government. Members of 
the DCPG compared their service and experience as the near 
equivalent of the Manhattan project. 17 This was because "it 
allowed you to be in on the birth of an idea and see it move 
through all its stages-design, development, prototype, 
testing, production-and into combat in Vietnam in just about 
the fastest time which was less than a year in most 
cases. "18 
C. TACTICS 
The initial tactics proposed by the DCPG were 
defensive, linear, and were intended to provide early 
warning of an attack against the "front lines" or the 
perimeter of a friendly position. This tactic was the 
original barrier plan and became known as the McNamara Line, 
which would separate North and South Vietnam. Other 
significant tactics would quickly follow; the 360-degree 
perimeter defense of Khe Sanh, which occurred in 1968, would 
17 The Manhattan Project was the title of a massive World 
War Two effort that developed the first Atomic Bomb. 
18 Dickson, P. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p. 33. 
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serve as one of the most successful applications of 
unattended ground sensors in combat. However, the greatest 
test of sensors would be a project known only as Igloo 
White. This proiect would tax the greatest minds of the 
DCPG to rapidly invent, produce and employ advanced sensors 
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
1. The McNamara Line 
The "McNamara Line" was one of many names applied to 
the barrier effort during the Vietnam War. The purpose of 
the. harrier was to seal off South Vietnam from North Vietnam 
and Laos. In the 1960s, soldiers and Marines had been 
fighting an elusive enemy that was infiltrating South 
Vietnam across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). They were also 
fighting an enemy that understood the American rules of 
engagement. US forces could not enter North Vietnam. 
However~ North Vietnamese and Viet Conq guerrilla fighters 
habitually used the imaginary boundary to their advantage. 
Guerrillas would infiltrate l strike US 'and ARVN military 
targets, and then retreat back across the imaginary line to 
safety. The barrier was intended to deny the North 
Vietnamese the ability to infiltrate and to deny the South 
Vietnamese Viet Cong the ability to retreat to safe havens. 
The barrier initially consisted of an integrated 
assembly of barbed wire~ mines L defoliated areas and troop 
emplacements to counter-attack against penetrations and 
• 
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probes by the enemy. The DCPG recognized that barrier 
operations would evolve within the realm of a "thinking and 
acting enemy" where for every action their is a reaction and 
a counter-action. 19 As such, they envisioned the barrier 
becoming a "dynamic battle of the barrier." 20 
To defeat the enemy with a barrier the DCPG planned much 
more than the original concept of a jungle "Maginot Line."21 
Instead, they envisioned a barrier upholstered with advanced 
sensors to provide constant intelligence on the enemy. 
Newsweek claimed that this "system would employ a network of 
noise, heat and optic detectors-and perhaps even laser-
rays." 22 Added to the sensors would be patrol planes, which 
could retransmit the sensor data and aircraft to conduct air 
strikes. Other technological innovations would also be 
added as the battle of the barrier evolved. 
19 Luttwak, E. (1987). Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. 
Cambridge, Harvard University. 
20 Senator Gravel, (1971-72). The Pentagon Papers: The 
Defense Department History of United States Decision Making 
on Vietnam. Boston, Beacon Press. p. 120. 
21 French line of fortifications conceived in the 1930s by 
the French war minister Andre Maginot. It extended 200 miles 
along the northeastern border of France to protect against a 
frontal assault. It was quickly flanked and defeated in WWII 
by the German Army. 
22 An Electronic Picket Line at the DMZ. (1967, April 17). 
Newsweek, p.25. 
The endstate of the barrier was a modern day great wall 
of Vietnam that would put an end to North Vietnamese 
infiltration. Other backers of the plan, such as Senator 
Mike Mansfield of Montana, even went so far as to propose 
that "the construction of the barrier would permit the 
United States to stop bombing North Vietnam." 23 Supporters 
of the barrier envisioned a point where technology would 
even replace the need for soldiers l leadin~ to a reduction 
in casualties. This was referred to by some as a transition 
to "Bli:pkrieg, "24 where the "blip" of a sensor would direct 
fires onto the enemy without the need for interaction with a 
human operator. Given the high rate of casualties incurred 
during the war this aspect was especially appealing to 
Secretary McNamara. McNamara had ":previously di~carded an 
Army proposal for a picket-line force below the 
demilitarized zone because it would have required an 
additional 250,000 men in Vietnam." 25 
23 Baldwin, H. (1967, July 21). US Adding 12 Miles to 
Vietnam Barrier Stri:p. New York Times, p. 2. 
24 Blipkrieg is a modification of the name Blitzkrieg which 
was an innovative strategy and tactic of mechanized and 
armored warfare developed by the Germans prior to WWII. 
Blipkrieg, it was proposed would have the same success but 
would be enabled by the blips or sensor hits produced by 
unattended ground sensors. 
25 An Electronic Picket Line at the DMZ. (1967, April 17), 
Newsweek, p. 25. 
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A significant source of debate for the McNamara line 
centered on its location. Should the line separate just 
North and South Vietnam? Should it extend into Laos and 
Cambodia? What about issues of territorial sovereignty? The 
original line began in the demilitarized zone. The New York 
Times noted that "a 12 mile extension of a cteared barrier 
strip is being started just south of the demilitarized zone 
in South Vietnam ... the original strip 600 yards [long] was 
previously authorized." 26 This strip began in front of what 
was known as Leatherneck Square c a network of Marine Bases. 
These bases were located in Conthien and Giolinh and had 
been tha scen.e... 0£. DmnerOllS battles. 'With. ~iltrators. The 
12-mile extension would increase. the barrier to a total of 
23 miles. With this extension went an attempt to create a 
sterile battlefield for the sensors. The sensors could not 
differentiate between a peasant or a soldier. So in 1967 
with the extension of the barrier, "approximately 11,000 
peasants were moved out of the cleared 'area to create a 
free-fire area." 26 
Another problem with the barrier. was that the actual 
DMZ was approximately 40 miles long. Even erecting a barrier 
along all 40 miles would not eliminate the ability of the 
enemy to circumvent the barrier by traveling through the 
26 Ibid, p. 2. 
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porous borders of Laos and Cambodia. In order for the 
barrier to succeed, it had to stretch across all of Laos or 
be erected along the entire western border of South Vietnam 
between both Laos and Cambodia. As the proponents of the 
barrier sought a solution, the government of Laos 
intervened. "The government of Prince Souvanna Phouma 
declared ... that it was opposed to the construction of an 
electronic_ harrier across the Ho Chi Mj nb lXail in southern 
Laos. "27 While this signaled the end of the physical 
construction of a barrier in Laos, it also marked a 
transition toward an automated battlefield. "The New York 
Times noted that,_ "The premier said nothing to indicate that 
he would consider the dropping of such devices a violation 
of his countries integrity." 28 While the physical 
construction of the barrier stopped, the DCPG began 
preparing for the advent of an "empty battlefield" where 
sensors coUpled with air strikes would replace the need for 
ground troops. 
In the end, the McNamara Line failed to achieve its 
purpose despite announcements by McNamara prior to his 
resignation "that the proiect would be completed late in 
27 Lelyveld, J. (1968, January 25). Electronic Line Opposed 
by Laos. New York Times, p. 1. 
28 Ibid, p. 1. 
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1967 or early in 1968." 29 Construction slowed and then 
stopp-ed. In fact, it is widely believed that with McNamara's 
departure, the barrier plan was allowed to die on the vine. 
HQwever~ the DCPG and their sensors did not die with the 
barrier. Instead, a new crisis occurring at Khe Sanh ensured 
their_ success ancL SUI:..VLVaL unt; J la..:t..a ~nto the war. 30 
2. Khe Sanh 
The success of sensors at Khe Sanh was important to the 
DCPG because it proved that ,sensors could be successful when 
used in_ a. batt.l.e. without hon:t.. lines.. or. lin.aa..r defenses. One 
of the main detractors of the McNamara line had been that he 
was trying to employ a linear approach to a 360-degree war. 
29 Roberts, G. (1968, March 25). Work on McNamara Line in 
Vietnam Near Stand still. New York Times, p. 1. 
30 While the McNamara Line was discontinued in Vietnam, 
another line was completed in the Republic of Korea. 
Infiltrator.s.. fz:.om Nor.th. Koraa c.onduct.ad. small-scale attacks 
across the Korean Demilitarized Zone at the same time that 
the NVA were infiltrating into Vietnam. In response, the 
technical advances and personnel of the DCPG were also 
offered to the US military in Korea. This culminated in the 
creation of a barrier similar in makeup to that of the 
McNamara Line. While some 'publications make isolated 
references to this, little information is available. The use 
of sensors in the DMZ is ongoinq and considered in many 
respects to be classified. Another interesting aspect is the 
transfer of sensor technology to the US Border Patrol. In 
the late 1970s, these same sensors would be used along the 
Texas-Mexico border to detect illegal immigrants. More 
advanced sensors than those developed by the DCPG continue 
to be used today. See Andelman, D. (1973, July 14). US 
Implanting an Electronic Fence to Shut Mexican Border to 
Smugglinq. New York Times. p. 1. Also, see Bolger, D. 
(1991). Scenes From an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity 
Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968. Washington D.C., GPO. 
Khe Sanh was a Marine base in the northwest corner of 
Vietnam. Intelli~ence information indicated that the North 
Vietnamese were conducting a massive buildup in preparation 
for an attack. The Marines at Khe Sanh quickly became the 
priority of the military and policy makers alike. In 
preparation for the battle to come, General Westmoreland 
created Niagara I. This was the name given to a massive 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield around Khe Sanh. 
The 7th Air Force provided many of its photo interpreters 
and many were flown in from the United States to analyze air 
and space surveillance photos of Khe Sanh. A Niagara 
intelligence center was created at Tan Son Nhut. "Impressive 
as the work of this center was-its photo specialists, for 
example, handled twice the weekly amount of film usually 
processed by the Seventh Air Force-it could not provide'the 
up-to-the-minute data needed by American Commanders."31 As 
a result, General Westmoreland offered the commander of Khe 
Sanh the technologica'l advances and services of the DCPG. 
On January 18, 1968, a team from the DCPG demonstrated 
the sensO.rs for the Marine.s at Khe Sanh. The sensors were 
quickly accepted and within 48 hours air delivered sensors 
were being dropped by the 7th Air Force around the 
perimeter. The DCPG had initially planned to land ground 
31 Nalty, B. (1986). Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh. 
Washington, D.C., GPO. P. 90 
teams by helicopter and implant sensors but enemy activity 
prevented this. Because these sensors were some of the 
earliest developed ,there was great difficulty in determining 
the_ exact... locati on o£ the.. s.ensors _ The... s.ens..ru;s became used 
as detection of activity in an area as opposed to a pinpoint 
detection device. The sensors ware hoth acoustic and 
seismic. Acoustic sensors could listen in on activities 
while their seismic counterparts would report the movement 
of soldiers and equipment. The following day Khe Sanh was 
attacked and surrounded! blinding the Marines to the enemy's 
activities while preventing reinforcements and support. 
The initial efforts by the North Vietnamese were 
standoff attacks using mortars and artillery. However, on 5 
February dismounted attacks began. This is the point where 
sensors proved their value. 
The sensors provided the Marines with forewarning of 
the enemy attacks as they began to mass and conduct movement 
toward the base. Colonel David Lownds L the commander of the 
26th Marine Regiment stated: 
The sensors which had been emplaced on Route 9 to the Laotian border 
suddenly came to life and it became obvious that a large column was 
movinKadiacent to Route 9 toward the base ... By computing the length of 
the column by information produced by the sensors, it became obvious to 
me that an enemy regjment was tryinK to close the base. This information 
coupled with possible assembly areas, allowed us to bring down upon this 
unit devastating firepower to breakup the impending attack. 32 
32 Dickson, P. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p. 74. 
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The success of the sensors was further attested to by the 
regiment's intelligence officer Maior Jerry E. Hudson. Major 
Hudson stated that prior to the advent of sensors, it was 
common to conduct harassment and interdiction fires using 
artillery and air strikes against the surrounding terrain. 
This was done based on a map ins:pection and suspected areas 
of enemy activity. However, once "the marines learned how to 
put sensor information to worklthe words harassment and 
interdiction were stricken from the 3d Marine Division 
vocabulary." 33 
Another interesting lesson of the use of sensors at Khe 
Sanh was that just as they helped destroy the enemy they 
.' 
also helped reduce American ,casualties.' Colonel Lownds went 
on to testify before the Senate that without the use of the 
sensors "his casualties would have almost doubled." 34 As 
knowledge of the sensors proliferated, the DCPG was deluged 
by requests from commanders in the field for more sensors. 
The DCPG suppo~ted them but rapidly began to develop a more 
robust plan for dealinqwith the enemy known by the code 
name Igloo White. 
33 Nalty, B. (1986). Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh. 
Washington D.C., GPO. p. 95. 
34 Ibid, p. 75 
3. Igloo White 
The ~ur~ose of o~eration Igloo White was to interdict 
the infiltration of supplies and personnel occurring in Laos 
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Igloo White was designed to 
accomplish electronically what had been previously planned 
for with the McNamara Line. While the barrier required 
physical construction and troops on the ground, Igloo White 
had its own Air Force~ and de~ended UQon thousands of 
sensors on the ground. Coupled with the sensors and aircraft 
was the largest building in Thailand. This building was 
known as the Infiltration Surveillance Center. The operation 
lasted. from lata 1..96..9- ro tha end o.L 1..9'Z2... ~ was considered 
one of the most secretive, expensive and successful 
operations of the Vietnam War. 
The method of the operation was to air deliver sensors 
from high-speed aircraft traveling at fast as 600 mph. The 
sensors were dropped in strings along trails, roads and 
suspected routes of enemy infiltration. A string was the 
word used to describe the sequential emplacement by air of 
sensors in a line. As a vehicle or group of soldiers would 
pass by the sensors, they would sequentially report "hits," 
which would show the IQc.ation and.... :r:.ate of movement of the 
enemy as well as differentiate between vehicles and 
personnel. The sensors were designed to be covert. They were 
made to look like plants and would hit the ground like a 
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lawn dart burying themselves up to their antenna. Others 
sensors were acoustic and were delivered by parachute. "The 
camouflaged parachutes [would] catch in trees and hang high 
out of sight in the foliage." 35 
All of the sensors were autonomous. They had battery 
packs and transmitters in addition to their sensors. As a 
"hit" was registered on the sensor it would transmit the 
data. The data was received electronically by circling 
aircraft called the EC-121R, .a four engine Air Force 
aircraft, and later by a small aircraft known as a Pave 
Eagle which could also be flown by remote as an unmanned 
aerial vehicle. Added to these aircraft were F-4s, B-52s, B-
57s, AC-130 Pave Spectre and a variety of helicopters, all 
of which were used to conduct air strikes against targets 
identified by the sensors. 
The last component of the Igloo White System was the 
Infiltration Surveillance Center. It had "a 20,000-square-
foot operations center,_ a 5 L 600-s@are foot communications 
building, and a building for housing six 200-kilowatt diesel 
generating sets." 36 This building_and its associated 
compound would be continually expanded throughout the war. 
It was "a windowless air-conditioned comQlex tucked away in 
35 Weiss, G. (1971, March 1). SEA Sensor Fields: More Eyes 
and Ears. Armed Forces Journal. p. 38. 
36 Staaveren, J. (1993). Interdiction in Southern Laos: 
1960-1968. Washington D.C., GPO. P 
33 
a jungle clearing and off limits to everyone but the 
analysts who worked there." 37 The air-conditioning was not 
so much for the personnel as it was for the computers that 
it housed. Within the building was an "IBM 360/40 
[supercomputer which was] replaced late in 1968 with the 
faster IBM 360/65." 38 The data collected b~ aircraft from 
the sensors was retransmitted to the supercomputers in the 
ISC and then digested and analyzed l only then was it 
presented to a targeting board which would direct air 
strikes against the enemy. One 2r020nent of the sensors 
stated that, "in response to picking up signals relayed from 
the trail, an I.B.M. 360-65 com2uter at the Air Force's 
Infiltration Surveillance Center in Thailand fixes targets 
and sends forth 2rint-outs as im2ersonally as next month's 
bills." 39 
The building with its associated base "of about 4,700 
Americans was selected for such operations mainly because of 
its location. Nakhom Thanomi at the northeast corner of 
Thailand, overlooks the jungles of Laos across the Mekong 
37 Berry, F. Jr. (1988). The Illustrated History of Gadget 
Warfare: The Vietnam War. New York, Bantam Books, p. 69 
38 Ibid, p. 72. 
39 Mitganq, H. (1971, December 20). Sensors Don't Bleed. New 
York Times, p. 35. 
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River, and is only 64 miles from North Vietnam." 40 The 
close proximity of the ISC to the action put it in range of 
the aircraft which acted as the sensor relay. In addition to 
the ISC, "a ground relay lstation operatedl from the top of 
Nui Ba Den"41 further increasing the communications range of 
the ISC. O·f the Americans at the base,_ 400 were required to 
operate the computers, data processing and signal center 
operations L which received the sensor data into the 
computers. The other personnel were primarily military 
personnel to plan missions as well as aircrews. 
The intended endstate of operation Igloo White was a 
transition from an earlier type of warfare involving the big 
and the few toward an era of the small and the many. The 
small and many would be the thousands of cheap and small 
unattended ground sensors that would target the enemy. The 
sensors would form an electronic fence along the 3,500 miles 
of the Ho Chi Mlnh Trail. This fence of sensors combined 
with airstrikes would provide a near real-time picture of 
the battlefield while targeting and destroying the 
infiltr.ation of the North Vietnamese. 
40 Browne, M. (1972, October 23). Sensors Attune US Base in 
Thailand to Movements on Ho Chi Mlnh Trail.New York Times, 
p. 32. 
41 Bergen, J. (1986). Mllitary. Communications: A Test for 
Technology. Washington D.C., GPO. P. 392. 
The response time between target detection and the 
delivery of area weaQons against the target was between two 
to five minutes. Much of the actual delivery of ordinance 
onto the target was automated. The Qilots of the strike 
aircraft did not see their targets or pull a trigger to 
release their bombs. Instead, the aircraft would fly over 
the sensor target and release its payload at a time directed 
by the aircraft's computer L which o:gerated off of sensor 
data. While bomb release was automated there was much more 
to the process. Within South VietnamL pilots were not 
required to visually acquire targets. During the battle for 
Khe Sanh discussed earlier, automated delivery of ordinance 
was a standard procedure. However, in Laos the rules of 
engagement were very different. 
In Laos, a Forward Air Controller (FAC) was required to 
visually acquire the target after bein~vectored to the 
target area by sensor information. The FAC would confirm the 
target, mark it with 'smoke producing rockets and then direct 
fighter-bombers against the target. Air strikes were 
forbidden against villages or ag?inst targets that were 
farther than approximately 220 yards away from a main road 
or trail. The exception to this rule was if the Laotian 
government or military had authorized the target. These ROE 
introduced inefficiency into the system in an attempt to 
retain the support of the Laotian government as well as to 
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reduce the chances that the civilian population might be 
accidentally targeted. This resulted in numerous sensor 
activations that were not acted upon because the target 
could not be confirmed due to weather, or the target was 
outside of accepted boundaries. 
The tactics of an operation involved the 'airdrop of , 
sensors in a string of five or six along a road, route or 
trail. As a vehicle passed the sensors, a pattern of 
activation would develop as each sensor reported enemy 
activity. This would enable the direction, location and 
speed of the truck convoy to be determined by following the 
activity of the enemy as it activated each sensor down the 
line. The arrival time of the truck convoy at the last 
sensor in the line would then be estimated as "point X and 
the coordinates of that point passed to F-4 fighter-
bombers."42 The delivery of ordinance by the aircraft would 
be timed by the F-4 computers to coincide with the expected 
time of. arri.v:al o.L the.... trllcks at_ ~ wbj cb was an area as 
opposed to a pin point location. This was termed the strike 
zone. The strike zone was necessary because the sensors were 
"listening-not viewing devices" and could not accurately 
determ.ine tha exac.:Llocatjon_o.L_eacb~ck. The sensors 
42 Dickson, P. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana. University Press. p: 86. 
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provided the area of the activity that would be targeted by 
area weapons. 
Igloo White was focused on the destruction of trucks 
not personnel. Its results were significant. In fact, the 
infamous Vietnam "body count" was replaced with the "truck 
count." The results were "12,000 trucks in 1971, .its last 
full year of operation; 12 LOOO for 1970; 6,.000 in 1969; and 
5,500 in 1968; its first full year of operation. In allover 
35, 000 trucks L were destroyed!" each of which carried [an 
estimated] 10,000 pounds of war supplies intended for South 
Vietnam. "43 
Despite this success there were problems. The most 
significant were categorized as poor bomb damage assessment 
and enemy forces that 2assed through the electronic fence 
without detection. Other problems dealt with the unintended 
consequences that were emer~inqas part of the automated 
battlefield. 
The premier problem was defining whether a sensor 
activation coupled with an airstrike had hit a truck convoy 
and if hit what that had achieved. It was widely believed 
that the Air Force had over-estimated the number of vehicles 
destroyed by its o2erations. This came to a head one year 
when the numbers of trucks reported as killed exceeded the 
number that the US Embassy believed existed in all of North 
43 Ibid, p. 90. 
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Vietnam. Many of the problems were traced back to the 
measures of effectiveness used by the Air Force. If a shell 
hit within ten feet of a truck, it was designated as damaged 
and a hit of any kind was recorded as a kill. This led 
military experts to estimate that as little as 10% of the NV 
supplies were making it through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The 
result was that most military officials began to apply a 
discount factor to the data. A fact findinqmission led by 
members of the US Senate found that "[t]hese figures are not 
taken seriously by most US officials l. even Air Force 
officers, who generally apply something on the order of a 
30% discount factor. ,,44 
The most significant issue that contributed to the 
demise of Igloo White, was the use of armor and artillery by 
the North Vietnamese in parts of South Vietnam. In 1972, the 
North Vietnamese conducted a major offensive using a 
combined arms approach reaching as far south as the An Loc 
region of Saigon. How could this happen if'the sensors were 
so successful in locating and destroying infiltration along 
the Ho Chi Minh trail? A number of explanations are 
possible. First, the munitions used by the Air Force were 
primarily anti-personnel. The primary type of ordinance used 
was the Sadeye/BLU-26B. The Sadeye was an area weapon. It 
44 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
United States Security and Commitments Abroad. (1971). Laos: 
April, 1971. Washington D.C. GPO. 
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was a cluster bomb munition designed to kill personnel and 
destroy thin-skinned vehicles such as trucks. It was never 
designed to destroy heavy artillery or tanks. Use of this 
munition might have damaqed tanks or artillery with a direct 
hit but would not take them out of operation. 
Second, some commanders com21ained that the sensors 
provided "them with more targets at a time when they already 
had enough targets, which had been discovered without 
sensors." This was combined with information overload caused 
by numerous sensor blips, which did not discriminate between 
priority targets such as tanks, and lesser priority trucks. 
Third was the idea of "spoofing." SpoofinCLwas the notion 
that the North Vietnamese would innovate or "fool" the 
sensors. One officer commented before a Senate committee 
that "he assumed the North Vietnamese were smart enough to . 
set off decoy explosives during attacks so that (the enemy 
tanks and artillery) would be counted as dead or damaged 
even if not hurt at all." 45 
Finally, many of the targets identified by the sensors 
were not acted upon because of the Rules of Engagement. In 
Laos, the Ho Chi Mlnh Trail was often obscured by heavy and 
persistent fog. The re~irement for Forward Air Control 
45 Dickson, P. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p. 93. 
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aircraft to visually confirm a target was often impossible. 
This allowed the enemy to infiltrate without being attacked. 
All of this led military planners and the United States 
Congress to ask whether the proiect was cost effective. The 
operation was costing the government approximately 1 billion 
dollars per year. Did the costs outweiqh the benefits? While 
congress wrestled with this issue Igloo White was shut down. 
This was not just a response to the problems of the project 
but a reflection of the war effort as a whole. The war was 
approaching a point where the military and civilian 
leadership was preparing a plan for a withdrawal from 
Vietnam and costs of the war were being reduced. 
D. TECHNOLOGY 
The Jason report presented to McNamara contained a 
detailed discussion of the type, quantity, cost and 
capabilities of the pro12osed sensors. The initial type of 
sensor envisioned by the Jasons were "acoustic detectors~ 
based on improvements of the Acoustic Sono-buoys currently 
under test by the Navy."46 The plan was to take off-the-
shelf hardware and modify it to serve the needs of the 
barrier plan. The sensors would be employed in both the 
anti-vehicle barrier and the anti-personnel barrier. Within 
46 Senator Gravel. (1971-72). The Pentagon Papers: The 
Department of Defense History of United States Decision 
Making on Vietnam. Boston, Beacon Press. p. 121. 
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the "anti-vehicle system acoustic detectors [would be] 
distributed every mile or so along all truckable roads in 
the interdicted area, monitored 24 hours a day by patrol 
aircraft."47 The q}.lantity of sensors re@ired to emplace a 
sensor per mile along the barrier amounted to "1600 acoustic 
sensors per month (assuming presently em~oyed batteries 
with a 2-week life) . "48 
Within the anti-personnel barrier, sensors would also 
be used but they would be distributed more densely. The 
sensors to be used were also acoustic~_ which would make 
detection of foot traffic difficult. A recommendation was 
made within the report for the introduction of button 
bomblets. "Button bomblets were miniature mines developed by 
the Picatinny arsenal that were designed to make noise when 
stepped on and cue an acoustic sensor to the presence of 
personnel. "49 When an infiltrator stepped on the bomblet, 
the acoustic sensor would hear the noise from a distance as 
far away as two hundred feet. The problem'immediately 
recognized was the high cost of the mines necessary to 
thwart pedestrian traffic. The Jasons estimated that the 
barrier would require 25 million button bomblets per month. 
47 Ibid, P 121 
48 Ibid, p. 122. 
49 Senator Gravel. The Pentagon Papers: The Department of 
Defense History of United States Decision Making on Vietnam. 
Boston, Beacon Press. p. 121. 
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While acoustic sensors were planned, a better sensor would 
be needed to eljmjnate_ the ~ faL~omblets and the 
aircraft required to dispense them. 
A£ter approval of the plan and the formulation of the 
Jasons as the Defense Communications Planning Group, the 
sensor plan became problematic. The DCPG tested the 
employment of modified Sono-buoys, and found that the off-
the-shelf plan would not work. "The e<TI;lipment was not 
suitable for the combination of air-delivered, ground 
emplaced, and lonq-ranqe transmission" that the plan 
required. SO These limitations necessitated the rapid 
development of new sensors based on new criteria. Within 
fifteen months of the activation of the DCPG they developed 
and fielded acoustic, seismic L maqnetic, and infrared 
sensors to detect the enemy besides those originally 
planned. The criteria used in their develogment ranged from 
the types of emanations they dete~ted to their cost. 
1. Sensors 
Common to the construction of all sensors were the four 
basic elements of "a detecting unit, electronic logic 
circuit, radio transmitter, and a battery"Sl However, not 
all sensors were alike. The DCPG developed acoustic, 
50 Dickson, P. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p. 35. 
51 Ibid. p. 39. 
seismic, electromagnetic and infrared sensors to suit a 
variety of requirements and capabilities. While there were 
as many different types or combinations of sensors tried 
during the war, the following contains a sampling of the 
most common types. 
a) ACOUBOY 
The first sensors used by the DCPG were acoustic. 
Acoustic sensors used microphones to "listen in" on 
activities within range of the sensor. These were 
essentially modified· Navy Acou-buoys previously used for 
anti-submarine warfare. The sonar device was removed and 
replaced with a microphone called COMMIKE. These sensors 
came in two versions, the Mark-I'and Mark-II. The Hazeltine 
Corporation of Little Neck, New York built the Mark-i. 
Magnavox of Urbana, Illinois built the Mark II. The earliest' 
Acoubuoy sensors had three detection modes. The C-mode 
detected vehicles, an I-mode could detect the detonation of 
button bomblets and a B-mode could detect both. The I-mode 
could detect "personnel up to 438 yards and the C-mode 
acoubuoy could detect vehicles at distances up to 1,094 
yards. "52 
The range at which the Acouboy could report a 
detection was determined by the strength of the sensor power 
52 Staaveren, J. (1993). Interdiction in Southern Laos: , 
1960-1968. Washington D.C., ,GPO. p.267 
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source (battery) and the frequency assigned to the sensor. 
On average, the sensor transmission could travel up to 30 
miles depending on terrain. The sensors operated on 
frequency channels ranging from 162.5 megahertz (MHZ) to 
173.5 MHZ on a very high frequency band. Each type of sensor 
had thirty-one channels. Each channel was separated by 375-
MHZ between channels. Within each channel were 27 
identification codes that could be set before sensor 
emplacement. This allowed 837 individual sensors to be 
deployed at one time in a single oQerational zone without 
duplication. As deve·lopment of the sensors progressed a 
different number of channels were qiven to each sensor to 
prevent duplic~~ion. The Acoubuoys were then allocated 11 
channels, and the ADSIDs 12.53 
The Acoubuoy, was parachute delivered and would 
catch in the high jungle foliage with its acoustic sensors 
hanging down. The parachute was camouflaged and would 
typically become tangled high in the trees where it would 
hang well out of the line of sight of passers by. In one 
incident, the Infiltration Surveillance Center monitored a 
group of North Vietnamese soldiers that detected an acoubuoy 
hanging in the trees. The ISC anxious to learn the reaction 
of the soldiers rapidly took the tape to a Vietnamese 
translator. The transcript of the conversation was not of 
53 Ibid, p. 268. 
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how to defeat the sensor, but of a non-commissioned officer 
telling a private to climb the tree and get the parachute so 
his wife could make clothes out of it. 
b) ADSID 
Seismic sensors used geophones to detect 
the vertical vibrations in the ground made by a person or 
vehicle. The Air-Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector 
(ADSID) was the most common sensor of this type. The Sandia 
Corporation produced the ADSID device. It could be dropped 
by aircraft traveling at speeds exceeding 500 mph. The 
device was dropped without a parachute and was thrown from 
an aircraft in a fashion similar to a lawn dart. The sensor 
then used "an aerodynamic brake to slow it. As it entered 
the ground, the device separated into two parts-the nose 
buried itself far into the ground~ while the tail remained 
at the surface, exposing only a green antenna which 
resembled a jungle plant. "54 Major General John Dean, a 
subsequent director of the DCPG commented that "in our test 
area in Panama I failed to see the antenna until it was 
pointed out to me." 55 Like most of the sensors, the ADSID 
54 Dickson, P. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p. 84. 
55 Weiss, G. (1971~ March 1). SEA Sensor Fields: More Eyes 
and Ears. Armed Forces Journal. p. 38. 
t 
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could be emplaced by hand if desired. This would improve the 
accuracy of emplacement but qenerally was not practicable. 
Given the weight of an ADSID of approximately 25 pounds 
each, the number required and enemy control over the areas, 
this was rarely done. 
The ADSID was uniqpe in a number of ways. First, it 
was reported to be the most durable of all the sensors and 
contained a self-destruct mechanism that would destroy the 
internal components of the device if opened. This was 
designed to prevent an enemy from g~ininq access to the 
technology or spoofing the sensor. The "ADSID could also be 
instructed by remote control to l2iCk up either men or 
vehicles."56 However, the ADSID had a much shorter range 
than the Acouboy. It could detect personnel within 33 yards 
and vehicles at 109 yards. 
One significant factor, which affected the use of 
sensors, was their batteries. The sensors empioyed by the 
electronic fence started at over $2 L OOO a. piece. The initial 
batteries used were a NiCad type that lasted approximately 
two weeks. Since the sensors were a one shot item and 1600 
were deployed per month, the introduction of a longer life 
battery was needed. This led to the development and use of 
lithium batteries, which varied in life from one to two 
56 Weiss, G. (1971, March 1). SEA Sensor Fields: More Eyes 
and Ears. Armed Forces Journal. p. 38. 
months. These innovations resulted in the unit price of 
sensors rapidly decreasing. "A 1967 Acoustic Directional 
Seismic Intrusion Detector (ADSID) cost $2,145 but that 
price had dropped to $975 by 1970. This drop, added to 
improved batteries for longer life and greater efficiency in 
placing them, netted a reduction in cost-per-sensor-per-day 
from $100 in 1967 to less than $15 three years later."57 
c) HELOSID 
The Helicopter Seismic Intrusion Device (HELOSID) 
was made by the Texas Instruments Company. The HELOSID was 
intended for delivery by helicopter. It was almost identical 
to the ADSID except that it was designed to be launched from 
a special pod attached to a CH-3 Jolly Green.Giant and had a 
battery life of 60 days.58 
The CH-3 and HELOSIDs were initially used in 
support of sensor' operations at Khe Sanh. The helicopters 
were configured with a pod that would shoot HELOSIDs while 
the pilot maintained a hover over the desired location. The 
plan was to orbit the location after deploying a sensor to 
receive verification by radio from the ISC that the sensor 
was in operation. More often than not, the sensor did not 
work. It either became embedded too deeply in the ground or 
57 Ibid, p. 84. 
58 Staaveren# J. (1993). Interdiction in Southern Laos: 
1960-1968. Washington D.C., GPO. p.268 
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was destroyed on impact. One enterprising pilot during the 
battle for Khe Sanh found that these same sensors would work 
if they were tossed out the side of the helicopter while at 
a hover. 59 
The Magnetic Intrusion Detector lMAGID) reacted to 
any metal such as a rifle or a truck. "The MAGID was almost 
always attached to a small seismic intrusion detector called 
the MINISID and wired in such a way that both seismic and 
magnetic activation were needed to send out notice of a 
target. "60 
e) EMID 
The Electromagnetic Intrusion Detector (EMID) is a 
sensor that generated a radio frequency (RF) field around" 
itself. If the field was disturbed by an intruder, the 
disturbance would cause a shift upward and downward in the 
RF field. This shift would trigger a detection and report 
the intruder. 
59 Nalty, B. (1986). Air power and the Fight for Khe Sanh. 
Washington D.C., GPO. p. 92. 
60 Dickson, P. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p. 40 
f) PIRID 
The Passive Infrared Intrusion Detector (PIRID) 
was the most complex of all the sensors and "was intended to 
sense fine temperature chanqes in its field of view allowing 
it to count the warm bodies passing by. "61 While it 
functioned fine in testing it was a dismal failure in the 
field. One reason for the failure was a tendency to attract 
insects that cauaed iLto malfunction. 
g) TORDSID 
Perhaps the most covert of all sensors was the 
TURDSID, which as its name suggested was designed to look 
like the excrement of a dog.. It was a small contact sensor 
about the size of a finger that would cue a larger sensor 
nearby. However, when the DCPG learned that there were no 
dogs running wild along the He Chi Minh trail, it was 
reconfigured to look like a small piece of wood. 
h) MINISID 
The Mini-Seismic Intrusion Detector (MINISID), was 
made by RCA Corporation. It was one of three sensors 
specifically desigped to be carried and emflaced by hand. 
The other sensors were the MICROSID which was smaller and 
even smaller still was the PSID. The MINISID was developed 
to count personnel and provide their location. It's value 
61 Ibid, p. 40. 
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was double that of many sensors because it could operate as 
a stand-alone sensor or be combined with different sensors 
to add a seismic detection capability. 
i) MICROSID 
The MICRO Seismic Intrusion Detector was 
made by Texas Instruments. It was a recoverable sensor, 
typically placed along a road or trail. Each MICROSID had 
its own identifying code so that activity could be 
pinpointed in. relation to each sensor. The MICROSID was 
designed to detect seismic disturbances to determine the 
number of dismounted troops that passed it as well as their 
direction of movement. 
j) PSID 
The Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector 
(PSID) was very popular because it was designed for the 
average infantry unit. The PSID was small enough that it 
could be carried in an ammo pouch on a soldier's combat 
harness. Each PSID consist~d of a 5-unit set. These could be 
emplaced by hand by a small patrol for ambush operations or 
perimeter security and later recovered. It had a small plug 
that was part of a larger sensor. The plug (geophone) would 
be forced into the ground and upon detecting footsteps would 
transmit a series of beeps. It had a detection range of 
approximately 500 meters. These small "soldier sensors" 
51 
averaged between $280 to $320 and were the cheapest of all 
the sensors. It was produced by Dorsett Electronics of Tulsa 
Oklahoma. 
2. Combined Sensors 
The last category was combined sensors. The combination 
of multiple sensors was made for two reasons. First, it 
enhanced the capabilities of the individual sensor to detect 
multiple types of targets in different ways. Second, the 
combination of sensors was an attempt to limit the number of 
false detections. By requiring the sensor to detect the same 
target in mUltiple ways before transmitting a "hit," the 
chances of a false report were reduced. MINISIDS were used 
in this way ang were usually attached to a MAGID .. The 
combination required a both a magnetic and seismic detection 
before reporting. Yet, another was the ACOUSID, Acoustic-
Seismic Intrusion Detector. 
3. False Activations 
Sensitivity of the sensors to activity other than 
infiltration was a major problem for the DCPG. The initial 
tests of the sensors were conducted in Panama with the 
intent of replicating. the conditions to be found in Vietnam 
and Laos. The anti-vehicle sensors performed well during the 
initial tests in Panama but the environment in Laos proved 
much different. The presence of frogs, animals and thunder 
caused a sensor activation rate three to four times higher 
than in Panama. This led to "491,814 ADSID activations and 
125,649 acoustic acoubuoy activations" during the initial 
deployment of sensors. 62 As the analysts at the ISC became 
more experienced in the use of these sensors, they rapidly 
learned to differentiate between the enemy vehicles and the 
environment. An aid in this was the employment of combined 
sensors, which required the detection of multiple types of 
emissions before reporting. 
E. ANALYSIS 
In Vietnam, sensors were designed not to provide a 
capability but to fill a requirement. Sensors became a 
substitute for ground troops. Information from the sensors 
provided a precise location and description of the enemy 
over hundreds of s~are miles. This timely, and accurate 
information enabled small, mobile reaction forces to respond 
to the site of a detection. The performance of sensors 
demonstrates how a small military force such as the air 
force in Laos or the Marines at Khe Sanh when equipped with 
information from sensors can have a positive and 
disproportionate effect on the battlefield. However, the use 
of sensors in Vietnam did not achieve the success necessary 
to justify its cost. This was largely because the proponents 
of the sensors overestimated the pace at which technology 
62 Ibid, p. 282. 
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would develop enabling greater performance at a cheaper 
cost. As a result, Vietnam serves as a treasure trove of 
lessons about tactics, sensors and precision engagement. 
These lessons are relevant today as the US military prepares 
a force that depends on the ability to gain information 
superiority and ~recision enqaqement to achieve success. 
As previously noted Precision Engagement has five 
component parts: Targeting, Command and Control (C2), the 
ability to achieve a desired effect, the ability to assess 
the level of effectiveness achieved (BDAl and the ability to 
re-engage when required. In order to achieve these 
requirements, the unattended ground sensors had to fulfill a 
number of criteria. (See Figure 2.1) 
SENSORS 





Figure 2.1 Sensor Criteria for Precision Engagement 
1. Targeting 
For targeting, ground sensors had to be delivered 
54 
to a location where they could sense the target. Second, the 
sensors had to be covert to prevent the enemy from 
destroying them or innovating around them. Third, the 
sensors had to be capable of discriminating between a 
variety of targets. 
a) Delivery 
The initial aircraft used for air delivery of the 
sensors was the OP-2E aircraft. This was a Navy aircraft 
produced by Lockheed. It was conventionally powered and 
later retrofitted with auxiliary jets. The Jasons planned to 
use sixty-two of these aircraft for sowing sensors in order 
to ensure that 800 sensors would be operating at anyone 
time. The OP-2E regularly operated in coniunction with a 
small aircraft to provide forward air control ofofighter-
bombers for suppression of enemy air defenses. One of the 
major difficulties with this delivery platform was poor 
accuracy. During the initial staqes of Igloo White, the 
aircrews relied on a bombsight consisting of a cross, made 
with a grease pencil. The cross was drawn on the Plexiglas 
of the bow and sensors were dropped using a form of Kentucky 
windage. The accuracy of this method resulted in sensors 
landing as far away as 900 yards from their intended target. 
The air force eventually acquired a number of Norden 
Bombsights, which greatly increased their accuracy. 
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Helicopters were also used for sensor delivery. The Air 
Force used the Sikorsky CH-3 helicopter to deliver sensors. 
The CH-3s were not just intended for air delivery of 
sensors. The CH-3s were also used for the transport of US 
Army Special Forces teams on sensor operations. The teams 
were called Prairie Fire Spike Teams. Each team consisted of 
seven to nine men, three Americans, the rest South 
Vietnamese. These teams implanted sensors l conducted battle 
damage assessment of B-52 air strikes and pinpointed 
critical targets. 63 
The final platform used for delivery of sensors 
was the F-4 Phantom. Although initially conceived as a 
fighter-bomber, it later became ~he aircraft of choice for 
sensor delivery. The Phantom was equipped with an SUU-42 pod 
that could be mounted underneath its wings. The pod 
contained 16 seismic sensors that could be deployed in a 
string formation. The F-4 was successful not only because it 
could deliver sensors, but because it could survive enemy 
anti-aircraft fire. The F-4 could fly low and fast over the 
sensor target during delivery without great vulnerability to 
enemy f~ak. 
In addition to the method of delivery, the 
location that sensors were delivered to was also important. 
63 Staaveren, J. (1993). Interdiction in Southern Laos: 
1960-1968. Washingt~n D.C., GPO. P1 270 and 283. 
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In Laos, the Laotian Government was willing to allow an 
electronic fence instead of actual troops on the ground. In 
effect, it did not view a technological substitute as a 
violation of its sovereign territory. Although bombing was 
conducted in conjunction with the sensors, it appears that 
the Laotian Government viewed the sensors much the same way 
that others view surveillance aircraft. While American U-2 
spy planes were shot down over China and the USSR during the 
1950s and 1960s, their use did not precipitate a war.64 One 
of the values of sensors may be the perception that they do 
not represent a hostile intent. 
b) Secrecy 
All of the sensors were designed to be covert. 
Most were painted to blend in with their surroundings and 
were m.a..da as.. sma J J as... 'WaS-. cas-t- effect; va ~ minimize their 
visual signature. In other cases, the imagination of the 
DCPG led them to design sensors that would replicate their 
surroundings. -Some sensors were even equipped with self-
destruct devices that would destroy the mechanical workings 
of the sensor if opened. This was an attempt to deny the 
enemy access to sensor technology. It was also an attempt to 
prevent the enemy from devising counter-measures for 
64 Schelling, T. (1995). The Role of Nuclear Weapons. In 
Derington, L., Mazarr, M. (Eds.) (1995). Turning Point: The 
, Gulf War and US Military Strategy. Boulder, Westview Press. 
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innovating around the sensors. This was referred to as 
spoofing. Air Force officers assumed that if the 
infiltrators knew where the sensors were located that they 
would detonate explosives during an air attack to make the 
pilots think that they had hit their targets. In one known 
example, the DCPG developed ravioli sized mines known as 
Gravel to channel the movement of the North Vietnamese 
soldiers toward the sensors. The NV forces employed oxen 
dragging logs through critical areas defeating the Gravel 
but at great expense to the oxen. 
While there are other examples available, the 
evidence does not indicate that the North Vietnamese were 
successful at defeating the sensors. Some of the evidence 
to support this came from the sensors themselves~ Three 
specific cases occurred in which the acoustic sensors 
recorded their interactions with the North Vietnamese. In a 
case already mentioned, the Vietnamese wanted to get hold of 
the delivery parachute to make clothes out of it. In 
another, the Vietnamese could be heard cutting down the tree 
which the sensor was in. The cutting sound was followed by a 
loud crack and screaming. The analysts believe that when the 
tree was cut, it fell on the North Vietnamese. The last case 
was on in which the ISC could actually hear a sensor, being 
urinated on. 
S8 
While the use of covert sensors was successful, it 
had an unintended conseqpence. The covert nature of the 
sensors reduced any deterrent value that they might have 
had. The employment of covert sensors created an empty 
battlefield where there were no soldiers, and the only 
evidence of the US military was a battlefield upholstered 
with sensors. If the North Vietnamese were looking for 
soldiers or tanks L and all they saw was a clear avenue of 
approach for infiltration, this may have actually encouraged 
them to continue their activities 
c) Discrimination 
Discrimination of targets was enabled by a variety 
of sensor types. These "types ranged" from seismic, infrared, 
electro-magnetic L magnetic L pressure L to acoustic. Many 
sensors often employed more than one type of capability. 
This allowed for "discrimination between tanks, trucks, and 
personnel. A combination of sensings also reduced the 
possibility that a sensing was a false activation caused by 
the weather, terrain (underground seismic activity) or 
animals. 
The sensors were very successful in discriminating 
between vehicles and humans but not between combatants and 
civilians. Thus they were most useful in a demilitarized 
zone or an area of intense fighting. The sensor technology 
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advanced to the point where it could identify a soldier 
through magnetic sensors. The maqnetic sensor would detect 
the metal in the soLdier's weapon and report the soldier as 
a combatant. However, the same sensor would also report 
"combatant" if a little girl carrying a metal pail or an old 
man carrying a metal shovel to his farm passed by the 
sensor. Likewise, a seismic detector would also report 
combatant if it detected the vertical motion in the earth 
created by a soldier, old man, or child walking by. This 
danger was widely recoqnized by the sensor o2erators and led 
to the use of Rules of Engagement (ROE). 
The Rules of Engagement were different in each 
area of operation. In the area around Khe Sanh where the 
Marines were under constant attack L any sensor activation 
could be engaged. In Laos, there was a mix of combatants 
and non-combatants. This dictated that a sensor activation 
could only be fired upon if the target was outside of a 
civilian area and only after the tarqet had been verified 
visually by a forward air control aircraft or ground 
reconnaissance team. While many sensor activations were 
undoubtedly enemy formations, they were not acted upon 
because they did not satisfy the rules of engagement. The 
danger was that If a sensor was linked directly to a weapon 
system, without rules governing the use of force, it might 
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result in an atrocity that would rival My Lai. 65 This 
demonstrates that although the rules of engagement were 
inefficient in one respect, the inability of the sensor to 
discriminate between combatants and civilians required it. 
2. Command and Control 
Command and Control (C2) is the ability to manage 
a diverse amount of forces and resources to accomplish a 
particular mission. Central to successful C2 is the ability 
to disseminate information about the enemy. 
a) Dissemination 
In defensive operations at Khe Sanh, the marines 
were quickly trained to use a remote sensor monitor. This 
enabled the Marines to monitor the battlefield without 
significant augmentation of their intelligence center. It 
also provided the Marine Commander with up-to-the-minute 
information from the sensors for targeting without placing 
ground reconnaissance forces and aircraft in harms way. 
Sensors provided the Marine Commander the ability to 
visualize the battlefield using information as opposed to 
intelligence. While Niagara l's satellite and aerial photo 
interpreters could not keep 2ace with intelligence, the 
sensors bridged the information gap needed to seize the 
65 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (1974). 
World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook 1974. 
Cambridge, The MIT Press. 
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initiative. This enabled the Marine Commander to employ 
joint firepower to disrupt attacks and prevent casualties to 
his own force. As already noted, the Marine Regiment's 
Intelligence officer said "the words harassment and 
interdiction were stricken from the 3rd Marine Division's 
vocabulary. "66 With greater precision L the need for firing 
into the blind in hopes of hitting the enemy disappeared. 
In the offense~ sensors allowed the battlefield to 
be operated by remote. The Intelligence Surveillance Center 
could monitor the actions of the enemy.from hundreds of 
miles away. The information was then displayed on computer 
screens. However, the inability of the sensors to process 
their own information required two supercomputers. The use 
of these computers resulted in a great increase in the 
number of personnel required to operate and maintain them. 
Each supercomputer had approximately four disk units, five 
magnetic tape units, a high-speed card read punch, and at 
least two teleprocess'ing typewriter terminals. It had a 360 
processor and a 265K storage capability. 
CurrentlYt the technology exists enabling sensors 
to be equipped with this technology eliminating much of the 
need for the computers. However t even without this 
capability, computer technology has progressed to the point 
66 Nalty, B. (1986). Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh. 
Washington D.C., GPO. p. 95. 
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that one personal computer today could replace one of the 
IBM 360 supercomputers. In effect, the personnel required to 
manage the information could be reduced from 400 to a 
handful. Additionally, the tens-of-thousands of square feet 
of office space required for the ISC would not be necessary. 
However, it is important to note that while the ISC was 
necessary, it was successful in conducting the war remotely 
from outside of the country in which the war was taking 
place. 
3. Effect 
The ability to achieve a desired effect against a 
target is not restricted to the sensor itself. It 
encompasses accurate targeting, the size and type of force 
allocated to the mission and the type and quantity of 
munitions expended against a target. In order to facilitate 
these requirements, various types of sensor data must be 
fused together to provide a complete picture of the target 
and the battlefield. 
a) Fusion 
The use of ground sensor data was most effective 
when it was fused together with optical images obtained from 
air and space sensors. The enemy was detected using multiple 
types of ground sensings to determine their location, number 
and direction of movement. The sensin~s discriminated 
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between the types of targets detected. These detections were 
often compared with air and space surveillance photos to 
develop a complete picture of the battlefield. While the 
targets could be attacked based on ground sensor information 
alone, the combination of optical images and sensor 
information enabled commanders to visualize the actions of 
the enemy while gaining a better understanding of the 
enemy's intent. 
The use of sensors at Khe Sanh is a case in point. 
The combination of an optical image combined with up-to-the-
minute ground sensings enabled the Marine commander to 
visualize not only where the enemy was but also where the 
enemy intended .. to move. As the commander monitored the 
sensor activations, this information was compared with old 
aerial photos that showed previous NV artillery 
emplacements. This combination enabled the commander to 
determine that these emplacements were being re-occupied. 
4. Bomb Damage Assessment 
BDA is the ability to assess the level of effectiveness 
of an airstrike or attack by determining if a bomb or 
munition had hit its target L and if hit what effect that had 
achieved. Various methods have been employed to assess bomb 
, 
damage. The ultimate goal is to get the tar~et to tell you 
if it is alive or dead. This is done by observing its 
actions or signature relative to a functioning target or 
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previous observation of the same target. This is best 
described as interroqating the target. 
a) Interrogation 
Vietnam is a mixed lesson in the ability to 
interrogate a target. The US Air Force attempted to use 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to assess incremental 
damage against the enemy. This resulted in a loss of 
credibility for much of the BDA process. While sensors had 
progressed considerably, the technology was not available to 
detect the emissions of individual vehicles, detect radio 
transmissions or take optical images from the sensors. 
However, the sensors could continue to detect vehicle and 
personnel movement (if they were not killed) and could 
continue to listen in on activity in the target area. This 
assisted in conducting BDA but it was not a complete 
solution. 
5. Re-engage 
After assessing the effect of munitions against a 
target, the assessor will invariably conclude that some have 
escaped destruction or have sustained damage, which allows 
them to continue operating. This necessitates the ability to 
reengage a target when required. Central to this requirement 
is the endurance of a particular sensor. If it can operate 
24 hours a day every day, then it can support targeting, 
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command and control, and BDA for a second strike against the 
same target. 
a) Endurance 
Ground sensors were capable of providing 24-hour 
coverage of the battlefield. As many as 800 sensors per 
month were airdropped along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The large 
quantity of sensors was required due to the short life span 
of the batteries., The battery life of the sensors was also 
the most significant component driving their cost. The 
sensors were a single use technology. The earliest sensors 
had a life of approximately two weeks at a cost of $2100 
each. By the end of the conflict L the life span of sensor 
batteries had increased to two months. This reduced the cost 
of the operations L enabled greater coverage of the 
battlefield, and reduced the number of times that aircrews 
and ground teams would be placed in harm's way in order to 
deliver the sensors. 
III. SINAI 
If a little knowledge is dangerous, 
where is the man to have so much to be out of danger 
-Thomas Henry Huxley 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A study of the Sinai demonstrates the value of sensors 
in promoting peace. While sensors in Vietnam were used by 
military forces for precision en~a~ement, sensors in the 
Sinai were used by the US State Department for peacekeeping. 
Many of the same lessons learned from Vietnam are also 
present in the Sinai, corroborating the value and relevance 
of those previously learned lessons. While the Sinai did not 
return to open warfare, the sensors did provide precise 
locations of activity within the confines of the 
Disengagement Agreement. While the current military concept 
of sensors and Precision Engagement focuses on attacking and 
destroying targets, this case study demonstrates their use 
in ~litary Qperations other than War. 
B. BACKGROUND 
At the end of the Yom Kippur Wart the Israelis and 
Egyptians found themselves with military forces on both 
sides of the Suez Canal. The Iaraeli forces held a 
commanding position on the main road leading to Cairo. The 
I 
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Egyptian Sixth Army was trapped behind these forces in the 
Sinai and all of their logistical lines had been cut. This 
hastened the desire of the Egyptians to reach an agreement 
in order to prevent the slow starvation of their Sixth Army. 
While the Israelis were in a better position to negotiate, 
they required a force of 100 L OOO men to maintain their 
military position in Egypt and the Sinai. These forces 
consisted primarily of reservists called up on short notice. 
The inability to return these men to their civilian jobs and 
the cost of supporting them caused the Israeli GNP to drop 
to 70% of its pre-war level. Added to this was the Israeli 
concern for soldiers being held as prisoners of war in 
Egypt. With these concerns, neither side could hold out for 
long. 
Henry Kissinger L the US Secretary of State successfully 
mediated a cease-fire through "shuttle diplomacy." Kissinger 
had written what was considered to be a vaguely worded cease 
fire agreement which both sides had agreed to sign. The 
agreement was intentionally left vague to sidestep problems 
and allow incremental steps toward peace. This agreement led 
to negotiations at kilometer 101 on the Suez road which were 
designed to "fill in some of the blanks" of the Kissinger 
sponsored cease-fire. 67 After four days of UN supported 
67 Associated Press. (November 26, 1973). Settlement on the 
Suez Road. Newsweek. p. 44. 
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talks, Israeli Major General Yariv and Egyptian Lieutenant 
General Gamazy signed the "Six Point Agreement" on November 
14, 1973. The agreement formalized the cease-fire, resulted 
in the exchange of POWs L and authorized the use of UN 
peacekeepers to monitor the movement of non-military 
Egyptian supplies to the Sixth Army. This agreement was the 
first of four agreements that would pave the way to peace in 
the Sinai between Israel and E~t. It is commonly referred 
to as the "Kilometer 101 Agreement" because of the location 
of the initial peace talks. 68 This marked the first time in 
25 years that direct talks were conducted between Israeli 
and Arab officials. Afterwards~ Israeli Defense Minister 
Moshe Dayan said "At last, we have arranged things by 
talking like human beings". 69 
1~ The Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement 
The Six Point Agreement lacked the ability to provide 
for long term stability and peace. between Israel and Egypt. 
Israeli and Egyptian Forces were still located on both sides 
of the Suez Canal and all movements of supplies required 
inspection and approval by UN observers. Despite the cease-
fire agreement, small-scale engagements continued to be 
fought west of the Canal. The Egyptian government feared 
68 Borchgrave, A. (November 26, 1973) Kilometer 101-Inside 
the Tent. Newsweek. p. 47. 
69 Ibid, p. 44. 
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that the Israelis would continue their advance on Cairo and 
sought to disruQt Israeli QreQarations. In the two months 
between the cease-fire and the first disengagement 
agreement, 452 skirmishes occurred west of the canal. 
Given the desire to achieve a buffer zone to prevent 
further attacks, the Israelis and Egyptians entered into the 
Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement on January 18, 1974. 
The terms of the agreement resulted in the withdrawal of the 
Israeli forces to the high ground of the Giddi and Mltla" 
passes in the Sinai. The Israelis were willing to make this 
concession because the passes were the strategic high 
ground. In 1973, there were few trafficable routes through 
the Sinai Peninsula. There was a.paved road along the 
northe.rn.co.a.at bl.lL this... route was. c.onsidered to be 
vulnerable militarily. In the center were two large roads 
through the Giddi Pass in the north and the Mitla Pass in 
the south. There were a few trails but they would not 
support a large-scale military oQeration and many were 
channeled into either the Giddi or Mitla Passes. To the 
south was a barren and unQopulated territory, which was a 
"sea of sand" and was not passable by vehicle. These 
geographical constraints made the two Qasses the center of 
gravity controling all military actions in the Sinai. 
With the signinq of the aqreement , the Israeli forces 
withdrew to the passes in a zone approximately 20 kilometers 
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east of the Suez Canal. The Egyptians in turn withdrew the 
Sixth Army west across the canal. A United Nations Emergency 
Force was created and positioned in a buffer zone 
approximately 10 kilometers wide and 165 kilometers long 
between the Israeli and Egyptian positions. On either side 
of the buffer zone were zones in which tYQe and number of 
forces and weapons each side could garrison were li~ited. 
2. The Sinai Interim Agreement 
This agreement was part of Kissinger's, step by step 
approach to achieve a diplomatic solution. The Sinai Interim 
Agreement was the third of four and was chiefly concerned 
with the l:at.u..l::n- o£ the. G; dd; and M; tl a E.as...ses. President 
Sadat wanted the Israelis to withdraw east of the passes. He 
feared that Israel miqht continue it's advance o~ Cairo and 
wanted to regain the strategic high ground in the Sinai~ A 
second issue- was the return o£ the.. Ahll-. Rude~ sand Ras Sudr 
oil fields that Israel had captured during the war. These 
resources were a significant source of income, especially to 
a country that had been soundly defeated in war. President 
Sadat wanted the negotiations for the passes and oil fields 
to be treated as a military disengagement as opposed to a 
political agreement. Sadat feared that any political 
agreement with the Israelis might be perceived as a 
softening of E~t's position toward Israel. 
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The Israeli Government had other ideas. The first was 
to divide the Arab coalition Qolitically to ~revent fighting 
another war against a unified Arab front. Also at issue was 
the maintenance of strategic de2th for early warning of 
another Arab attack. Prime Minister Rabin wanted Sadat to 
renounce the current state of belligerency in order to 
divide Egypt from her allies. This necessitated that any 
agreement have strong 20litical overtones. Israel had 
suffered not only militarily at the hands of the Arabs but 
economically as well. Israel was still reeling from an 
economic boycott by the Arab coalition. The separation of 
Egypt from her allies might lead to an end of the embargo 
between Israel and Egypt. 
The second idea was Israel's refusal to relinquish its 
electronic monitoring station at the western end of the 
Giddi Pass. Israel felt that this intelligence station was 
essential. The distance between Cairo and Tel Aviv was short 
and any settlement necessitated that Israel have early 
warning. This would enable Israel to mobilize it's military 
which consisted 2rimarily of reservists. Finally, Prime 
Mlnister Rabin refused to relinquish control of the oil 
fields to the Egyptians. The oil fields sUPI?lied Israel with 
approximately 50% of her oil needs and the Arab economic 
blockade made this resource a national security issue. This 
particular issue was resolved through the assistance of the 
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Shah of Iran. On February 18, 1975, the Shah stated that he 
would be willing to sell oil to Israel in exchange for the 
return of the Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudr oil fields to Egypt. 
This left the issues of early warning and political 
settlements at the forefront. 
President Sadat pro12osed that a solution might be 
achieved by stationing American military forces in the 
Sinai. This was not the first time that this had been 
proposed. However, Secretary of State Kissinger was opposed 
to the idea. The American 12eople had recently witnessed the 
fall of Saigon on television and the idea of placing troops 
into action so soon was politically impossible. Israeli 
Defense Minister Peres sought to modify this proposal by 
suggesting that American civilians monitor the Sinai from an 
electronic monitoring station. As the negotiations 
continued, the Egyptians consented to this idea but 
stipulated that if Israel had a monitoring station in 
addition to the American p~eserice, then Egypt must have one 
as well. Although Kissinger was averse to placing Americans 
in the Sinai as a buffer L it eventually percolated to the 
top as the one solution that both parties would accept. 
The Sinai Interim Agreement was finally signed on 
September 4, 1975. The American presence took the form of 
US military overfliqhts for surveillance and the monitoring 
of ground sensors by American civilians in the buffer zone. 
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The surveillance flights and the civilian monitoring were 
considered separate and distinct. However, both fell under 
the umbrella of the newly created Sinai Support ~ssion 
(SSM). The SSM was an interagency head~arters that reported 
to the US National Security Council on all matters related 
to support of the Sinai Interim Agreement. Underneath the 
SSM was the Sinai Field Mission (SFM). The SFM was .the 
action arm of the Sinai SU220rt Mission and concerned itself 
strictly with the emplacement of early warning sensors in 
the Sinai and their monitoring by American civilians. 
3. Camp David Accord 
In 1979, the Camp David Accord was signed between Egypt 
and Israel. This agreement led to a phased withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from the Sinai. The withdrawal st~rted in 
April of 1979 and was completed by April 1982. The buffer 
zone remained intact, as well as the limited force zones 
with three zones for the Egyptians and one for the Israelis. 
The Israelis were also allowed to maintain four electronic 
monitoring stations as part of the agreement. The charter of 
the Sinai Field ~ssion was changed marking a transition to 
on-site inspections of areas formerly held by the Israelis 
and low level aerial surveillance flights by US aircraft. 
The sensor fields and monitoring of the Giddi and ~tla 
Passes officially shut down on January 25, 1980. Further 
monitoring of the passes was deemed unnecessary as "the 
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parties had developed a sufficient amount of confidence that 
such an elaborate system was not needed." 70 
C. TACTICS 
The tactics of using sensors in the Sinai were 
defensive and linear and were intended to provide tactical 
early warning of an attack by either the Israelis or 
Egyptians. Sensor monitoring was tactical because once a 
sensor field was activated by an intruder at one end of a 
pass, "it would not take a vehicle more than one-half hour 
to transit" to the other end. 71 The purpose was to support 
the peace process thr.ough a civilian US presence and 
monitoring of the Giddi and Mitla passes. Monitoring of the 
.' 
passes would provide for control of a small, key geographic' 
area that would produce a stabilizing effect over the entire 
region. The monitoring of sensor fields by American 
civilians would also provide an obiective third party, which 
would monitor the Sinai for violations, referee disputes, 
and enable the .partitioning of belligerents. The method was 
to increase the amount of timely and accurate information 
available to both sides. The information necessary to do 
70. Vannoni, M. (1998). Sensors in the Sinai, 1976-1980. 
Sandia National Labs, New Mexico. Section 3, p. 4. 
71 Peyer, R. (AprilL 1978}. Between Egypt and Israel: The 
Establishment of the US Sinai Field Mission. p. 18. 
Unpublished paper obtained from the C. William Kontos 
Collection, Gerald R. Ford library, National Archives. 
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this would come from activations of unattended ground 
sensors placed along roads and the open expanses surrounding 
the Giddi and Mitla Passes. If sensors detected unauthorized 
activity, a report would immediately be made to the 
Egyptians and Israelis as well as the US National Security 
Council. American civilians would immediately investigate 
any violation. The intended endstate was to prevent minor 
incidents or misperceptions from escalating to open 
conflict. This would enable both parties to build confidence 
and trust, enabling further peace efforts. 
The organization established a small headquarters in 
Washington D.C. led by a representative of the President of 
the United States and staffed by State Department Officers. 
This organization was titled the Sinai Support Mission (See 
Figure- 3.1). Underneath the SSM came its field-operating 
agency responsible for the construction and day to day 
monitoring of the sensors. This- ~ield agency was named the 
Sinai Field Mission (See Figure 3.2). 
1. Sinai Support ~ssion 
The US Sinai Support Mission (SSM) was established on 
January 13, 1976 under the provisions of Executive order 
11896. The specifics of the Sinai Support Mission were 
derived from a memorandum written by Henry Kissinger. At the 
time, there was great concern over the mission timeline 
because there were less than five months between the signing 
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of the Sinai Interim Agreement and the time at which 
monitoring had to be in place. The sensors had to be in 
operation by February 22, 1976, the date set for the 
turnover of Israeli occupied lands to the United Nations 
force. Additional difficulties were expected because 
Kissinger had been opposed to usinq the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to conduct the monitoring. Since DOD was the 
only agency with the personnel and e~ipment on hand, this 
would be a tall order for another agency to fill. 
The SSM was quickly established under National Security 
Decision Memorandum 313. This established the basic 
organization of a director and a staff of 14 personnel from 
the Department of State and the US Agency for International 
Development. The director would report to the president 
through the National Security Council and would have an 
interagency board of advisors. Mr. C. William Kontos was 
chosen as the Director of the SSM. Director Kontos also 
served as the chairman of the Interagency Management Board. 
On the Board were represent.ati ves of the Department of 
Defense and State L US Agency for International Development, 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. This board was established under the 
executive order. It enabled Director Kontos to draw on a 
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large pool of experts to support the peace initiatives. 72 
Director Kontos also had the benefit of engineering and 
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Figure 3.1 
The U.S Congress approved the establishment of the SSM 
and SFM. They also stipulated that while members of the 
Department of Defense could not participate in the mission, 
they could assist with the initial setup and establishment 
of the sensor fields due to the time constraints. Congress 
directed that active duty military and intelligence 
personnel could not participate in the mission. However, 
those that had retired from the military or intelligence 
services before October 13~ 1975 could serve in the SFM. 
Qopgress also specified that the number of personnel 
72 US Congress, Senate. (April 13, 1977) United States Sinai 
Support Mission: Second Report to Congress. Washington D.C., 
GPO. p. 4. Obtained from the C. William Kontos Collection, 
Gerald R. Ford Library, National Archives. 
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assigned to the Sinai Field Mlssion would not exceed 200 
personnel. The use of a private contractor to establish and 
support the mission was authorized and an intent to contract 
was published in the Commerce Business Daily.73 
Additionally, sensors used by the field mission were 
available from the on-hand stocks of the Department of 
Defense. These initial stocks were sensors that had been 
developed for use in Vietnam. 
An interagency site survey team was sent to the Sinai 
on 2 December. "Nicholas G.W. Thorne~ a career Foreign 
Service Officer and retired Marine Corps officer led the 
team. He would later become the first director of the Sinai 
Field Mlssion. In three days, the team identified all 
technical and loqistical requirements to include locations 
of the base camp, four sensor fields, and watch stations." 
A request was made by the Israelis to move one of the sensor 
fields farther west on one of the routes but this was denied 
on the basis of the signed agreement. 
2. Sinai Field M1ssion 
The Sinai Field Mission (SFM) was the action arm of the 
Sinai Support Mlssion. It was responsible for carrying out 
all aspects of the electronic monitorinq. Within one month 
73 The text of the Intent to Contract can be found in Ford, 
G. , Kontos, C. (April 13, 1976) First Report to Congress: 
United States Sinai Support Mlssion. Obtained from the C. 
William Kontos Collection, Gerald ~. Ford Library, National 
Archives. 
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of the published intent to contract, six companies had 
submitted proposals. A selection committee chose the 
contract proposal submitted by E-Systems Inc. E-Systems was 
an international electronics and aerospace firm. The 
contract was signed on January 16, 1976. The company would 
provide the personnel and eqpipment minus the sensors to 
conduct the mission. These personnel would in turn report to 
a small cadre of State Department Foreiqn Service officers 
who would serve as the leadership of the SFM (Figure 3.2). 
Director 
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On January 20, 1976, the first installment of equipment 
and personnel arrived in Tel Aviv and construction of the 
site began on January 23, 1976. The four sensor fields 
required as part of the siqned aqreement were installed in 
four days. By February 19, 1976, the SFM was fully 
operational. This was achieved 28 days after the start of 
the construction and 3 days ahead of schedule. The SFM 
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officially began operating on February 22 in accordance with 
the Sinai Interim Agreement. 
While the SFM was fully operational, its facilities 
were temporary. This required that construction continue 
throughout the year. During one particular week in June 
1976, 240 personnel were in the Sinai to complete 
construction of the base camp. The number of personnel 
exceeded the congressional mandate; however, this was 
expected and authorized to insure a timely completion of the 
facilities. Once the permanent facilities were completed on 
July 4, 1976, the number of personnel required dropped to 
165 and remained relatively constant throughout the duration 
of the mission. While the congressional limit of 200 
personnel had been established based on the monitoring 
requirements of the sensors, the number could have been much 
lower. During the initial planning stages of the SEM, the 
Department of Defense argued that. "it was technically 
feasible to install the sensor fields and operate them 
remotely-without manning the watch stations-with 
substantially fewer than 200 personnel."74 This option was 
not chosen because Congress believed it was essential to 
maintain a US presence in the buffer zone. 
Other options relating to personnel were considered. 
One option involved the use of foreign nationals to operate 
74 Ibid, p. 12. 
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the watch stations. This option was shelved due to the 
difficulty of conducting background checks as well as 
Israeli insistence on Americans in the Sinai. The Israelis 
expressed a lack of confidence in both foreign nationals as 
well as some member nations of the UN. This issue would 
resurface in later years after the monitoring had been in 
place. The US Congress solicited alternative ideas to reduce 
costs and the American 2resence in the Sinai by using 
foreign nationals. The Egyptian and Israeli governments 
opposed this idea for three reasons. First L it would take a 
successful system, which had a unity of command under one 
nation and s2linter it under multi2le nations. Second, there 
were security and administrative difficulties involved in 
the import of foreign nationals into the SFM. This would 
require negotiations with multiple nations in order to 
mitigate these difficulties, making the entire program much 
more complex. Third, employing foreign nationals would alter 
an element of the original agreement, which could open the 
door for other changes. Both the Egyptians and Israelis 
believed that this could cause the original agreement to 
unravel. 75 
75 Carter, J., Kontos, C. (October 13, 1977). Fourth Report 
to Congress: The United States Sinai Support Mlssion. p. 11. 
Obtained from the C. William Kontos Collection, Gerald R. 
Ford library, National Archives. 
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central to the success of the SFM was the principle of 
"symmetry." In order for the SFM to be regarded by both the 
Israelis and Egyptians as fair and impartial, all actions by 
the SFM had to be evenhanded. If the SFM contracted for 
workers to take rest and recreation, half would go to Israel 
and half to E~t. When housing was contracted for families 
of State Department Foreign Service officers, half would 
live in either country. This principle of symmetry was 
carried out with respect to all possible issues ranging from 
logistics to notification procedures of violations. This 
enabled the SFM to maintain a maximum of credibility in all 
of its actions. 
a) Base Camp 
The Base Camp consisted of an eleven-acre 
compound that was located 3 miles north of the Giddi road. 
It was built on a 2,600-foot high plateau, which partially 
overlooked the west entrance to the Giddi pass. The nearest 
populated area was the city of Suez located fifty miles to 
the west-southwest. Cairo, Egypt was -155 miles northwest 
across the Suez Canal; Tel Aviv was 240 miles to the 
northeast. The camp was designed to be a self-contained 
community that would provide the full range of municipal 
services necessary for its personnel stationed in the Sinai. 
The initial base camp was temporary and relied on the use of 
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"Kelly closures," prefabricated steel and fiberglass panels 
for building construction. Within a year, the permanent base 
camp was constructed using prefabricated concrete modules 
shipped from the United States. The modules for the 
permanent camp were originally built for use as a Holiday 
Inn in Texas. The permanent base camp was capable of 
supporting all personnel and missions. Some temporary Kelly 
closures were retained for storage and administrative 
functions. 
b) Watch Stations 
Three watch stations were established in 
the Sinai, as called for in the orig~nal plan, with the base 
camp doubling as the fourth. The planned site for the base 
camp proved inadequate L however another was chosen out of 
sight of the west-end of the Giddi Pass. The speed at which 
the plan had to be accomplished and the limits on funding 
prevented a fourth station from being constructed. This 
meant that the sensor field aL thaweat ~ of the Giddi 
pass had to be monitored remotely. All other sensor fields 
had watch stations that allowed visual oversight of the 
activity within the field. Each of the stations were 
permanent, air-conditioned facilities which were enclosed by 
chain link fences. Within each station, there was always a 
minimum of two personnel on duty. Personnel within each of 
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the stations had a variety of optical and night vision 
devices for observation of the sensor fields. 
0) Sensor FieIdS 
The Mitla and Giddi Passes run in a 
generally east-west direction. They are located just south 
of the mid-line of the buffer zone. The two-lane road that 
runs through the Giddi Pass is approximately lS.S miles 
long. The two-lane road that runs through the Mitla Pass is 
18.6 miles long. A single road that is ten miles long 
connects the two passes. The total area under sensor 
surveillance was approximately 620 square miles. This was 
divided among four sensor fields. Two sensor fields were 
allocated to each pass .and within each field were a variety 
of different sensors. Sensors were employed in strings, 
which could be several thousand yards in length. Strings 
were placed across the passes and along the roads through 
the passes. Individual sensors within the strings could be 
positioned up to ten miles away from their associated watch 
station without the use of a radio relay. The relationship 
between the sensor fields and the watch stations they 
reported to were: 
"Mitla West Field-Mitla West Watch Station 
Mitla East Field-Mitla East Watch Station 
Giddi East Field-Giddi East Watch Station 
Giddi West Field-Mitla West Watch Station" 76 
76 Ford, G., Kontos, C. (April 30, 1976). First Report to 
Congress: The united States Sinai Support Mission. p. 30. 
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d) Communications 
The sensor early warning system in the Sinai had 
three major functions: "detection of movement through the 
Mltla and Giddi Passes~ identification of the vehicles or 
personnel involved in the movement, and reporting 
unauthorized movements." 77 Sensors accomplished the first 
two functions and the last function relied upon State 
Department-personnel and their communications. 
The SFM maintained extensive communications 
capabilities to facilitate the reporting requirements of 
Sinai violations as well as the conduct of day to day 
operations. At the outset~ notification of the Egyptians and 
Israelis was made by voice communications from the Sinai 
Field Mission to the Egygtian and Israeli watch stations in 
the Sinai. This was later changed to streamline 
communications~ with the SFM reporting directly to the 
Israeli Defense Forces in Jerusalem and the Ministry of War 
in Cairo. This modification was made by recommendation of 
all parties and the E-Systems contract was amended in the 
amount of $230~OOO to make it possible. 
Obtained from the C. William Kontos Collection, Gerald R. 
Ford library, National Archives 
77 Ford, G., Kontos, C. (January 11, 1977). Second Report to 
Congress: United States Sinai Support Mlssion. p. 11. 
Obtained from the C. William Kontos Collection, Gerald R. 
Ford Library, National Archives. 
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Teletypes were the primary method of 
communications used between the SFM, Israel and Egypt. This 
is because it provided a written record of communications 
and provided little opportunity for misinterpretation. These 
reports were prepared and signed by a Foreign Service 
Officer to ensure authenticity. Teletype messages were 
transmitted by radio and were not encrypted. A report of a 
violation could be sent to each party to the agreement 
within five minutes. An alternate system available to the 
SFM was a radio link to the international telephone system 
as well as a secure State Department communication system. 
The State Department communications were kept in a location 
separate from C?thers. They operated off a single side band 
teletypewriter. 
Communications between the sensors L watch stations 
and the base camp were different. When a sensor was 
activated, it would reqister within the adjacent watch 
station. The watch station personnel would then notify the 
base camp if the sensor activation was known or believed to 
be an illegal intrusion. The watch station would notify the 
base camp usinq a very hiqh frequency (VHF) radio message 
that would be followed up by a teletype message. This would 
. 
then be analyzed and the notification procedures for all 
parties would be initiated. 
&7 
e) W~oops 
United Nations Emergency Forces regularly 
operated in the limited force zones of the Sinai. "Armed 
strength within the buffer zone lwasl provided by 4,400 UN 
troops from Sweden, Ghana, Australia, Iran, Indonesia and 
Finland."78 These forces provided security at the road 
checkpoints into and out of the buffer zones and conducted 
patrols throughout the zones as well. While the UNEF forces 
operated in the Sinai, their activities were not conducted 
with close coordination or approval of the SFM. Instead, 
they were considered separate entities and the UNEF force 
did not interact with the SFM other than to notify them when 
they would be operating in an area monitored by sensors. 
Part of the reason for little coordination is because the US 
proposal for monitoring omitted any reference to the UN or 
UNEF forces. The only reference to the UNEF in the document 
was that violations detected by-tpe SFM would also be 
reported to the UNEF forces. The only exception to this rule 
was the Ghanaian Battalion. This unit provided local 
security patrols for the Sinai Field ~ssion. The battalion 
provided 27 soldiers as a guard force for the SFM base camp 
and other soldiers from the same battalion provided security 
at the three SFM watch stations. 
78 Kolcum, E. (August 23, 1976). New Sensors Evaluated in 
Sinai Buffer. Aviation Week and Space Technology p. 42. 
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f) Survei1.1.ance Stations 
Both Egypt and Israel maintained a surveillance 
station in the buffer zone as part of the Sinai Interim 
Agreement. The Egyptian station was located 7.5 miles east 
of the SFM base camp. The Israeli station was located five 
miles northwest of the base camp. Each station consisted of 
"an enclave of several buildings."79 The buildings were 
designed to support visual and electronic surveillance and 
were strictly defensive in nature. No more than 250 persons 
could be present at either station. These personnel were 
authorized to carry small arms for personal protection but 
all offensive weapons were prohibited. 
Within each enclave was a building for use by an 
SFM liaison officer. This officer was a State Department 
employee who was empowered to inspect and approve each 
vehicle~ person or item of equipment that entered either 
station. The liaison officer and the director of the SFM 
were the only personnel authorized to enter or inspect the 
surveillance stations. The.liaison officers conducted 
announced inspections and the director conducted unannounced 
inspections. United Nations Emergency Force personnel would 
escort Egyptian or Israeli convoys to their stations but 
79 Ford, G., Kontos, C. (April 30, 1976). First Report to 
Congress: The United States Sinai Support Mlssion. p. 26. 
Obtained from the C. William Kontos Collection, Gerald R. 
Ford library, National Archives 
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could not enter or inspect. The liaison officers maintained 
various methods of communications equipment which enabled 
voice and data exchange with the base camp. If a violation 
occurred and the base camp sent a report to a surveillance 
station, it was actually received by the liaison officer. 
The officer would then hand deliver the re~ort by hand to 
the commander of the surveillance station. 
g) Cost 
The funds for the Sinai Field Mission were 
drawn from Section 903 of the Middle East Special 
Requirements Fund of. the Foreign Assistance Act. The total 
cost of personnel, operations, training, maintenance and 
construction of the Sinai.Support Mission and the Sinai 
Field Mission was 92.7 million dollars. These funds were 
spent over the course of five years with the majority being 
for contracts with E-Systems. These contracts paid for the 
initial setup and constructions costs of the project as well 
as day to day 9perations. The least expensive costs were 
personnel wages~ trainingL and daily operations. The budget 
approved by congress called for approximately 25 million 
dollars for the initial site construction. Approximately 
ha~f of this amount was used for construction. Another 2 
million dollars was spent for sensors and monitoring 
equipment from the Department of Defense. The remainder of 
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the funds were used for wages, training and that year's 
daily o12erations. ApJ2roximately 12 million dollars was 
allocated in the following years for salaries and 
operations. The amount of funds allocated were not adjusted 
for inflation and were maintained at a fixed rate. 
D. TECHNOLOGY 
The initial design for the monitoring was to use 
sensors from Department of Defense stocks. These sensors had 
been combat proven in Vietnam and were on hand for use by 
the SFM. While there were numerous types available, only 
hand-emplaced sensors were used. The technology of the 
sensors allowed for remote long-range monitoring. However, 
the need to maintain an American presence in the buffer zone 
reduced the benefits of the remote monitoring capabilities. 
A compromise with the technology was achieved by connecting 
the monitoring of the individual sensor fields to their 
adjacent watch stations. Knowledqe that the sensors would 
be monitored by civilians who had little to no experience 
with sensors required that they be simEle to emplace, 
operate and monitor. All of the sensors had these qualities. 
Some QLthe Vietnam era sensors had self destruct devices 
that were designed to prevent an enemy from gaining access 
to the technology durinq war. This ca12ability was not 
necessary and these devices were dismantled before use in 
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the Sinai. Additionally, all of the sensors were 
unclassified and knowledge of the sensor technology could be 
shared with the Israelis and Egyptians. However, all parties 
considered knowledge of the sensors to be classified when 
speaking to parties outside of the agreement. 
1. Sensors 
A variety of sensors were used in the Sinai. Tne most 
common were seismic sensors because the sandy soil provided 
near ideal conditions for monitoring. Seismic sensors would 
often be combined with acoustic and magnetic sensors. Other 
types of sensors were "structural sensors." These were 
pressure sensitive cables, remote controlled video cameras 
and infrared beams. These were structural because they were 
mounted to tripods or buildings and were not mean~ to be 
camouflaged. Instead they were an overt method of monitoring 
activity in the Sinai and provided a visible deterrent to 
infiltrators. 
a) M7NISID-III 
There were seven types of sensors used in the 
Sinai. The most commonly used sensor was the ~ni Seismic 
Intrusion Detector MINISID-IIT. This sensor had initially 
been used in Vietnam and was an improved version of an 
earlier model. It was buried below the surface by hand. 
This sensor was powered by a battery that lasted 
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approximately one year. The nominal range of the seismic 
sensors was 300m for vehicles and 30m for people. However, 
the ideal soil conditions in the Sinai resulted in 
detections at SOOM for trucks and SOM for personnel. Sensor 
activations were transmitted to the adjacent watch station 
by radio. Seismic sensors were emQlaced in strings of three 
sensors each. This provided for redundancy and assisted in 
the identification of vehicles. The larger the vehicle the 
more sensors would activate not only near the road but 
farther away as· well. The MINISID-III was 19 centimeters 
long by 19 centimeters wide and 7.6 centimeters high. It 
weighed 4.1 kilograms. 
b) AAU 
Acoustic Sensors consisted of Acoustic Add-on 
Units (AAU) which could be combined with the MINISID-III. 
The microphone of the AAU was attached to an electronic unit 
by a three-meter long cable. The method of operation was for 
the seismic sensor to cue the acoustic sensor. If the 
MINISID activated three times within thirty seconds, the 
acoustic sensor would begin sensing for fifteen seconds . 
. This combination of sensing would assist the watch station 
officers in determining the source of the activation. If the 
source was an animal or low flying aircraft, the operator 
could listen in on the activity to assist in determining the 
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cause. The AAU could detect personnel at 30 meters and 
vehicles at up to 100 meters. Its dimensions were 25.2 
centimeters long by 7.6 centimeters in diameter. It weighed 
3.2 kilograms. 
c) MAGID 
The use of magnetic sensors in the Sinai was also 
in the form of add-on units, which would be combined with 
the MINISID-III. The magnetic add-on unit was called the 
Magnetic Intrusion Detector (MAGID). This sensor had a range 
of three to four meters for a person carryinq a rifle and 15 
to 20 meters for a truck. The MAGID had a module that 
contained an electronics unit and a plug to connect to the 
MINISID-III. The MAGID was constructed with a cable that had 
magnetic sensors at either end. The electronics module was 
attached to the midpoint of the cable. If both sensors 
detected emissions, it was probably a truck. If only the 
seismic sensor activated, vehicles could be discounted as 
the cause and it would be investigated as either a false 
activation or personnel. The magnetic sensor would transmit 
through the MIINISID-III transmitter much the same as the 
acoustic add-on unit. 
d) SSCS 
The Strain Sensitive Cabla Sensor (SSCS) was 
buried across roads and trails and could extend for several 
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hundred meters. It was capable of detecting both personnel 
and vehicles. The cable was activated when compressed by an 
object passing over it. The SSCS was capable of 
discriminating between 2ersonnel and vehicles because it 
would transmit a signal proportional to the amount of weight 
that had compressed it. An electronics module was buried 
next to the SSCS. When activated, it would send an 
electronic'2ulse to a MINISID-III that would relay the pulse 
to a watch station. 
e) Infrared 
The. Directional Infrared Intrusion Detector 
(DIRID) was an infrared break-beam device. The sensor would 
be emplaced on a small tripod in pairs at the start and end 
points of roads and large paths. For each pair of DIRIDs 
there .was- one. transmi tte:r:. a.n.d.- receiv:e:r:._ The DIRID could 
monitor a space three to seven meters wide. As an object 
passed through the space monitored by the DIRID, it would 
break the infrared beams in a sequential pattern alerting 
the watch station to an intrusion. The pattern of breakage 
would also provide the watch station with the direction of 
movement. 
f) Video 
Video cameras capable of low-light monitoring were 
mounted on platforms at the west- end of the Giddi Pass and 
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at the Base camp for local security. Operators at the base 
camp remotely controlled the cameras. Video cameras were 
needed at the west-end of the Giddi Pass because the Giddi 
sensor fields were monitored remotely and none of the watch 
stations had visual line of sight. The cameras were 
commercial cameras powered by solar cells. Each of the 
cameras also had a battery backup for use at night or during 
incl~enL weather. Same of the cameras were mounted 
alongside remote controlled spotlights to increase the 
quality of observation. 
g) Imaging IR 
This last sensor was a prototype called the 
Passive Confirming Scanner. It was intended for use during 
low-visibility conditions due to dust and fog. This system 
was determined to be unreliable and was removed after less 
than one year. 
2. Treaty Violations 
Over the course of monitoring the Sinai, 90 violations 
of the agreement occurred. These violations occurred within 
the area being monitored as well as the Israeli and Egyptian 
monitoring stations. Israel was responsible for sixty-seven 
of the violations. Egypt was found responsible for two of 
the violations. Nineteen other violations were attributed to 
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unidentified aircraft and two to unidentified personnel. 80 
The maiority of the violations involved unauthorized Israeli 
aircraft, which strayed to close to the buffer zone. A few 
of the violations involved personnel or vehicles. Egyptian 
violations were for unauthorized weapons at their 
surv~llance station. 
In order to understand the number of violations and the 
high incidence attributed to Israel it is necessary to 
visualize the location of the sensor fields and the buffer 
zone. Where the eastern boundary of the buffer zone and its 
sensor fields end, the Israeli limited force zone begins. 
The Egyptian limited force zone was not similarly situated. 
It was five miles from the sensor-monitored buffer zone. 
This five mile zone was occupied by'the United Nations 
Emergency_Force Buffer Zone. If Egyptian forces made a 
shallow incursion, it would not be detected because the 
Egyptian boundary line was five miles beyond the detection 
range of the sensors; Instead, these incursions might or 
might not be detected by the UNEF forces. If an Israeli 
patrol crossed the boundary, it would immediately activate 
the sensors resulting in a violation. The result is that 
Israel had the greatest number of violations from personnel, 
80 Carter, J. Kontos, C. (April 16, 1980). Ninth Report to 
Congress: The United States Sinai Support Mlssion. p. 7. 
Obtained from the C. William Kontos Collection, Gerald R. 
Ford library, National Archives. 
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vehicles and aircraft. It is also possible that some 
violations were intentional to test the alertness of the 
SFM, the sensitivity, of the sensors, and the reaction time 
by which the intrusion would be reported. The maximum 
penetration of the sensor fields by unauthorized vehicles or 
personnel was 300 meters while the averaqe was 220 meters. 81 
3. False Activations 
Many activations occurred as part of the normal day's 
activities as authorized vehicles and personnel moved to and 
from the EgYQtian or Israeli watch stations. The small-arm~ 
training of the Israelis and construction blasting of the 
Egyptians also caused activations. However L numerous other 
activations occurred but investigations determined that 
these were due to weather, animals, seismic activity or 
Bedouins. Very heavy winter fog during the morning and 
evening sometimes was enouqh to activate the sensors. 
Rodents were also a significant cause of activations. When 
the workers from the SFM em}2laced sensors, ,their 
perspiration would smear on the sensors and their electrical 
cables. The rodents would be attracted to the smell of the 
sweat and gnaw on the cables. This problem was alleviated by 
having all 12ersonnel wear work gloves. Despite these 
81 Carter, J., Kontos, C. (October 13, 1977). Fourth Report 
to Congress: The United States Sinai Support Mission. p. 5. 
Obtained from the C. William Kontos Collection, Gerald R. 
Ford Library, National Archives. 
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problems failed sensors were replaced within 24 hours and a 
sufficient number of sensors were emplaced to ensure 
redundancy. The result was that "sensor equipment loss due 
to failure approximated 5%. "82 Wild herds of gazelles, 
camels and flocks of birds also caused problems. 
The most significant problems were with Bedouin Tribes 
that were indigenous to the area and traveled without 
respect for borders L sensors or United Nations patrols. 
While officially citizens of Egypt, all parties recognized 
them as a group unto themselves and did not treat their 
activities as a "treaty violation." However, the Bedouins 
did-cau..aa difficulties i.o..l:- the... Sinai Field :M.\ssion. One of 
the most significant was thievery. The Bedouins had battery-
powered televisions that were compatible with th~ 12 volt 
car batteries used by the video cameras at Giddi West. It 
was not until these were locked in makeshift battery cases 
that the thefts subsided. 
4. Alternatives to Sensors 
The Sinai Field Mission conducted a study to identify 
alternative technologies and procedures for use in the 
Sinai. The purpose was to reduce or eliminate the number of 
personnel required to operate the watch stations. The study 
82 Vannoni, M. (1996). Sensors in the Sinai: A Precedent for 
Cooperative Monitoring. Sandia National Labs. p. 12. 
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was conducted with the advice and assistance of the Mltre 
Corporation. Four alternative courses of action 
(COAs) were identified. Course of action one was a 
centralized detection of intruders where all sensor alarms 
were transmitted to the base camp. An investigation would be 
conducted by dis2atching a iee2 or airborne patrol. The 
second course of action was a centralized detection of 
intruders where the sensors would be transmitted to the base 
camp and the intruder would be identified using remote 
controlled video cameras. Course of action three was the 
substitution of Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) for the 
sensors. The GSR could maintain a wider area of observation 
than the sensors and the GSR would transmit an alarm to a 
watch station if a detection occurred. Personnel at the 
watch station would then investigate. Course of action four 
required a centralized radar detection system and the use 
television cameras to identify the intruder. 
The SFM determined that the first course of action was 
unacceptable. This was because the Sinai Disengagement 
Agreement allowed a large number of vehicles to pass through 
the monitoring zone on a regular basis. The monthly average 
was 6,000 vehicles. Many of these vehicles belonged to the 
United Nations Emergency Force and others belong to the 
Egyptians and Israelis. All of these vehicles and movements 
were authorized to support travel to surveillance stations , 
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in the buffer zone and patrols. This quantity of vehicles 
and the alarms they produced would require the dispatch of 
literally thousands of vehicle and air surveillance missions 
to investigate the sensor alarms. The third course of action 
of substituting radar for sensors did not provide a 
significant advantage. It would require the same number of 
personnel. In addition the improvement of detections was 
minimal and the cost of the radar was much ~reater than the 
sensors. 
Course of action two and four did show promise. Both 
involved the removal of the watch station operators and 
centralized monitoring of the alarms from the base camp. 
Course of action two continued to use sensors and.COA four 
" . 
substituted radar for sensors. The identification of 
intruders would them be made by remote controlled video 
cameras. Further study determined that neither course of 
action could be implemented. This was because the text of 
the basic agreement required ."American civilian personnel to 
operate the three watch stations and provide continuous 
tactical surveillance." While the study was unsuccessful 
overall, it did result in the use of video cameras at Giddi 
West, which was beyond the line of sight of the base camp. 
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E. ANALYSIS 
The use.. o£. sen.s..ru:s.. irL the. Si nai was.. successful. The 
principle objective was to use information provided by the 
sensors as a confidence building measure to promote peace 
and further negotiations. Up-to-the-minute reports of 
activity within the Sinai enabled the SFM to reduce the 
possibility that misperceptions of hostile intent might 
spark a chain of escalation resulting in a return to open 
conflict. 
The US role in the Sinai and it's ability to achieve 
success was due to a "unique set of circumstances". The 
circumstances were: (1} The critical role Rlayed by the US 
in the negotiations, (2) the geography of the Giddi and 
Mitla passes which allowed control of a wide area to be 
reduced to the control of two passes, (3) the sterile buffer 
zone which was generally uninhabited l and (4) the absence of 
terrorist activity. It is import~nt to recognize that those 
circumstances l which made the effort 2ossible, may not be 
present in other areas. The most important of these factors 
was the absence of terrorist activity. This was primarily 
due to the desire of Egypt and Israel to achieve a lasting 
peace. Both countries had willingly signed the peace 
agreement and took the necessary steps to support the 
security arrangements. 
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The successful employment of sensors in the Sinai 
serves as a model of how sensor technology can be used to 
support peacekeeping operations. Had the US not participated 
in the Sinai peace effort a stable peace in the Sinai would 
not have been achieved. President Ford stated before 
Congress that, "the early warning system in the Sinai is an 
important investment in Peace ... continuing presence of the 
system provides in itself an important contribution to 
stability in the area and to the creation of a climate of 
confidence so necessary for further progress toward a just 
and durable peace. "83 Sensor monitoring also received 
accolades from both the Egyptians and Israelis. "One senior 
Israeli official suggested that the SFM could serve as a 
model for use in other Mideast trouble spots, such as the 
Golan Heights or the West Bank." 84 
The capabilities of the sensors were dictated by a set 
of self-imposed limitations. First, the sensors would be 
monitored by civilian personnel who had a minimum of sensor 
training or experience. Second, the technology would be used 
for peacekeeping operations. Third l it was necessary to 
share the knowledge and capabilities of the technology with 
83 Khisheib, U. (May 17, 1976). A Lonely Outpost Where 
Yanks Guard Against Sinai War. US News and World Report. p. 
54 
84 US Congress L Senate. (June 6 L 1977). An Evaluation of the 
US Early Warning System in the Sinai. Washington D.C., GPO. 
p. 6. 
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both the Israelis and Egyptians to assure them that the 
technology would be successful. However this was done 
without without compromising key aspects of the technology 
which would have allowed either side to spoof the sensors. 
Finally, while the technology could be monitored remotely, 
the peace agreement regpired an American presence as a 
buffer between the parties. These self-imposed limitations 
required a force of aQQroximately 170 Qersonnel to monitor 
the Sinai and perform support functions. However, the unique 
geography_of the Sinai enabled the SFM to reduce a large 
geographic area to the control of two key passes. 
These Qasses which comQrised 620 square miles could 
then be monitored 24 hours a day by 43 civilian personnel. 
While infiltrators of the sensor fields were not .killed or 
bombed they were targeted and intercepted by a quick 
reaction force of United Nation's Qeacekeepers. This 
translated to a form of precision engagement appropriate for 
peacekeeping operations. 
As noted earlier, precision engagement has five 
component parts: Targeting, Command and Control (C2), the 
ability to achieve a desired.effect, the ability to assess 
the level of effectiveness achieved (BDA) and the ability to 
re-engage when required. In order to achieve these 
requirements the ground sensors had to meet a number of 








Figure 3.3 Sensor Criteria for Precision Engagement 
1 . Targeting 
For targetingL sensors had to be delivered to a 
location where they could sense the target. Second, the 
sensors had to be covert in location and key aspects of the 
technology to prevent the enemy from destroying them or 
innovating around them. Third~ the sensors had to be capable 
of discriminating between a variety of targets. 
a) De~ive.ry 
All of the sensors reqpired for monitoring the 
Giddi and Mitla Passes were emplaced in four days. While the 
capability of air delivery was available, it was not 
required. Instead, all sensors were emplaced by hand. This 
method of delivery was easy and inexpensive. However, it was 
• 
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only possible due to the lack of hostile activity in the 
Sinai. While the delivery of sensors was successful, the 
location the sensors were delivered to was problematic. 
Sensor fields were placed adiacent to the Israeli 
Limited Force Zone. The sensors fields ended five miles away 
from the Egyptian Limited Force Zone. This resulted in 
numerous unintended violations by the Israelis as their air 
and ground patrols bumped aqainst the boundary. On the other 
hand, the Egyptians were not charged with unintended 
intrusions largely because their forces would have been 
detected by the UNEF before reaching the sensor fields. This 
provided the Egyptians with a political advantage in which 
they could point to the large number of Israeli intrusions 
and accuse them of military aqqression. Extending the sensor 
monitoring an additional five miles until it joined the 
border of the Egyptian Limited Force Zone might have 
prevented this. 
b) Secre~ 
In the Sinai, both overt and covert sensors 
were used. Seismic, acoustic and magnetic sensors were 
covert and were buried below the surface of the earth where 
they were not visible. They were so covert that some of the 
SFM personnel that emplaced the sensors had trouble finding 
them to change the sensor batteries. This prevented an 
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intruder from determining the location of the sensors and 
infiltrating through a blind spot in the sensor coverage. It 
also prevented an intruder from destroying the sensors or 
collecting them to ~ain intelligence on the sensor 
capabilities. However, the sensors were not as secret as 
might be desired. The communication frequency of the sensors 
was not encrypted and the possibility existed that it could 
be jammed. The sensor transmission could also be intercepted 
or detected because of its transmissions. While these 
possibilities existed, these types of innovations by an 
enemy did not occur. One aid in preventing this was the 
short duration of a sensor transmission. If a sensor 
activated, the duration of the alert would be burst to the 
watch stations in seconds making it difficult to triangulate 
its location. 
Overt sensors were also used. The video cameras 
and Infrared break beams were an overt method of sensing. 
While these sensors 2erformed a valuable function, their 
overt presence enabled intruders to disrupt them. The most 
common example was provided by the Bedouins. While this was 
immediately detected by the SFM personnel, it became a 
constant 2roblem until the batteries were secured in locked 
containers. This disrupted the monitoring efforts of the SFM 
until the batteries could be replaced. 
W7 
Another issue related to the secrecy of the 
sensors was the technology. All of the sensors used were 
unclassified. If the sensor technology had been compromised, 
it would not have been a maior concern. The fact that the 
sensors were unclassified actually made the operation more 
successful because the sensor information could be shared 
with both parties. This was used to convince both parties 
that the sensor monitoring would be successful. In this 
case, the location of the sensors was secret but the 
technology was not. 
c) Discr~ation 
The.. sensors used. in... tha Sinai could detect 
and discrimina'te between vehicles, tanks and personnel. 
Multiple types of sensors were used in each of the sensor 
fields to detect infiltrators. Often an infiltrator would be 
detected by pressure£ acoustic£ seismic£ infrared, magnetic 
and other means all in a matter of minutes. Detection was 
especially eff.ective at night when the Sinai was relatively 
uninhabited with the exception of Bedouins. This enabled a 
rapid detection and discrimination of activity. However, 
during the day and at other scheduled times there was a 
la,rge amount of traffic wi thin the Sinai. The Sinai Interim 
Agreement allowed for the movement of personnel to 
electronic surveillance stations operated br the Egyptians 
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and the Israelis. It also allowed for the movement of United 
Nations Forces within the buffer zone. These movements 
resulted in thousands of sensor activations, which were part 
of authorized activity. During these 2eriods, the sensors 
could detect activity but they could not differentiate 
between authorized and unauthorized activity. This could 
only be accomplished by the watch station personnel. 
During the course of the o2eration, remote 
controlled video cameras were introduced to allow remote 
discrimination of activity. This reduced the need for a 
large number of personnel to man watch stations and allowed 
a centralized discrimination between authorized and 
unauthorized activity. As technology advances an improvement 
would be to combine remote video or optical technology with 
each sensor. This would enable monitoring personnel to 
channel-surf between sensors, that had detected activity. 
Discrimination of targets could then be accomplished 
remotely and with greater precision. 
2. Command and Control 
The SFM had to 2rovide C2 over a large amount of sensor 
information and disseminate it to multiple nations and 
forces to increase their chances of mission succes·~. 
a) Dissemination 
In the Sinai, precision engagement consisted of 
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the immediate detection of intruders ranging.from individual 
vehicles to 2ersonnel. Once a detection occurred, an 
investigation would be conducted. If analysis confirmed an 
unauthorized intrusion~ notification would be made within 
five minutes to all parties. A report would also be 
transmitted to UNEF 2atrols that would interdict the 
intruder. Notification of the Israelis, Egyptians and US 
National Security Council was not automated. While this 
would have made notification. faster, it was not possible due 
to the requirement to discriminate between authorized and 
unauthorized activity. 
While the requirement for an investigation 
increased the time requirement, it did not inhibit 
interception of infiltrators. During the course of the 
monitoring, the maximum penetration of the sensor fields was 
300 meters and on averaqe was 220 meters. Air and space 
surveillance assets could not provide this capability on a 
24-hour basis nor could they provide the resolution 
necessary to detect intrusions by individual soldiers. 
A unique aspect of the Sinai monitoring was the 
use of civilians. The use of civilians as a proxy for US 
military forces required the use of Information Brokers. 
While American civilians were sufficient to conduct the 
monitorinq and day to day o2erations L they did not represent 
the US government. The value assigned to the information 
UQ 
created by the sensors was dependent on a recognized third 
party. This party was the United States Government. The role 
of infor.mation brokers was satisfied by using State 
Department officers. These officers were responsible for the' 
authenticity, accuracy and integrity of the infor.mation. 
Authenticity was achieved by havinq an officer personally 
sign a report· of a violation guaranteeing its authenticity. 
Accuracy was a function of usinq teletypes, which would 
produce a written record of a report. Written records were 
preferred because they allowed less opportunity for 
misinterpretation than verbal reports. This is particularly 
important, as they had to be translated by the receiver. 
Integrity was achieved by sending the message directly from 
the base camp to the State Department liaison officers at 
the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations. Hand 
delivery of the reports prevented the possibility of the 
report being modified. 
3. Effect 
The ability to achieve a desired effect against a 
target is not restricted to the sensor itself. It 
encompasses accurate tarqetinq, the size and type of force 
allocated to the mission and the type and quantity of 
munitions expended aqainst a target. In order to meet these 
requirements, various types of sensor data must be fused 
111 
together to provide a complete picture of the target and the 
battlefield. 
a) Fusion 
In the Sinai, sensor data was fused into a 
synoptic picture. Each infiltrator was detected by a variety 
of different sensors with different capabilities in a matter 
of minutes. This information was received by the watch 
station personnel and an investigation was conducted using 
remote controlled video cameras, or other optical devices. 
The different methods of detection were then combined to 
form a complete picture of the detected activity. In the 
Base Station, all of the sensor readings were immediately 
displayed on an electronic map, which would indicate 
individual sensor activations using small light bulbs. This 
ensured that the target was detected rapidly and by a 
variety of different methods to minimize the chances of a 
false activation as well as to develop a complete picture of 
the activity. One of the distinct advantages of the 
electronic map was that it would constantly update itself 
according to the sensor activations as opposed to a 
photograph which was merely a snapshot in time. 
4. . Bomb Damage Assessment 
BDA is the ability to assess the level of effectiveness 
of an airstrike or attack by determining if a bomb or 
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munition has hit its target and, if hit, what effect that 
ach.i.evecL The- usa o£ ae.ns.o.:r:.a iIL a BillL ral e is an effort to 
interrogate a target for emissions which would indicate a 
live or dead target. 
a) Interrogation 
The ability to interrogate a tar~et in the Sinai 
is a missing variable. Unauthorized activity in the Sinai 
consisted of Israeli ground patrols and aircraft which 
accidentally strayed into the sensor fields. Other 
violations of the Sinai Interim Agreement were for 
unauthorized weapons ~t the watch stations. None of these 
targets were fired upon. However~ unauthorized intrusions 
were rapidly intercepted by the UNEF. It is also important 
to note that the monitoring of the Sinai was peacekeeping 
not combat. In the Sinai, the Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) 
was interception not destruction. In this regard, the 
operation was entirely successful. While the ability to 
interrogate a target was not present~ the SFM did maintain a 
variety of sensors both unattended and attended, which could 
have assessed destruction of a target. Destruction would 
have been determined by the absence of a seismic, magnetic, 
inf;rared~ or pressure activation combined with observation 
by video or other optical means. Again, the capability to 
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combine an optical capability with each sensor would have 
increased the interrogation ca~ability of the sensors. 
5. Re-engage 
Assessment will invariably conclude that some targets 
have escaped destruction or have sustained only minor 
damage~ which allows them to continue operating. This 
necessitates the ability to reengage a target when required. 
Central to this requirement is the endurance of a particular 
sensor. Long endurance will enable a sensor to support a 
second strike against the same tar~et if required. 
a) Endurance 
At the onset of the Sinai monitoring, battery 
technology had advanced enabling the sensors to operate as 
long as one year on the same battery. This greatly increased 
the cost effectiveness of the sensors and reduced the 
maintenance requirements for long term monitoring. It also 
enabled the ground sensors to monitor activity in the Giddi 
and Mitla passes 24 hours daily. Monitoring was continuous 
and effective during all light conditions as well as during 
periods of cloud cover or inclement weather. 
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IV. DESERT STORM 
There is nothinR more exhilarating, than to be shot at without result 
-Winston Churchill 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the Gulf War~ a great deal of precision engagement 
was conducted. However, it was conducted in the absence of 
Unattended Ground Sensors. Precision engagement was enabled 
through the use of satellites and aircraft sensors. My 
purpose in using the Gulf War as a case study is twofold: 
First, to identify what failures in precision engagement 
occurred hacauaa of an Qvar-ralianca on satellites and 
aircraft sensors; second, is as a tough test for ~round 
sensors. It is a tough test because the Gulf War is viewed 
by many as the most successful war ever prosecuted by the 
United States. The war was short~ few casualties were 
incurred, and much of,the success of the war could be traced 
back to the use of airpower and precision guided munitions. 
Additionally, the United States enjoyed many advantages in 
the area of precision engagement. To name iust a few, the 
war was conducted in the desert where there were few places 
for the enemy to hide. The US had the qreatest number of 
reconnaissance satellites in orbit in its history. The 
establishment of a coalition also provided the US with the 
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ability to employ its air reconnaissance assets in the 
airspace of bordering countries. Given these advantages, was 
there a role for UGS? Was there a gap in precision 
engagement which UGS could have filled? 
B. BACKGROUND 
Ira~ invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 with an armored 
and mechanized assault consisting of three Republican Guards 
divisions. Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein wanted to extend 
his influence in the Gulf region and gain control over 
Kuwait's rich oil reserves and wealth. Saddam also wanted 
greater access to the Persian Gulf. Iraq had long maintained 
the desire to gain control of the Warbah and Bubiyan Islands 
which were situated along the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway. 
Iraq's other waterway the Shatt Al-'Arab was clogged with 
the remnants of sunken vessels and dangerous munitions from 
the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam iustified his actions by accusing 
"Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of complicity with the 
United States to cheat on oil production quotas."85 Saddam 
argued that an over production of oil 'had deflated its price 
causing serious harm to Iraq's economy. This statement was 
made despite the fact that Iraq's economy had long been 
bankrolled by Kuwait and other Arab countries through 
generous long-term loans and support. 
85 Department of Defense. (April 1992). Conduct of the 
Persian Gulf War. Washington D.C., GPO. p. 5. 
ll6. 
Kuwait quickly crumbled under the weight of Iraq's 
superior military force. The defeat was quick, as the 
Kuwaiti government had reduced its military readiness 
posture from a 100% alert to 25% iust prior to the invasion. 
This was done by the Kuwaiti government in a political 
attempt to· reduce tensions between the two countries. As 
the invasion unfolded, the greatest fear of international 
leaders was that Ira~ would merely pause in Kuwait and then 
invade Saudi Arabia. On 3 August, US President George Bush 
warned Saddam Hussein not to invade Saudi Arabia. Despite 
this warning, Iraqi armored forces continued to buildup 
along the Saudi Border. Even more ominous was the withdrawal 
of the Republican Guards forces from Kuwait and their 
replacement with regular army divisions from Iraq. These 
regular forces occupied defensive positions along the 
Kuwaiti border while the Republican Guards conducted 
resupply. This freed the Republican Guards for an invasion 
into Saudi Arabia. 
In a few days following the invasion L Saddam quickly 
assembled a force of approximately 200,000 soldiers and 
2,000 tanks in or around Kuwait. It quickly became apparent 
to President Bush that an invasion of Saudi Arabia was 
imminent and the only option immediately available was land-
based air power. The navy could move its carriers closer 
into position but they did not have the range or quantity of 
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firepower necessary to stop an invasion. While ground forces 
were obviously needed, it would take months to deploy a 
force capable of stopping an Iraqi Armored advance. On 6 
August, King Fahd bin Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia 
requested military reinforcements from the international 
community. 
1. CENTCOM 
The task of reinforcing Saudi Arabia fell to the US 
Central Command (CENTCOM). CENT COM was the newest of all the 
regional commands and was commanded by General Norman 
Schwarzkopf. Its area of responsibility included Northeast 
Africa~ the Middle East and Southwest Asia. General 
Schwarzkopf immediately responded to President's Bush's 
order to reinforce Saudi Arabia. CENTCOM deployed .squadrons 
of F-15 aircraft, and the 82d Airborne Division, a rapid 
deployment force. When the invasion occurred, CENT COM was 
the only regional command that did not have a headquarters 
within its area of responsibility. CENTCOM had its 
headquarters at MacDil1 Air Force Base in Florida. CENTCOM 
had to deploy not only its forces, but its headquarters as 
well. 
2~ Desert Shield 
The initial military response to the invasion of Iraq 
was defensive and became known as Operation Desert Shield. 
The first military forces to deploy to Saudi Arabia were Air 
LLa 
Force Squadrons and Navy aircraft carriers. However, the US 
Army would be close behind. While aircraft could deploy 
quickly, the decision was made not to attack. The danger was 
that this might cause the Ira~is to invade sooner rather 
than later. Instead, Operation Desert Shield would draw a 
line in the sand and establish an air and ground defense 
against an Iraqi invasion. The initial ground force would be 
the 82cL Airbo.rne- Di:sz:i si on Thia. di~i si on. ~d limited anti-
armor capabilities and could ~e expected to take high 
casualties when fighting tanks. However L CENTCOM reasoned 
that by augmenting them with aircraft in an anti-armor role 
they could provide an initial defense. 
General Schwarzkopf's priority for deployment into 
theater rapidly became heavy forces such as armor, 
mechanized infantry and artillery. In order to achieve the 
buildup of these types of forces L General Schwarzkopf had to 
deploy them without much of their supporting assets. CENTCOM 
achieved this by developing support agreements for food, 
fuel and other resources from Saudi sources. However, this 
meant leaving other military forces behind as well. "Early 
in Operation Desert Shield, the build-up of in-theater 
intelligence capabilities was intentionally and rationally 
restricted by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf."S6 This was 
86 US Congress. (August 16, 1993). Intelligence Successes 
and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Washington 
D.C., GPO. p. 4 
119 
done with the reasoning that supporting assets such as 
military intelligence forces would be easil~ overrun by the 
Iraqi's if they were introduced into theater too soon. This 
decision was also made in recognition of the great number of 
satellite and air surveillance capabilities within the US 
military inventory. However L ~ltlhe absence of early 
deploying tactical intelligence collectors meant that 
theater commanders were initially forced to rely heavily on 
national intelligence systems such as satellites, as the 
primary intelliqence collectors. "87 
While this supported General Schwarkopf's intent, it 
had two side effects. First, it reoriented the grand 
majority of the,. nations strategic surveillance assets on 
Iraq. In fact L ~for the first time,. the Soviet Union took a 
back seat to another part of the world as an intelligence 
collection target."88 Second L the lack of tactical 
intelligence limited General Schwarkopf's knowledge of the 
enemy. 
While,. CENTCOM's intelligence staff could visualize 
much of the battlefield, it was the equivalent of "searching 
New York City throuqh a soda straw". Sattelites did not 
provide a wide field of view and intelligence was not 
available on an up-to-the-minute basis. Furthermore, It 
87 Ibid, p. 4 
, 88 Ibid, p. 5 
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lacked the detail necessary to support tactical commander's 
on the ground. While Satellites could locate major units 
they could not detect and report targets in real-time, 
effectively conduct battle damage assessment or provide the 
resolution to detect infantry soldiers. This led General 
Schwarzkopf's staff to develo2 a worst case estimate in the 
absence of detailed information on the enemy. In effect, 
Clausewitz's observation became true L "that military 
commanders tend to opt for a worse-case analysis under 
conditions of uncertainty. ,,89 The Iraqi Army was painted 
as being much stronger, and in some cases larger than it 
really was. This led General Schwarzkopf to deploy 
approximately 50% of the United States Army, 25% of the 
Navy, 25% of the Air Force, and 66% of the Marine Corps to 
Saudi Arabia. The time required for air and sealift of these 
forces caused a significant delay before executing a ground 
offensive. 
While the military intelligence forces' from the Army 
were initially left behind, it is not entirely clear that 
their deployment would have significantly changed the war 
effort. At the time of Desert Shield, the Army did not have 
a surveillance analysis ca2ability. The personnel required 
for imagery interpretation from satellites and aircraft had 
89 Handel, M. (Ed.) (1990). Intelligence and Military 
Operations. Portland, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. P. 80 
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largely been cut from an Army role because it was widely 
believed that they were no longer needed. Technology, it was 
argued had advanced to the point where imagery could be 
analyzed by a centralized facility and the digitized results 
transmitted to the user. 
At the tactical level t much of the army's doctrine had 
outpaced the ability of military intelligence to keep up or 
support. While the Army had a variety of systems for 
collecting intelligence, they required an extensive amount 
of time for set-up and tear down. Even military intelligence 
assets that were mounted in Ml13 armored personnel carriers 
could not keep pace with the army's M1 tanks that could 
travel 40 miles per hour on a desert battlefield. These 
inadequacies and the lack of tactical intelligence led to a 
capabilities focus for General Schwarzkopf. Instead of 
relying on intelligence to determine the appropriate 
military response, the lack of intelligence led military 
planners to develop an offensive plan based on capabilities 
such as air power to attrit the Iraqi tanks. 
C. TACTICS 
The initial tactics developed by CENTCOM were defensive 
and linear and were designed to provide an air and ground 
defense against an Iraqi invasion. This defense would 
provide the time necessary to prepare an offensive if 
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required. It would also allow time for the development of a 
coalition of military forces from different countries that 
would lend international support for the operation. The 
offensive plan named Desert StormL would begin with a 
protracted air war that would establish air supremacy over 
Kuwait and Iraq. Air strikes would then be used to attrit 
50% of the enemy's tanks, armored personnel carriers and 
artillery. Once this statistical goal had been achieved, 
coalition ground forces would begin their ground offensive. 
Critical to all·phases of Desert Shield and Storm was the 
use of space and air surveillance for early warning of an 
invasion~ targeting of the Iraqi forces, command and control 
(C2) and battle damage assessment (BDA). 
1 . Air and Space Surveillance 
Space and air surveillance systems are divided into 
three segments: the space or air segment, the control 
segment and the user segment. The space segment consists of 
satellites~ while the air segment consists of aircraft. The 
control segment refers to the ground stations, which direct 
the satellites, as well as the satellites which support 
ground to space communications. The user segment consists of 
the personnel and receiving stations that utilize the 
imagery collected and analyzed by the control segment. 
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a) 8,pace/Air Segment 
At the time of Desert Shield, the US had an 
unprecedented number of satellites available for 
surveillance of Kuwait and Ira~. The US had three of the 
older KH-11 (Keyhole) imagery satellites and one LACROSSE 
radar imaging satellite in orbit. In addition, the US had a 
variety of other satellites to support communications and 
collect weather data. There was also an undefined number of 
Defense Support Program Satellites (DSPS), which could 
detect missile launches. While a variety of surveillance 
aircraft were available, General Schwarzkopf prohibited them 
from conducting overflights of Iraq before the start of the 
Air-war. This was done because of their vulnerability to 
Iraqi air defenses and the concern that their use might 
hasten an invasion by the Iraqis. 
The space segment had many limitations. First, 
while there were three optical satellites that could pass 
over Iraq, there were periqds as long as five hours where 
none could observe Iraq or Kuwait. Having only one LACROSSE 
satellite available meant that radar imagery would only be 
available every 12 hours. With these resources it would 
often take multiple passes to develop accurate imagery or 
intelligence on a target. "According to a DIA official, only 
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the enemy's large static defense strategy allowed us totrack 
his numbers and disposition with acceptable accuracy." 90 
Second, the satellites themselves had limited 
capabilities. KH-11 satellites were good during the day but' 
had little value at night. This combined with weather 
limitations from clouds or man-made oil fires prevented good 
imagery of selected areas. In addition, heat and radar 
contrast made it difficult to differentiate between targets 
or pinpoint their locations. While the optical (KH-11) 
satellites had resolution of approximately 10 centimeters, 
the LACROSSE provided a resolution of 1 meter. As a result, 
the KH-11 could detect if a bomb had penetrated the roof of 
a bunker but a LACROSSE could not. However, the LACROSSE 
could detect targets through clouds L which the KH-11s could 
not. 
Third L satellites are a top-down system. They were 
good for looking at the rooftops- qf buildings but not at 
seeing what was inside or covered by shelters. Iraq's 
development of underground complexes and its use of sand and 
bunke.r.:s. to. CQver its. tanka further limited their value. 
Fourth, Iraq made extensive use of decoys and 
deception measures. Ira~had purchased a qreat amount of 
satellite imagery of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait prior to 
90 Richelson, J. (1995). The US Intelligence Community. 
Boulder, Westview Press. p. 157. 
us. 
the war. Some of the coverage was the equivalent of US 
capabilities purchased from the Russian and French 
governments and some was from commercial sources. This 
knowledge of satellite capabilities coupled with information 
about US satellites enabled Iraq to plan its operations, 
while determining when satellites could be expected to 
overfly Iraq. This knowledge enabled the development of 
decoy sites and vehicles as well as the knowledge of when to 
hide or disperse capabilities. 
Fifth~ the targeting effort of the coalition 
required months of satellite coverage. Had Iraq immediately 
invaded Saudi Arabia, the satellite coverage would not have 
been possible. 
Sixth, the Gulf War was uni~e as it occurred in 
the desert. There was little to prevent overhead observation 
of the entire region during the course of the war. However, 
if the conflict had been conducted in Southeast-Asia 
satellites would have been foiled b¥ the cover and 
concealment of triple canopy jungle. 
Finally, satellites operate in a standard orbit 
and cannot be dispatched to cover events on short notice. In 
order to provide the necessary coverage of a selected area, 
satellites will often have "to be re-tasked. Given the 
limited amount of fuel each satellite carries, multiple 
changes to a satellites' flight path may reduce its life 
• 
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span. Additionally, the willingness to re-task will be based 
on a cost-benefit analysis in which its current orbit may be 
deemed more important than the requested orbit. Inevitably, 
one priority will outweigh another. 
In air surveillance many aircraft with different 
types of sensor cap-abilities were em12loyed by the US and 
coalition forces during the Gulf War. Many focused on the 
detec.t.i.on of airc.raft while others.. ~oncentrated on 
electronic signatures from radar and communications. 
Relatively few were ca12able of detecting ~round targets that 
were relevant to tactical ground force commanders. These 
commanders were concerned with tanks L armored personnel 
carriers, Scud missile launchers and the disposition of 
enemy troo12s on the battlefield. 
Reconnaissance aircraft consisted of F-16s with 
Lantirn Infrared· navigation pods L Air Force OA-10s, OV-1D 
and RV-1D Mohawks and F-14Ds with Tactical Air 
ReCODna;ssanc..a Eods. (TARP5..1. Thes.e a.iJ:.c.raft. flew hundreds of 
missions during Desert Storm. Some of these aircraft 
required :pilots to fly low with binoculars to spot targets 
while others used onboard cameras and sensors for detection. 
Some contributed in minor ways to targeting and battle 
damage assessment or intelligence gathering. While the 
cumulative effect of these aircraft did c.ontribute to the 
127 
war effort, their individual contributions were negligible. 
This was due to their inability to conduct reconnaissance at 
night or their inability to transmit imagery in real time. 
The greatest contributions in the areas of· detection, 
targeting and intelligence for ground targets came from 
dedicated tactical surveillance aircraft. Tactical aircraft 
used in the Gulf War consisted of the JSTARS, the U2/TR-1 
series aircraft and the RF-4C. However,. these aircraft were 
only used during the air war and not during the preparation 
for the war. "Official US histories have confirmed that t:qe 
US was unwilling to risk manned airborne collection 
platforms like the RF-4C,. U-2, and TR-1 over Iraq until a 
coordinated air operation began. ,,91 This decision was also 
made to avoid the possibility that the loss of an aircraft 
might start the war before CENTCOM was prepared to fight it. 
b) Space Contro.! Segment 
Control of the satellites was centralized for a 
number of reasons. Firstl. the same satellite that took 
pictures of Iraq would also take photographs of other parts 
of the world as it continued its orbit. However, on a 
priority basis a satellite might be re-tasked to a·different 
orbit. Second,. satellites consisted of the National 
Technical Means (NTM) for intelligence and surveillance. 
91 Ibid, P. 296 
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They were not designed or organized to support tactical 
commanders on the ground. The doctrine for space support to 
the military depended on a high to low dissemination. 
Analysis was conducted by a centralized facility, with the 
digitized results disseminated to the user. 
The path of the maiority of satellite imagery 
would start with the satellite. It would then be sent to a 
Satellite Data Systems (SDS) satellite L then to a ground 
station, followed by retransmission to a Defense 
Communications Satellite (DCS). The transmission would then 
be passed to Ft Belvoir in Virginia, over to the National 
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPICl for processing, 
then to a communications satellite and then to the user. 
While most parts of this process could be accomplished in 
minutes, the bottleneck would occur at the NPIC. On the 
other hand L if the transmission was immediately relayed to a 
ground terminal in the Gulf, the bottleneck would occur at 
the analysis section in theater: 
Tactical military commanders had greater control 
over the air segment. However L the inability to use the 
systems before the start of the air war greatly limited 
their value. While there were a variety of types of 
aircraft, most relied on the use of film, which could not be 
transmitted in real time. Dissemination occurred after the 
plane landed and the film processed and analyzed. After 
129 
that, it was transmitted by a secure fax or transported by 
courier to the user. 
c) User Segment 
The dissemination of imagery obtained from 
satellites did not become a significant problem until the 
start of the war. Each of the different services as well as 
different commands employed a variety of systems for 
secondary transmission of imagery. These were secure fax 
machines that would enable the sharing of imagery obtained 
from air reconnaissance aircraft and satellites. CENT COM 
used the Digital Video Imagery Transmission System (DVITS) 
which was purchased by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Only 
a few of these systems were procured and shipped to the Gulf 
before the war ended. 
The Air Force had the Tactical Digital Facsimile 
(TDF). This machine was slow to transmit, had poor 
resolution~ and did not have an automatic arror correction 
capability. As a result, if an image was not received 
correct lYe the entire image had to be resent. The price tag 
of the TDF was also a problem as each machine cost $688,000. 
The Navy and Marines used the "Fleet Imagery Support Terminal 
(FIST). During Desert Shield, other types of srDs were 
deployed as well. The Navyc Marines L Air Force and Army 
deployed 12 different types of Secondary Imagery 
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Dissemination Systems (SIDs) to the Gulf. Only four of these 
were abla to. co.mmuni cate 'Wi..:th each o.:theL_ "These were not 
compatible because they were not equipped with the national 
imagery transmission format or common communications 
protocols. The resulting hodgepodge of systems injected time 
delays into distribution of time-critical imagery and 
imagery derived intelligence."92 
As noted~ the first intelliqence bottleneck was 
analysis. The lack of interoperable SIDs systems in the Gulf 
became the second. After :processinq at the NPIC, "Intel data 
could be passed in real-time or near real-time [from 
Washingtonl to J-2 lintelliqencel in-theater L but because of 
a lack of commop imagery data dissemination systems, the 
component commands as well as forward-de:plo1ed units could 
not always gain timely access to such imagery. "93 The 
magnitude of the :problem did not become readily apparent 
because of the short duration of the war. 
During Desert Shield~ military :planners had the 
benefit of 5 and 1/2 months in which to develop target 
folders inserting the most accurate and u:pto date imagery 
for use during the air campaign. During this period, the 
92.' Clapper, J. (September 1991). Desert War Was Crucible for 
Intelligence Systems. Signal. P.77 
93 US Con~ess. (Auqust 16, 1993). Intelligence Successes 
and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Washington 
, D.C., GPO. p. 14 
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lack of adequate SIns was satisfied by using couriers who 
could transport the imagery by plane to the Gulf. However, 
once the air campaign started, the 18-hour trip from the US 
to the Gulf rendered much of the imagery unusable because 
the battlefield had changed considerably between the time 
the photos were taken and delivered. While the initial 
three days of the air campaign benefited from imagery, 
"after three days, however, tarqet imagery and current 
intelligence on mission performance decreased dramatically, 
and what did arrive was often late, unsatisfactory or 
unusable."94 The problem became so chronic that, "One wing 
reported that a s~adron flying over 1,000 missions received 
only four images after n+3, none in useable form."9S 
2 . The Air War 
While an accurate plan had been developed for targeting 
fixed sites throughout Iraq and Kuwait, the targeting 
problems for the Air Force occurr~d at the tactical level. 
The JSTARS, TR-1 and U2-R aircraft were required to conduct 
surveillance ~aatandoff distance at 75 kilometers 
behind the front lines. This was done to prevent their loss 
to Iraqi air defenses. Even operating under this limitation, 
some of the aircraft could still observe as deep as 150 
94 Ibid, p. 14. 
9S Cordesman, A., Wagner, A. (1996). The Lessons of Modern 
War Volume IV: The Gulf War. Westview Press, Boulder. p. 290 
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kilometers into Iraq. While this is an exceptional 
capability, it did not provide the range necessary to 
observe all of the areas from which Scud missiles were being 
launched. It also did not sU220rt the conduct of targeting 
or bomb damage assessment of tactical targets deep in Iraq. 
Problems also occurred as the range limitations of the 
aircraft sensors required overflight agreements with Syria 
in order to achieve a broader coveraqe of the area of 
operations. Syria approved the overflights because of its 
membershiQ in the coalition. However, if the requirement had 
been in Jordanian airspace this would not have been 
possible. 
The U2-R aircraft had the most limited range while the 
TR-1 and JSTARS could range for 150 kilometers. While these 
aircraft could conduct surveillance of a large area, 
detailed targeting was achieved by concentrating on detailed 
4 by-4 kilometer grids. Both systems were incapable of 
detecting and targeting stationary vehicles and both 
required a force 2ackaqe of.electronic iamming aircraft and 
fighter escort for protection. While the JSTARS aircraft had 
advanced capabilities, only two eX2erimental aircraft 
existed at the time of the air war. These aircraft conducted 
44 air missions over 41 days. The time spent in the air 
averaged 12 hours or less preventing the aircraft from 
providinq a true 24-hour ca2abilit~ for targeting. 
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The RF-4C, a Vietnam era aircraft provided 
reconnaissance at the tactical level as well. The RF-4C was 
not limited to flying from a standoff distance because it 
had a limited range. Instead, it would be sent forward as 
part of a force package of electronic jamming aircraft and 
fighter escort to increase its survivability. While the RF-
4C could take detailed film for reconnaissance and bomb 
damage assessment, the film had to be 2rocessed upon return 
to its base. This prevented it from providing a real time 
method of targeting and assessment. 
3. Bomb Damage Assessment 
The lack of doctrine and systems to conduct Bomb Damage 
Assessment was 9ne of the.greatest intelligence failures of 
Desert Storm. The United States military had not invested in 
BDA technology or training in the years since the Vietnam 
War. Analysts from that conflict had long since retired and 
many of the lessons learned had been forgotten. The lack of 
BDA doctrine was not an accident. Insteaci~ "it was sometimes 
assumed that improved targeting and more lethal and smarter 
weapons largely eliminated the need for detailed hard data 
on damage effects. This seems to have been a reason that 
CENTAF and the Special Planning Group initially decided not 
to use reconnaissance aircraft to cover targets that 
Coalition air forces had already struck during the war."96 
'96 Ibid, p306 
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In preparation for the air war, General Schwarzkopf 
made two important decisions that would have a profound 
impact on the role of bomb damage assessment. First, he 
dictated that the ground war would not be launched until the 
air war had attritted 50% of Iraq's tanks and armored 
personnel carriers. Second, "General Schwarzkopf sensibly 
chose to have the Army-which would have to face any 
surviving tanks L APCs and artillery pieces-rule on how many 
pieces of equipment air power was knocking out. "97 However, 
the Army component of Central Command (ARCENT) was not 
trained to conduct proper bomb damage assessment. 
The ARCENT Intelligence officer (G-2) began by 
establishing percentages for how effective different types 
of aircraft and weaQons systems were. For example, "the 
ARCENT G-2 determined, that he would count 75 percent of all 
the kills reported by A-10 crews. The A-10 does not have a 
gun camera. But A-lOs normally operated in pairs and ARCENT 
decided the trailing pilot generally had a ggod enough view 
of what the lead pilot accomplished to accept three-fourths 
of all claims. Other percentages were adopted for other 
pieces of equipment.,,98 However, during the air war, "A-10 
pilots made exaggerated claims, and US CENTCOM initially 
97 US Congress. (August 16, 1993). Intelligence Successes 
and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Washington 
D.C., GPO. p.18 
98 Ibid, p19 
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directed that all such claims be automatically discounted by 
50%. As time went on, however l imagery led the ARCENT 
analysts, assessing damage to Iraqi ground targets, to 
discount their claims by 66%, and later analyses of U-2 
flight data, gathered over.the battlefield immediately after 
the war~ indicated that even the 66% discount may still have 
been too low. "99 
The same types of 2roblems occurred with other aircraft 
throughout the air war. In some cases, the coalition air 
force began double and triple counting the same tank as 
being killed because attacking aircraft had a tendency to 
attack the same vehicle more than once. Other problems were 
a result of tactical doctrine. Pilots would typically attack 
the lead and trail vehicle of a convoy. The Iraqis would 
then abandon the vehicles in the center of the column and 
these would be counted as dead. In still other cases, a 
vehicle would be damaged to the point that it could still 
shoot but not move and these would be counted as kills. "By 
the time the ground attack began, General Schwarzkopf had 
effectively. abandoned any effort to base operational 
decisions on precise estimates of damage assessment." 100 
99 Cordesman, A., Wagner, A. (1996). The Lessons of Modern 
War Volume IV: The Gulf War. Westview Press, Boulder. P. 
307 
100 Ibid, P. 308 
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4. The Great Scud Chase 
Mobile missile launchers presented the greatest 
difficulty in the areas of detection and targeting during 
the Gulf War. Much was known about the Scud production and 
support facilities because of monitoring the Iran-Iraq war. 
However~ a significant qap existed in the knowledge of how 
Iraq would doctrinally deploy its Scud missiles. These gaps 
included what types of tarqets Ira~ would choose when facing 
a coalition, how it would deploy its missiles and what 
firing techniqpes it would use. There was also a gap in 
knowing how many launchers Iraq had in its inventory. 
Intelligence analysts based their assessments of Iraqi 
Scuds on doctrine developed by the Former Soviet Union. 
Soviet doctrine dictated long deployment times with an 
extensive amount of time required for set up of the firing 
site, calibration of the missile telemetry as well as time 
to tear down the firing site. Thes~ procedures were required 
when targetinq small military sites or targets as well as 
key facilities in urban areas. These procedures required a 
minimum of 40 minutes and as high as 90 minutes to 
accomplish all tasks. Additionally, Soviet doctrine called 
for- f; xed 1 aunch s; tes 'With. central; zed bases for the 
missiles. Instead, Iraq chose to target large urban areas, 
skipped many of the calibration and set up procedures and 
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then fired. Many of these missiles were fired from sites 
that had been pre-surveyed and required a minimum of 
set up. Using these minimal procedures, Iraq was able to 
develop its own shoot and scoot doctrine. "Iraqi Scud teams 
could fire a missile, drive away, and hide in a culvert, 
all within five minutes. Then after letting the launcher 
cool some more (to reduce its infrared signature), they 
would drive off to some remote location to wait out the day, 
resuming firings the next night. In Basra, Iraqi forces took 
to hidin~ Scud ~rans2orter Erector Launchers (TELs) in 
residential neighborhoods as well, also hiding them under 
highway overpasses. "101 
Iraq also took advantage of the five and a half months 
leading up to Desert Shield to disperse its missiles 
throughout the desert L away from ~roduction and support 
facilities. This reduced the travel and exposure time of the 
missiles and ~revented the concentration of its missile 
forces denying the coalition an easy target. The initial 
estimate of Iraq's Scud force was a2proximately 48 
launchers. "Intelligence eventually concluded the Iraqis 
might have as many as 15 battalions with 15 launchers 
101 Hallon, R. (1992). Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the 
Gulf War. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington D.C. p. 
183 
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apiece-a whopping total of 225, over twelve times as many 
launchers as estimated on the eve of the war. "102 
The Scud missiles presented a significant threat to the 
coalition because of the dan9:.er that Scuds falling on Israel 
might bring Israel into the war and cause the predominantly 
Arab coalition to unravel. However, they did not present a 
significant threat in purely military terms. Despite their 
l~ited value militarilYL the political factor placed Scuds 
at the top of the list for destruction. During Desert 
Storm, the Air Force flew 1,460 airstrikes against Iraq's 
Scud forces. In comparison, "the coalition fiew 260 strikes 
against leadership tar9:.ets , 580 strikes a9:.ainst C4 targets, 
970 strikes against military industry, 1,170 strikes against 
Lines of Communication, 1,370 strikes against SAMs, 1,460 
strikes against airfields, and 23,430 strikes against ground 
forces. "103 
These airstrikes were conducted by numerous types of 
aircraft with extremely limited results. In' fact, "there is 
no hard evidence that the Great Scud Chase destroyed even a 
single Scud missile or mobile launcher. "104 Before the Gulf 
102 Ibid, p. 179 
103 Cordesman, A., Wagner 1 A. (19961. The Lessons of Modern 
War Volume IV: The Gulf War. Westview Press, Boulder. p. 
329 
104 US Con9:.ress. (August 16 1 1993). Intelligence Successes 
and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Washington 
D.C., GPO. p. 12 
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War started, tests and exercises aimed at destroying 
simulated Scuds were conducted by the US Air Force. These 
exercises determined that Air Force aircraft could not 
locate the launchers during daylight and had little success 
at night. Tests also determined that even if an F-15E 
aircrew was given a 1 by I-mile square in which a launcher 
was located, this information was not accurate enough to 
allow the aircrew to target the launcher. These tests were 
conducted using Soviet doctrine in which the launcher would 
be stationary for 40-90 minutes as opposed to the 5-10 
minutes, which actually occurred in Desert Storm. 
During Desert Storm the Ira~is conducted all launches 
at night making detection significantly more difficult. They 
also timed their launches to coincide with ~eak periods of 
cloud cover to defeat satellite observation. However, the 
coalition did have some advantages. The soft and sandy 
terrain in Iraq and efforts by the Scud missile forces to 
avoid radio signatures caused them to travel on roads close 
to landlines for communications. This however, was not 
enough to imgrove detection and targeting. During the 
conflict, aircraft patrols observed 42 Scud launches. Of 
these, only eight resulted in detections that supported 
follow on airstrikes. There is no evidence to indicate that 
any of the eight airstrikes resulted in a kill. Part of the 
difficulty in targeting the Scuds was attributed to the use 
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of decoys. Iraq made extensive use of decoy missiles in and 
around launch areas. "Some of these decoys were so realistic 
that UN inspectors later stated that they could not be 
distinguished from real launchers on the ground, and they 
were mixed with low-fidelity decoys to make targeting even 
more difficult. "105 
Given the lack of success in detection, targeting and 
destruction of these missiles by the Air Force, Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) from the United States and Britain 
were given the task. These forces took the form of an 877-
man force comQosed of special operations aviation and ground 
forces. These forces infiltrated primarily into western Iraq 
with the mission of conducting surveillance of suspected 
Scud missile production, support and launch sites .. They were 
also tasked with conducting reconnaissance in the open 
desert to locate dispersed TELs before they had a chance to 
fire their Scud missiles. SOF forces were not very effective 
at the tactical level: However, their operations did have a 
strategic and political effect. Knowledge that the U.S and 
Britain had committed their most elite ground and air forces 
was a contributing factor that prevented Israel from 
entering the war. 
105 Cohen, E. (Ed.) Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, 
Part II, p. 331, 334-336, 340. 
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5. The Ground War 
The United States had a total of 50 Pioneer Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in its inventory at the start of 
Desert Storm. The Army had only one Pioneer ~latoon at the 
start of the war and it did not arrive in Saudi Arabia until 
late January and did not fly its first mission until 
February 1st • The Army pioneers flew a total of 46 sorties 
for a total, of 155 flight hours. "The USMC had four Pioneer 
companies which were used for real time situation analysis 
utilizinq day television cameras and forward-looking 
infrared sensors. The USMC flew 138 missions 'and 318 hours 
during Desert Shield and 185 missions and 622 hours during 
Desert Storm." 106 The US Navy was able to use Pioneers off 
two different battleshi2s in the Gulf for 151 sorties and 
520 flight hours. The Pioneer UAVs received accolades from 
the forces that used them. The Qioneers Qrovided near-real 
time imagery for tactical commanders of the targets that 
were directly in front of them. However their range of 120 
miles and loiter time of 4-5 hours prevented their use in 
targeting and BDA deep into Iraq. 




Satellites, which comprise the National Technical Means 
(NTM) for intelligence gathering, acted as the primary 
source of intelliqence information durinq Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm. The US had a variety of satellites available 
during the conflict. 
a) KH-11 Imagery satellite 
Three KH-11 imagery satellites were in orbit 
during Desert Shield/Storm. These satellites were known by 
the codename KENNAN. The KH-11 "flies lenqthwise with the 
axis of the opt.;Lcal system parallel to the earth. ,In front 
is a downward lookinq mirror that can be rotated from side 
to side, causing a periscope effect in which the area being 
viewed can change from moment to moment. "107 The primary 
ground station for the KH-11 satellites is the Mission 
Ground Site at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. It's official name is 
the Defense Communications Electronics Evaluation and 
Testing Facility. 
These satellites could not image targets through 
cloud cover and 40-60% of Iraq was covered with clouds from 
December 1990 throuqh January 1991. The fact that Kuwait was 
107 Richelson, J. (1995). The US Intelligence Community. 
Boulder, Westview Press. p. 152. 
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covered with smoke from burning oil fields during 
app~oximately 50% of the satellite observations also reduced 
their effectiveness. This generation of satellites also 
lacked wide area coverage that caused some planners to 
compare them to "searching New York City by looking through 
a soda straw. "108 
The greatest value of the KH-11 is that it was the 
first satellite that could not run out of film. While 
previous satellites would drop a film canister from space 
for retrieval, the KH-11 could digitize the images it took 
and transmit it to a ground station in near real-time. The 
ability of the KH-11 to digitize imagery combined with an 
increase in its fuel payload greatly extended its life span 
beyond previous satellites. While previous satellites (KH-8 
and KH-9) had a life span of 270 days, the KH-11 far 
surpassed their performance (Figure 4.1) 
108 US Congress. (August 16, 1993). Intelligence Successes 
and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Washington 
D. C ., GPO. p. 10 
Launch Date 
December 19, 1976 
June 14, 1978 
February 7, 1980 
September 3, 1981 
November 17, 1982 
December 4, 1984 
October 27~ 1987 
November 6, 1988 
Deorbited 
January 28, 1979 
August 23, 1981 
October 30, 1982 
November 23, 1984 
August 13, 1985 
November 1994 
November 1992* 
Still in Orbit 
* Inferred from a late 1992 launch. 
A Approximation 
Figure 4.1 









During the initial staqes of the KH-ll program the 
CIA was successful in its argUment that KH-ll imagery should 
not be provided to the military. The reasoning was that its 
capabilities were so advanced that to prevent its compromise 
only senior level ~olicy makers should have the data. This 
policy held until a disgruntled CIA employee sold the KH-ll 
technical manual to the KGB. Various classified photos taken 
by the KH-ll have been published in open sources. One 
notable example occurred after the failed Iran Hostage 
rescue mission. Various photos were left behind in 
helicoRters at Desert One. These photos were recovered by 
the Iranian military and published by Iranian students. 
While the KH-ll has consistently proven its value, 
its deployment has been problematic. During the mid 1980s 
the US was reduced to one KH-ll satellite. The intent of the 
intelligence community was to maintain at least two in orbit 
109 Richelson, J. (1995). The US Intelligence Community. 
Boulder, Westview Press. p. 153. 
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at all times. On August 28, 1985, an attempt to launch a KH-
11 using a Titan 34D booster failed crashing into the 
pacific. The destruction of the space shuttle Challenger 
soon after, eliminated the shuttle as a method of transport. 
Attempts to launch a KH-9 substitute failed when another 
Titan 34D booster exploded destroying the satellite at a 
height of 800 feet. Finally, on October 26, 1987 a Titan 34D 
carrying a KH-11 was successfully launched. In the meantime, 
the United States had to rely on one satellite for a period 
of over two years. 
bl Lacross.e Radar Imaging Sate~~ite 
This satellite was initially known by the code 
name INDIGO and was later n~ed LACROSSE. Its initial 
purpose was to locate Warsaw Pact armor forces during all 
weather conditions~ especially cloud cover. This is critical 
as many countries are covered by clouds as much as 70% of 
each year. In order to develop a picture of an area or a 
region it might take a years worth of imagery organized asa 
montage to develop a complete picture. This satellite 
provided thousands of images during Desert Shield/Storm. It 
effectiveness was reduced as it only passed over Iraq twice 
d~~ly and could not discriminate between different types of 
vehicles. Processing of data required on average 15-20 
minutes for downlink and processing. It assisted in 
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targeting and bomb damage assessment (BDA). However, BDA of 
tanks was accomplished by looking for vehicles that remained 
stationary after an air strike. If the vehicle did not move 
for a lengthy 2eriod, the 2hoto analysts assumed that the 
vehicle had been destroyed. 
The LACROSSE satellite orbits at about 400 miles 
above earth and has a resolution of approximately I-meter. 
In comparison, the KH-I1 has a resolution of approximately 
10 centimeters. While the LACROSSE can image through clouds, 
its limited resolution prevented it from detecting details 
such as scorch marks on a target which would indicate the 
destruction of a vehicle or building. Data from the 
satellite is relayed to a ground station in White Sands, New 
Mexico by a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite .110 Martin 
Marietta built the satellite at a cost of approximately 1 
billion dollars. 
c) The Defense Sqpport Program SateIIite 
The DSPS uses a twelve-foot infrared telescope to 
detect the infrared plumes of SCUD missile launches. The 
DSPS satellites had been used to track Iraqi SCUD testing in 
December of 1990. These satellites had the capability to 
transmit and share data in real time with JSTARS, Patriot 
110 Richelson, J. (1995). The US Intelligence Community. 
Boulder, Westview Press. p. 157. 
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missile batteries and other systems. The accuracy of the 
DSPS was limited to determininq the location of a launch 
within 30 nautical miles and the data would take several 
minutes to proc~ss. The DSP could not locate the SCUD 
launchers with enough accuracy for follow on air strikes. 
2. Air Surveillance 
Air Surveillance was used in conjunction with 
satellites for the detection, targeting and bomb damage 
assessment of tactical targets. While satellites were used 
during both Desert Shield and StormL these systems were not 
used until the start of the air war. 
a) JSTARS 
The Air Force-Army Joint Surveillance a~d Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS-E8A) was still in development at 
the ens_at. o£ DeseI:t Shieldi StQ:r:::ID...- Lt was an airborne 
surveillance aircraft similar to the AWACS but designed to 
focus on ground targets instead of aircraft. It consisted of 
a modified B-707 aircraft with a variety of computers, 
sensors, and communications systems that allowed it to 
transmit data to ground station modules. These modules could 
be deployed in theater as well as the United States. It 
provided commanders with near real time information on 
moving targets in virtually all weather conditions. 
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The JSTARS is equipped with Side-Looking Aperture 
Radar (SLAR) with a high resolution. It is mounted in a 24-
foot radome in the nose of the aircraft. ~It typically 
operates at a distance of 80-120 kilometers from the front 
lines and can detect vehicle locations, numbers and 
movement."lll Surveillance coverage of areas measuring 25 by 
20-kilometer sections can achieve great detail and detailed 
targeting can be achieved using 4 by 4-kilometer sectors. 
The US Air Force (USAF) initially resisted the deployment'of 
JSTARs to the Gulf because it was an experimental system. 
The USAF believed that it might complicate the conduct of 
air battle management and there was also the danger that it 
might be lost·to air or ground fire. This resistance 
continued even though the USAF knew that December through 
February were the worst months for satellite imagery due to 
heavy cloud cover. Clouds could be expected to obscure the 
region from 40-60% of the time. This system was eventually 
deployed to the Gulf because of congressional inquiries 
combined with requests from 7th Corps officers, had seen a 
successful demonstration of its capabilities. 
Two JSTARs were deployed to the Gulf and arrived a 
few days prior to the start of Desert Storm. Both were 
experimental and were deployed missing large components that 
111 Cordesman, A., Wagner, A. (1996). The Lessons of Modern 
War, Volume IV: The Gulf War. Westview Press, Boulder. p . 
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had not yet been completed. The JSTARS lacked the ability to 
discriminate between vehicle types and it could not detect 
stationary vehicles. It's computers also proved inadequate 
to handle all of the data processinq reqpirements of its 
systems. This created numerous difficulties when 
communicating with strike aircraft for battle management. 
The JSTARS systems also required extensive maintenance. The 
lack of spare systems and parts reqpired the cannibalization 
of one aircraft to keep the other flying. This limited the 
degree of coverage 20ssible and resulted in a total of 44 
air missions during the entire war. The ground station 
modules also had problems. They were initially designed to 
handle the data from the JSTARS and other surveillance 
aircraft simultaneously. However, it qpickly became apparent 
that the modules could only handle data from one aircraft at 
a time. 
b) TR-l 
The TR-l is the successor to the U-2R surveillance 
aircraft. Its purpose is tactical reconnaissance. It has a 
high-altitude reconnaissance capability with speeds in 
excess of 430 miles per hour and a range of 3,000 miles. The 
TR-l can fly at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. It was 
equipped with an electronic intelligence capability, 
advanced synthetic aperture side-Iookin~ radar (ASARS), 
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photographic and infrared capabilities. These capabilities 
enabled the TR-l to cover an area 180 kilometers wide and 
5,000 kilometers long on a single mission. The ASARS was 
regarded as an excellent system for detectinqmoving targets 
and battle management. The TR-l was deployed with a mobile 
ground 'station, which could receive and process the radar 
data in real time and disseminate it to the user level. 
However, the TR-l is susceptible to anti-aircraft defenses 
and requires a "force package" of electronic jamming 
aircraft and fighters to defend it. Five TR-l aircraft were 
deployed to the Gulf. 
c) U-2R 
The U-2R is a strategic surveillance aircraft. The 
U-2R has a wingspan of 103 feet, a height of 16 feet and a 
length of 63 feet. It can range 3,000 miles with a maximum 
speed of 528 knots at an altitude of 40,000-70,000 feet. It 
was a successor to the U-2 series of aircraft. The U2-R is 
equipped with an H camera system, which can provide 
resolution varying from 6 to 18 inches at a distance of 35-
40 nautical miles. It is also equipped with an advanced 
synthetic ~erture Radar System (ASARS) which is an all-
weather and light condition imaging system. It was designed 
to detect, locate and classify ground targets. The ASARS is 
designed to provide 10-foot resolution in near real time. It 
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is also capable of slant photography in which it can look 
into a target area at an angle without having to cross a 
border or into an area defended by anti aircraft systems. 
d) RF-4C Phantom II 
The RF-4C is a multi-sensor reconnaissance 
aircraft capable of day and night operations. It can fly at 
altitudes of 100 to 45,000 feet at speeds in excess of 600 
miles 2er hour. It has optical, infrared and electronic 
reconnaissance systems. Its cameras have good resolution for 
high and low altitude photography during the day. It also 
has an infrared sensor that can produce a continuous map at 
night of the area located along the aircraft's flight path. 
It can record reconnaissance data on film but this must be 
downloaded and processed after landing. This feature 
prevented BDA and targeting data from being used in real-
time. A total of 24 RF-4C aircraft were deployed to the 
gulf, 12 of which did not arrive until just before the air 
war began. "It took outside command pressure on the Air 
Force to persuade it to devote ramp space to the RF-4Cs."112 
At the time of Desert Storm, the RF-4C aircraft were 
considered by many to be obsolete. They had initially served 
as reconnaissance aircraft in Vietnam and only a small 
number of the aircraft remained in the inventory, almost all 
112 Ibid, p. 312 
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of which were in the air national guard. The RF-4C flew 822 
sorties larqely in sUQport of BDA missions. 
e) UAVs 
Each of the services had an Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) program at the time of the Gulf War. The Army 
had previously canceled its Acquilla UAV program because of 
program mismanagement. The US Air Force was in a similar 
situation as it had concentrated on developing strategic 
UAVs which had little application for tactical and theater 
operations. All of the services were forced to rely on a 
modified Israeli UAV named the Pioneer until others could be 
developed. 
(1) . Pioneer. The Pioneer unmanned 
aerial vehicle has a length of 14 feet and a wingspan of 17 
feet. Its rang_e was aI?proximately 120 miles and it has a 
mission altitude of 1,000 to 12,000 feet. The Pioneer's most 
significant limitatiqn is that it is a line of sight 
aircraft. The Pioneer must operate within line of sight 
(avoid terrain which might interrupt its command frequency) 
of its associated ground station. It has an endurance of 4-5 
hours, and has both video and a forward-looking infrared 
capability. During UAV operations 12 were destroyed, 11 
suffered maj or damage and 3 suffered minor damage. Out of 
these, 1 was shot down by ground fire, 2 destroyed by 
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operator error, 3 by electro-magnetic interference and 6 
from general or engine failure. Damage was due to small arms 
fire, operator error.and engine problems. 
While the pioneer UAV system was 
relatively primitive at the time of Desert Storm, it was 
successful because it was able to support the needs of the 
tactical commanders. UAVs provided focused, real-time 
information- on what was in front of the divisions and corps. 
It was a survivable system, as the loss of a UAV did not 
mean the loss of an aircrew. It could loiter over a target 
area for a few hours while providing target observation from 
different angles. The Pioneer could provide the resolution 
needed to detect tanks, convoys, and troop movements during 
dayliqht that were needed at the tactical level. However, 
the Pioneer lacked the range needed for targeting and BDA of 
targets deep inside Iraq and Kuwait. 
(21 Pointer. The pointer was a 
light, hand-launched remotely piloted vehic-le used by the 
Marine Corps. It was a·failure as it was very fragile, and 
had an extremely limited range that prevented it from 
gathering enough information over a widely spread 
battlefield to be useful. 
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(3) High Altitude Endurance UAV. 
With the.- cancel 1 ati on o.L the.- SR::-7:L theater reconnaissance 
aircraft, the US Air Force planned a long-loiter, high-
altitude,. unmanned aerial vehicle as its re~lacement. This . 
program was a failure with technological problems at 
numerous levels resulting in crashes. The cancellation of 
the SR-71 combined with a failing follow on program left the 
US Air_ FQrce withQut a thaater reconnaissance aircraft 
during the Gulf War. Attempts were made to revive the SR-71 
during and after the war but the costs and lack of aircraft 
parts prevented its return. The High Altitude Endurance UAV 
never flew during the war. 
E. ANALYSIS 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War Brigadier General 
Scales [Army Chief of Staff for CENTCOM]wrote that 
"Strategic intelligence, intended to support a host of users 
at the national level, has only limited application to 
tactical theaters. In the desert, .commanders' expectations, 
especially below corps, remained unmet. Finished 
intelligence produced at the national level was not 
necessarily suitable for tactical planning."Il3 While many 
were unsatisfied with the amount of intelliqence available, 
Desert Storm was probably the most successful war the United 
113 Scales, R. (1994). Certain Victory: The US Army in the 
Gulf War. Washington D.C., Brasseys. P. 163-164 
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States has fought. The US military accomplished its 
objectives rapidly with the added benefit of minimal 
casualties. However, there were many lessons to be learned, 
especially at the tactical level. One of these lessons is 
the need for improvement in order to achieve precision 
engagement. 
As noted, Precision Engagement has five component 
parts: Targeting, Command and Control (C2), the ability to 
achieve a desired effect~ the ability to assess the level" of 
effectiveness achieved (BDA) and the ability to re-engage 
when required. In order to achieve these requirements the 
air and space sensors had to fulfill a number of criteria. 
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Figure 4.2.Sensor Criteria for Precision Engagement 
1. Targeting 
For targeting~ sensors had to be delivered to a 
1..56. 
location or orbit where they could sense the target. Second, 
the sensors had to be covert to Qrevent the enemy from 
destroying them or innovating around them. Third, the 
sensors had to be ca2able of discriminating between a 
variety of targets. 
a) Del.i very 
Satellites were the dominant form of surveillance 
during the Gulf War. The United States was fortunate that 
it had a great number of imaging satellites in orbit at the 
beginning of Desert Shield. In fact, the four imaging 
satellites available 90nstituted a larqer number than had 
previously been in space at one time. While these satellites 
were already in"place, their historical 'deployment has been' 
problematic. Satellites are extremely expensive to build and 
have a finite life span. Puttinq them in orbit is another 
problem. While numerous satellites have been built, many are 
waiting in storage for a means of delivery into orbit. Just 
prior to the Gulf conflict, the United States found itself 
with only one imaqery satellite in orbit due to launch 
failures and the destruction of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger. Satellites cannot be launched on short notice 
due,to the extensive logistical requirements, cost and 
limited number of delivery systems. Additionally, the short 
duration of many contingency operations conducted by the 
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military would result in satellites being deployed at the 
tail end of conflicts or after the fact. While there were 
an extensive number of satellites in orbit during the Gulf 
War, that number has been siqnificantly reduced in recent 
years due to declining budgets. It is doubtful that if the 
Gulf War were conducted today that space systems would play 
as important a role in the conflict. 
The ability to deploy aircraft sensors within 
range of the enemy was a mixed story. The JSTARS and TR-
I/U2-R aircraft had to conduct surveillance of the enemy 
from a standoff distance due to the Iraqi air defenses. The 
U-2 series aircraft has a history of being shot down over 
denied territory with multiple losses in Russia and China. 
The loss of an aircraft not only results in the loss of an 
aircrew and sensor system but may also provide the enemy 
with access to technoloqy that he miqht not otherwise have. 
While these aircraft could sense targets from a standoff 
position, they did not have the ranqe to 2rovide coverage of 
the entire battlefield. This required international 
agreements with Syria and other countries for permission to 
overfly their territory. Other nations may not be so willing 
to provide this access in future conflicts. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles were widely praised 
during the Gulf War. They could be launched from the front 
providing reconnaissance for the lead Corps and Divisions. 
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The UAVs were survivable, as their loss did not equate to 
the loss of an aircrew. Additionally, the UAVs were basic 
enough that the loss of UAV technology would not compromise 
a secret technology. However L the range of the Pioneer UAV 
was limited to 120 miles preventing its use in the deep 
battle area in Iraq and Kuwait. 
b) Covert 
None of the satellites were covert. Iraq had 
accurate information regarding the orbits and observation 
times of the satellites as well as a general knowledge of 
their capabilities. Russia and other countries provided much 
of this information. Iraq also purchased a large amount of 
satellite imagery from commercial companies and foreign 
sources which enabled it to determine how to innovate around 
the satellites. This led to the use of decoys, which were 
detected as if they were the real thing. It also led to 
tactics of dispersion, rapid l~unches, and operations at 
night during periods of maximum cloud cover. Iraq even 
started hundreds of oil fires throughout Kuwait to create a 
smoke screen to defeat coalition surveillance systems. 
The sensors of the JSTARS and TR-1/U2-R were not 
covert. The aircraft could easily be detected by radar 
requiring that they operate at a standoff distance. While 
the aircraft could defy the radars if accompanied by 
electronic jamming aircraft, this required a force package 
of aircraft to support the operation. By the very nature of 
jamming the radars, the aircraft would be signaling that 
they were in the area. The Ira~i innovations of launching 
Scud missiles during cloud cover or under the umbrella of 
smoke_ alae jnhibjted the aurveillance aircraft. 
c) Discrimination 
Satellites had a variety of capabilities for 
discriminating between targets. The KH-11s could 
discriminate between tanks~ armored personnel carriers and 
other types of vehicular targets. However, they did not have 
the resolution necessary to detect personnel. Air 
surveillance aircraft cQuld detect moving targets such as 
cars or tanka but could not differentiate between them. As 
such a convoy of cars would look the same as a convoy of 
tanks. Additionally~ these aircraft could not detect 
stationary targets. While much has been said of Iraq's 
failure to act offensively~ its defensive tactics frustrated 
the detection efforts of air surveillance. UAVs were 
successful in discriminating between different types of 
targets ranging from tanks to 'infantry soldiers. However, 
the utility of UAVs was limited by their short range, 
limited loiter time and reliance on line-of-sight 
communications. 
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2. Corrmand and Control 
Command and Control is the ability to manage a diverse 
amount of forces and resources to accomplish a particular 
mission. In the Gulf War, commanders had to manage a large 
amount of information such as imagery, and send it to the 
right user to increase their chances of mission success. 
Central to successful Command and Control in the Gulf War 
was the ability to disseminate information about the enemy. 
a) Dissemination 
Processing-and the dissemination of satellite 
imagery was one of the major bottlenecks during the 
conflict. While a number of secondary ima~ery systems were 
available, each of the military services and other joint 
commands had different systems. These did not share a 
standardized communications protocol and were not 
interoQerable. While some systems proved their value, they 
arrived in theater late in the conflict, they were very 
expensive and they were limited in number. While data could 
be passed in near-real time, the security classification of 
the material Qrevented its transmittal over anything but a 
.secure fax machine. The lack of adequate Secondary Imagery 
Dissemination systems (SIDs) resulted in the use of couriers 
adding as much as 18 hours or more to the time required for 
dissemination. Dissemination was also limited as the 
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secretive nature of US satellite capabilities often limited 
the ability of the military to share the photos with forces 
at the lower echelons. 
Air surveillance aircraft performed significantly 
better than their satellite counterparts. Both the JSTARS 
and TR-l aircraft could transmit their images and 
surveillance data in real time to other aircraft and ground 
stations. This supported the rapid dissemination of 
targeting data to other aircraft in flight. However, the 
ground stations often became the bottleneck. Ground systems 
that were supposed to simultaneously handle the information 
provided by multiple aircraft became overloaded. This 
overload reached the point where each ground station could 
only support one aircraft. Some aircraft were limited to 
film based reconnaissance which required development in 
theater..aft.er tha aircraft landed. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles also performed 
dissemination well. UAVs could transmit optical imagery in 
real time to their associated ground stations in theater. 
This enabled the lead Corps and Division commanders to 
visualize the battlefield immediately in front of them. 
However~ the ability to share the data was limited by the 
number of ground stations. The limited size of the UAV force 




The ability to achieve a desired effect against a 
target is not restricted to the sensor itself. It 
encompasses accurate targetin~ the size and type of force 
allocated to the mission and the type and quantity of 
munitions expended against a target. In order to facilitate 
these requirements, various types of sensor data must be 
fused together to provide a complete picture of the target 
and the battlefield. 
a) FUsion 
Satellite and air surveillance data were not fused 
into a coherent picture of the battlefield. Each type of 
data was treated in a separate manner with a priority focus 
on optical imagery. While multiple types of sensings could 
be made~ each target would often be detected, attacked, and 
assessed for BDA based on a single image. This image was 
often an o2tical image taken during daylight and after the 
third day of the air war, optical images were often late, 
inaccurate or unusable. The inability to fuse the data was 
partly a result of poor dissemination. However, a larger 
part of the story was the inability of the ground stations 
to process data from more than one aircraft at a time or the 
lack of ground station terminals in theater. Yet another 
aspect was the centralized control held over these systems 
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in which processing was conducted in the United States and 
then forwarded into theater. 
4. Battle Damage Assessment 
BDA is the ability to assess the level of effectiveness 
of an airs trike or attack by determining if a bomb or 
munition had hit its target, and if hit what effect that had 
achieved. Various methods have been employed to assess 
battle damage. The ultimate goal is to get the target to 
tell you if it is alive or dead. This is done by observing 
its actions or signature relative to a functioning target or 
previous observation of the same target. This is best 
described as interrogating the target. 
a) Interroga tion. 
The Gulf War is another in a succession of 
historical failures to adequately conduct bomb damage 
assessment. While much has been written of the failure to 
adequately conduct BDA in the Gulf, the United States has 
historically had immense problems in this area. This failure 
was more of an inability to learn and prepare based on 
lessons from ~revious conflicts as opposed to a unique 
problem that occurred in the Gulf. Bomb damage assessment in 
g~~eral is a lengthy and highly inaccurate 2rocess. Multiple 
types of methods were used to determine if a weapon had hit 
a given target and if hit, whether it had achieved a kill. 
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The coalition forces were more successful at determining if 
a bomb hit its target. 
Many observ~rs were awed by the use of precision 
guided munitions during the Gulf War. Videotapes of bombs 
penetrating a 2recise location such as a window or 
ventilation duct were shown on TV. However, the military was 
unable to determine what level of destruction had been 
achieved as the effects of the bombs were often contained 
within the building. Even more problematic was the ability 
to assess the effect achieved on dispersed targets such as 
tanks. This re~ired thousands of images to determine if 
area munitions had destroyed individual tanks. While scorch 
marks~ were sometimes a tellinq sign of the destruction of a 
building, evidence to indicate the destruction of a dug in 
tank was much more obscure. This forced the coalition to 
assess the destruction of a tank largely on whether or not 
it was moving or stationary. If it could move it was alive, 
if it was stationary, it was dead. Iraq's ~eliance on 
stationary and defensive tactics prevented an accurate 
accounting of its forces. 
What the coalition needed was the ability to 
interrogate the target to determine if it was alive. Were 
soldiers located around the vehicle? Was the engine of the 
tank emitting exhaust fumes? Was the tank making noises that 
could be detected by an acoustic sensor? Des~ite the desire 
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to remain concealed, the crews of these types of vehicles 
had no choice but to run their engines periodically to 
recharge their batteries. Without charged batteries they 
could not start their vehicles, power their sights, enable 
radio communications or operate heaters. These are the kinds 
of emissions that would have indicated the life or death of 
a tank. These were exact types of signals that air and space 
surveillance could not detect. 
This inability to c~nduct BDA led to repeated 
airs trikes against the same tanks or target until the damage 
was so catastrophic that it was obviously dead. This placed 
numerous aircrews in harms way as they attacked through 
heavy air defenses and placed their lives on the line to 
attack a target that had been killed two or three times 
before. It also resulted in the excess expenditure of 
different tmes of munitions to conduct re}2eated airstrikes. 
5. Re-engage 
After assessing the effect of munitions against a 
target, assessors invariably conclude that some have escaped 
destruction or have sustained minimal damage, which allows 
them to continue operating. This necessitates the ability to 
reengage a target when re~ired. Central to this requirement 
is the endurance of a particular sensor. If it can operate 
24 hours a day every day, then it can su~port targeting, 
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command and control, and BDA for a second strike against the 
same target. 
a) Endurance 
The satellites and reconnaissance aircraft were 
not capable of providing 24-hour coverage of the 
battlefield. For satellitesJ. this was a function of their 
orbit that would result in one pass every five or twelve-
hours. Each of these ~asses would. often be of different 
locations of Iraq and Kuwait. Satellites were also inhibited 
by the limitations of their onboard sensors. The inability 
to observe the battlefield at night, through cloud cover, or 
through a man-made smoke screen prevented 24 hour a day 
coverage of the battlefield. 
Surveillance aircraft were not capable of filling 
the gap. Their fuel capacity and aircrews limited their 
endurance. There were only two JSTARS aircraft available and 
one was constantly being cannibalized in order to keep the 
other flying. Aircraft flyinq in a protecting role for 
electronic jamming and fighter escort had even less 
endurance than the aircraft conducting the surveillance. 
Finally, aircraft such as the RF-4C were limited to film 
based surveillance and the only way to obtain the 
reconnaissance information required them to return to base 
for developing and analysis of their film. This limitation 
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inhibited 24 hour targeting, command and control, the 
ability to achieve a desired effect, the ability to assess 
the destruction of targets, and the ability to re-engage 
targets that were not destroyed after an initial airstrike. 
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v. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
That's an amazing invention, but who would ever want to use one of them? 
-President Rutherford B. Hayes114 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer two research 
questions. 
• What role can UGS fill in precision engagement? 
• What are the costs, benefits, and unintended consequences 
of UGS? 
The answers to these questions will be used to generate a 
prescription for the future of UGS whil~ demonstrating its 
linkage to historical evidence. This chapter will conclude 
by summarizing the results of the study 
B.- ROLF,!S AND MISSIONS 
There are two roles which ground sensors can fill in 
precision engagement. First, UGS may substitute for other 
systems. This could achieve an economy of force enabling a 
high-cost or limited air or space sensor to focus on other 
missions. UGS may also be used as a substitute for highly 
classified sensors enabling sensor information and 
114 Comment made by President Rutheford B. Hayes to 
Alexander Graham Bell upon the invention of the telephone. 
Malone, J. (1997). Predicting the Future: From Jules Verne 
to Bill Gates. New York, M. Evans and Company, Inc. 
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technology to be shared with a coalition partner. A second 
role for UGS is as a complement to other systems. UGS would 
be used to provide a capability air and space sensors cannot 
or as a force multiplier to augment other sensors. This 
would support specialized missions requiring specific 
intelligence, an ability to speed detection and targeting, 
or to enable "force projection of a tactical military 
intelligence capability. 
1. Substitute Role 
a) Re~ease of Air and Space Assets 
UGS have the potential to substitute for high-cost 
and limited resources. This would release aerial 
reconnaissance aircraft and satellites from a tactical role 
and enable them to focus on strategic priorities: Both the 
peacekeeping mission in the Sinai and the conduct of 
operation Igloo White in Vietnam are examples of using 
ground sensors as a "substitute." In these cases, UGS 
provided an expansion of choice for tarqeting and precision 
engagement. UGS also provided a capability that air and 
space sensors could not. Air and space sensors did not have 
the endurance, or resolution necessary to target individual 
soldiers and vehicles in either the Sinai or Vietnam. They 
were also limited in their ability to target an enemy hiding 
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under triple canopy jungle. 115 Use of UGS as a substitute 
may also extend the life s2an of other sensor systems such 
as satellites because they would not be required to perform 
as many missions or be re-tasked which might reduce their 
limited fuel supply. 
bl Coa~ition SUpport 
The US led coalition in the Gulf War was almost 
completely dependent upon US intelligence gathering 
capabilities. The great disparity between the American and 
Iraqi intelliqence ca2abilities 2laced the coalition in a 
position of fighting a "blind" enemy. However, if the U.S 
had not been part of the coalition it is believed that the 
conflict would have been characteri,zed as the blind fighting 
the blind. While the US did share a great deal of 
intelligence information with its coalition partners, it was 
a very difficult process in which certain materials could 
not be shared due tO,the sensitive nature of their 
collection. It was also difficult because the coalition 
forces did not have the technology to receive or disseminate 
imagery and other types of intelligence. UGS hold the 
potential of acting as a substitute for much of the 
115 See Callan, C. (1996). ~crosurveillance of the Urban Battlefield. 
McLean, Virginia, ~tre Corporation. 
Also see Cindrich, I., Del Grande, N., Johnson, P. (1993). Underground 
and Obscured Object Imaging and Detection. Washington, SPIE 
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classified intelligence and targeting systems used in the 
gulf. The devel02ment of unclassified sensors and monitoring 
equipment could be shared with coalition partners during a 
conflict. Unclassified UGS could also be provided to a non-
US led coalition to enable them to conduct targeting without 
requiring constant support from US intelligence sources. 
While some may become concerned that UGS might be used 
in a manner contrary to US interests L this danger can be 
reduced. A solution might be the use of "expireware". 
Either the sensors, monitorinq e@ipment or both could be 
loaded with software that has a built in expiration date by 
either date or number of uses. Or , it could be loaded with a 
device that requires it to receive a periodic signal, which 
allows it to continue operating. 
2. Corrplementary Role 
a) B.Pecia~ized mission 
UGS may be used to complement other sensors to 
accomplish a specialized mission. The Son Tay rescue mission 
in North Vietnam is an example. During the Vietnam War, 
intelligence information qained by satellite photography 
indicated that a number of American pilots were being held 
as prisoners of war (POW) in a North Vietnamese Prison camp 
called Son Tay. Their initial presence was confirmed through 
air and space 2hotoqraphy of code letters marked on the 
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ground by the POWs. A rescue force was assembled and 
trained for the mission. In the weeks leading up to the 
mission, concerns arose as to whether the POWs had been 
moved. An agent was infiltrated into North Vietnam to 
reconnoiter the outside of the camp but was unable to 
confirm the presence of American POWs. The operation was 
later conducted and was unsuccessful in rescuing POWs as 
they had been relocated a short time earlier. After the 
mission failed, "Military Intelligence officials would admit 
that there was one ace card they had failed to play: 
acoustic and seismic sensors to spike the camp at Son Tay." 
116 Brigadier General Donald Blackburn the commander of the 
Son Tay mission had even been part of the development of the 
sensors but had not thought of using them for the mission. 
"In retrospect [Blackburn] said he would have spiked the 
camp, and to mask the real obiective, the Air Force could 
have seeded every other rice paddy in North Vietnam." 117 
bl Force MIl~tip~ier 
The great Scud chase is an example of how UGS 
could be employed with great benefit as a complement to air 
and space sensors. In the Gulf, satellites and air 
surveillance were successful in locating fixed launch pads 
116 Schemmer, B. (1976). The Raid. New York, Avon Books. p 
101 
117 Ibid, P 103 
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for Scuds as well as factories and other fixed facilities. 
However, in the conduct of locating mobile missile 
launchers, air and space systems were inadequate. Air and 
space sensors tYQically detect and 2rovide the location of a 
target with the accuracy of a 1 by 1 kilometer grid square. 
Desert Storm 2roved that this level of accuracy was not 
sufficient. Air Force aircraft could not locate the .Scud 
missiles and dro22inq a cluster bomb within this grid square 
did not have a destructive radius capable of destroying the 
target (See Figure 4.1). 118 





...... 1----+ Cluster 
Bomb .coverage 
Example of cluster bomb kill radius overlaid 
on satellite determined Scud location 
UGS used in Vietnam were limited in their range and 
could only locate a tarqet if it 2assed within a few hundred 
meters of the sensor. This limitation actually enforced 
118 It is important to note that different types of cluster bomb 
munitions have a different destructive radius and capability. The 
coverage achieved by a cluster bomb is determined by the height at which 
the bomb releases its ~ayload. Many cluster bomb munitions can achieve a 
very large area of coverage by releasing their payload at a high 
altitude but this reduces the ratio of bomblets to square feet reducing 
the possibility of hitting a target. 
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accuracy in targeting and achieved precision engagement. 
When a UGS detected a target l it meant that the target had 
to be located within approximately 300M of the sensor. If an 
Air Force aircraft dropped a bomb directly center of mass of 
the sensor, the kill radius of the cluster bomb was often 
sufficient to achieve a kill or at the very least 
incremental damage (See Figure 4.2). The employment of UGS 
in this role would serve as a force mUltiplier for detection 
and targeting where satellites and air surveillance focused 
on fixed launch sites, while UGS targeted mobile launchers. 
UGS would also provide a form of redundancy where the loss 
o£_a_sateJJ;te. OL Sll.L\Z:e;JJance aircraft w01J.l4 not result in 
the inability to conduct targeting and precision engagement. 
Figure 4.2 
Example of cluster bomb kill radius 
overlaid on UGS determined Scud location 
c) Force Projection 
A final role for UGS is force projection. In the 
Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf initially left his tactical 
military intelligence assets behind in order to deploy 
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combat forces into theater. This forced him to rely heavily 
on National Technical Means (NTM) for targeting the Iraqi 
military. Part of the reasoning for this was the danger that 
lightly armed Military Intelligence forces would be overrun. 
This decision was also made with the recognition that many 
of the tactical collection systems available could not keep 
pace with a rapidly moving mechanized and armored force. The 
use of UGS may solve this Qroblem. UGS have the potential of 
providing the tactical commander with a means of conducting 
targeting while reqpiring the deployment of a small Military 
Intelligence force into theater. 119 The force would 
consist of aircraft and sQecial oQerations ·forces (SOF) that 
could deliver ground sensors. The Milit~ry Intelligence 
force required to monitor these sensors would be relatively 
small and the UGS would provide a tactical capability that 
was sorely lacking during the Gulf War. 
C. BENEFITS AND COSTS 
Unattended Ground Sensors have numerous benefits, many 
of which are embedded in their role as a substitute or as a 
complement to other systems. However, the use of UGS to 
reduce the "fog of war" may enable even greater benefits to 
119 See Seffers, G. (1997, September, 1). Report: Adequate Land ~ne 
Replacement Could Run Billions. The Army Times{ p 1-4. Also see Seffers, 
G. (1998, January, 12). Army to Test High-Tech Battlefield Weapons: 
Equipment Could Boost Early-Entry Force Defenses. The Army Times, p 8. 
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be achieved. These benefits are "tailor to task" forces and 
reduced basing requirements. 
1. Benefits 
a1 "Tai~or to Task" Forces 
The US military has traditionally deployed the 
bulk of its forces into theater whenever drawn into a 
conflict. This has taken excessive amounts of resources, 
material, and manpower to accomplish. This is done because 
the military wants to ensure that is has an adequate amount 
of forces and resources necessary to prosecute the conflict 
and achieve a quick solution. The need for large forces is 
tied to the commander's lack of intelliqence information to 
confirm locations, strength, disposition, and capabilities 
of the enemy in theater. The direct result is that 
commanders over-estimate their needs to ensure success. 
Ground sensors have the potential of improving the ability 
of commanders to reduce the "fog of war" enabling them to 
accurately tailor their forces based on an accurate picture 
of the enemy. This "tailor to task" capability will then 
allow commanders to respond to conflicts faster, with 
smaller, more lethal forces. 120 
120 Schoomaker, P. (1998). Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead. 
Florida, USSOCOM, p3. 
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b) Reduced Basing Requirements 
One of the most significant issues today is the 
unwillingness of countries to support the forward basing of 
US military trooRs. The absence of forward bases requires 
the US military to concentrate on force projection, in order 
to remain relevant for maior regional conflicts (MRC). If 
ground sensors significantly increase the ability to "tailor 
to taslC' forces then... it should hold tJ:.ua ~at fewer forces 
are required to support an MRC. If fewer forces are 
required~ then the US military needs smaller or fewer bases. 
As the development and employment of ground sensors and 
other sensor systems 2roduces a ca2ability that will 
identify the "Achilles Heel" of an enemy, the force required 
may be so small that a "tailored" military unit can bypass 
the need for a forward base and strike its target directly. 
2. Costs 
a) De~i very 
The greatest cost of UGS is not defined by 
monetary concerns. It is measured by casualties and mission 
compromise. UGS can be delivered by airdr02 or emplaced by 
soldiers. Airdrop requires overflight of enemy territory. 
Emplacement by soldiers also may involve overflights and 
will certainly involve placing troops on the ground. In the 
L7a 
Gulf War case study, both of these options would have been 
prohibited by General SchwarzkoQf out of concern that this 
might cause Iraq to invade. It also invites the possibility 
that the delivery force miqht suffer casualties. In 
response, various government laboratories have begun to 
develop other means of deliverinq sensors. Sandia Labs, 
Lawrence Livermore and others are developing UAV, artillery 
and cruise missile delivery systems for qround sensors. 121 
While these methods eliminate the danger of casualties, they 
are lacking on two Qoints. First l UAVs and artillery will be 
able to deliver UGS at a very limited range and this will 
negate their value when fiqhtinq in the deep battle area. 
Second, while cruise missiles overcome this problem, the 
cost of cruise missiles is so Qrohibitive that they will 
elevate UGS into the same category as air and space 
surve; 11 anca with little value added~ Thi.a is because each 
cruise missile will have a relatively small sensor payload 
relatiye to its cost. 
While artillery and UAV delivery will be an 
effective means of supporting general-purpose forces in the 
121 See Bendowski, M., McFeaters, R., Taylor, R. (1997). Demonstrated 
Delivery/Employment Systems for Unattended Ground Sensors. In G. Yonas 
(Ed.), Peace and Wartime Applications and Technical Issues for 
Unattended Ground Sensors. Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 3081, 178-186. Also 
see Eaton, W., Fischer, J., Kraft, G., Lafond, G., Schatmann, L. 
(1997). Tomahawk Cruise Missile Internetted Unattended Ground Sensor 
Delivery~ In G. Yonas (Ed.), Peace and Wartime Applications and 
Technical Issues for Unattended Ground Sensors. Proceedings of SPIE 
Vol. 3081, 219-227. 
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close battle, the deep battle will most likely depend on the 
use of S~ecial Operations Forces (SOF) for delivery. Special 
Operations Forces typically operate in the deep battle area 
for reconnaissance and other missions. Delivery of sensors 
could be accomplished as part of a mission in which sensor 
delivery is the primary purpose or as a secondary mission 
while travelling enroute to an objective. This delivery 
could be accomplished either in an air or ground delivery 
mode or both. The cost of using SOF to deliver UGS is the 
willingness to risk compromise and casualties during 
delivery. 
bl Research and De~~opment 
The doctrine of the US military is based on the 
ability to project forces on short notice. It is also based 
on the notion that future wars and contingency operations 
will be conducted with forces in being. While the Gulf war 
was an anomaly in which Saddam,engaged in "sitzkrieg" while 
the US led coalition deployed and trainedL it is not likely 
that a future adversary will make the same mistake. Ground 
sensors must be developed L and tested nowL or the military 
risks not being able to produce adequate UGS in time for the 
next conflict. While many scientists and military 
professionals are quick to talk of using commercial-off-the-
shelf technology (COTS) as a way of speeding up the R&D 
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process, Vietnam demonstrates that this may not be 
sufficient. The Defense Communications Planning Group is an 
example of an organization that built its operational plan 
on COTS and modifyin~ existin~ technoloqies only to spend 
years in the R&D process. 
D. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Unintended consequences of information technologies are 
a very real danqer. When you recognize that military 
technologies act as a "systems of systems," it is fair to 
surmise that a chanqe in one can lead to significant changes 
in another.122 These changes spawn side effects, which are 
unintended. 123 Some are positive if captured and addressed 
as part of innovation. Other side effects can have 
catastrophic effects if not identified until employed in 
war. To mitigate these effects, it is best'to incorporate 
new technologies into the military during times of peace. 
This gives the advantage of time in which simulations and 
exercises may be conducted to develo2 a sound understanding 
of the technology, and the required tactical, strategic and 
organizational innovations re~ired to exploit it. Some of 
122 Department of Defense (1997). Joint Vision 2010. 
Washington D.C., GPO. p. 21. 
123 Alberts, D. (1996). The Unintended Consequences of 




the unintended consequences, which have already been 
identified and other which may emerqe are addressed below. 
1. Precision Munitions 
One of the main selling features of precision 
engagement is the notion that a small, lethal projectile can 
be fired at a tarqet with maximum precision. This will 
enable forces to accurately engage and destroy military 
targets with minimum collateral destruction or loss of life 
to a civilian populace. However, Harvey Brooks in a study at 
Harvard University points out that "historically, greater 
accuracy has always brought with it an increased rate of 
delivery-doubling every eight to ten years by the Pentagon's 
own accounting. "124 Despite this constant increase in the 
ability to deliver accurate fire L the damaqe and destruction 
of civilian property and loss of life to civilians has 
constantly increased. While precision enga~ement holds the 
promise of greater accuracy, history indicates that a 
concsious effort will have to be made to prevent an increase 
in the destructive power of future weapons. 
2. Technological My Lai 
Part of the US Army's goal of precision engagement is 
the ability to couple sensors directly to weapons systems. 
This is commonly referred to as the "sensor to shooter 
124 Dickson, p. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. London, 
Indiana University Press. p~ 205. ' 
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problem". The difficulty has centered on different operating 
systems, and technology. The idea is that eventually, 
warfare will be conducted in the absence of input or 
interaction with a human o2erator. Technologies such as 
unattended ground sensors can identify a soldier through 
magnetic sensors. The magnetic sensor detects the metal in a 
soldiers weapon and reports it as a combatant. However, the 
same sensor will also re20rt "combatant" if an old man 
carrying a metal shovel to his farm passes by the sensor. If 
a sensor was linked directly to a wea20n system, this could 
result in atrocities that could easily and regularly rival 
My Lai. 
3. "Privates' War" 
As the US military experiments with the use pf 
simulations as 12art of its "Army after Next" gaming process, 
personnel and organizational issues have come to the 
forefront. In October of 1997~ a simulation was conducted at 
Fort Sill Oklahoma involving artillery, sensors and missile 
systems against Scud launchers. The objective was to conduct 
remote warfare by connecting a variety of command centers, 
which had the ca2ability of directing strikes into the deep 
battle area. The result was that "you've got instances where 
soldiers 2rocess that data in a matter of seconds-from 
acquiring the target to shooting-and no one above the rank 
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of sergeant will actually look at that." 125 During the 
simulation some of the most advanced, high cost and 
destructive weapons were fired faster than officers or 
senior NCOs could track. The result is that the war rapidly 
fell to the control of 'the lowest ranking members of the 
centers. This raises serious concerns about how best to 
organize as well as how we train our enlisted force. 
4. Information Overload 
Attempts have been made at the National Training center 
to digitize an army division to test the effect of 
incorporating information technolo~ies into warfare. It was 
widely believed that by providing commanders at all levels 
with a "perfect 12icture" of the battlefield L that the speed 
of the attack would increase. Instead, Army evaluators found 
that it actually slowed the pace of the battle as it created 
an information overload for leaders and commanders at all 
levels. 
5. Loss of Deterrence 
While many agree that technology will give the US 
military a decisive edge in future conflicts, a great 
concern is the possibility that this will lead to a loss of 
deterrence. Strategists have 2r020sed that the use of 
autonomous sensors and weapons systems will lead to an 
125 Tice, J. (1997, October, 9). The Deep Strike Revolution: 
Battle Lab Adds Dimension to Warfare of Next Century. Army 
Times, p.1 
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"empty battlefield" where there are no soldiers, and the 
only evidence of the US military is a battlefield 
upholstered with sensors. If this holds true, how do we 
deter future enemies? If an enemy is looking for a tank, 
and all he sees is a clear avenue of approach for attack, 
this could· cause an increase in conflicts. Despite the 
ability of the US military to prosecute wars more 
efficiently, we may actually fight more conflicts because 
the enemy cannot recognize what we have created as being a 
threat. 
6. Spoofing 
Each time the United States has introduced tactics and 
technologies into the military, a cycle of action, reaction 
and counter-action has taken place. This is referred to as 
spoofing. In the Gulf War, spoofing took the form of decoys, 
which, would 2resent a visual, and infrared signature 
identical to an actual Scud missile launcher. With UGS, this 
type of spoofing can be expected to continue and even 
increase. The UGS used in Vietnam and the Sinai are 
suscep-tible to being spoofed by these types of decoys. 
Currently UGS are being developed by US government 
Laboratories that will detect Scud missile launchers by 
counting the number of cylinders of a vehicle engine as it 
passes the sensor. The UGS will then compare it to the 
number of cylinders that a Scud launcher has and report a 
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detection. 126 As UGSs are introduced, one wayan enemy 
might innovate is to produce Scud launchers consisting of 
non-standard platforms (different engines, number of 
cylinders). While this would initially foil a sensor, it 
could be expected to have a positive benefit to the US 
forces over the long term. The production and employment of 
non-standard vehicles might make it harder for the enemy to 
maintain its missile launchers, provide supply parts and 
train operators in their use. 
A second aS2ect of the spoofing problem is electronic 
intercept, detection and jamming. If the UGS transmissions 
are not encrypted the signal could be intercepted, recorded 
and retransmitted to draw aircraft or forces into an ambush. 
If a UGS is constantly transmitting,· its signal c~n be 
traced back to the sensor and the sensor destroyed. Third, 
if the signal is transmitted over a single channel, the 
frequency may be jammed eliminating its value. These 
concerns re~ire a sensor that transmits in short encrypted 
bursts with some form of a frequency hopping capability. 
7. EMP weapons 
The United States has based its warfi~hting doctrine 
for the future on information superiority. Much of this is 
126 See Trudo, R., Stotts, L. (1997). Steel Rattler. In G. Yonas (Ed.), 
Peace and Wartime Applications and Technical Issues for Unattended 
Ground Sensors. Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 3081, 13-20. 
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based on advances in electronic systems and digitization of 
information. Ground sensors fall into this same category. 
One way in which an enemy might try to level the playing 
field is to use an electro-magnetic pulse weapon. EMP was 
initially discovered as a by-product of a nuclear 
detonation. When a nuclear weapon detonates as an air burst, 
its showers a large area with EMP destroying all electronic 
circuits within the footQrint of. the detonation. It has been 
determined that a single 100 Kiloton hydrogen warhead 
detonated 300 kilometers above Kansas would destroy or 
disrupt nearly all electronic circuits in the continental 
United States. 127 Even a low yield nuclear weapon detonated 
over Iraq during the Gulf·War would hav~ had much·the same 
effect. This necessitates that sensors be hardened against 
the effects of EMP. 
8. Bandwidth Overload 
Each transmission system (radio, microwave, laser, etc) 
has a limited bandwidth. Bandwidth is the maximum rate at 
which the hardware can change the signal to send data. 
Transmissions such as video re~ire a much.higher bandwidth 
than voice communications. In the Gulf, there were so many 
d~fferent tYQes of communications beinq transmitted that the 
military exceeded the amount of bandwidth available. This 
127 Edwards, S. (Autumn, 1997). The Threat of High Altitude 
Electromagnetic Pulse to Force XXI, National Security 
Studies Quarterly. P. 61-80 
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forced the military to lease commercial satellites in order 
to meet the demand. This requires that sensors be designed 
to do a maximum of data processing internal to the sensor 
before transmittinq. This will assist in reducing the amount . 
of bandwidth required. It will also reduce the time required 
to transmit the detection of a target. 
9. Reduced Value of Camouflage 
The pu~ose of military sensors is primarily to find an 
enemy that is trying to hide. A tactic employed in the 
hiders vs. finders dynamic has been the use of camouflage to 
conceal, deceive or disrupt the enemy force. In recent 
years, the tYQes of camouflage employed by military forces 
have not changed much since their use in World War II. 
Military forces continue to use camouflage paint, nets, 
foliage and other basic methods. A notable exception is 
stealth technology however, this type of camouflage is 
largely the domain of the United States. The employment of 
UGS on the battlefield (in large ~antities) has the 
potential for eliminating much of the value of the basic 
forms of camouflage. Camouflage paint, nets, or foliage do 
not eliminate a magnetic, acoustic, seismic, infrared, or 
other t~e of emission, which can be sensed electronically. 
This may drive future adversaries toward an era of decoy 
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armies similar to what the allies used during the Normandy 
Deception of World War 11. 128 
E. PRESCRIPTION 
The final purpose of this thesis is to develop a 
prescription for the future of UGS. What qualities should be 
incorporated into each of the seven principles of UGS to 
achieve precision engagement? 
First, the principle of delivery will require both an 
airdrop and hand emplacement 'capability to support a variety 
of mission a22lications. It will also require a cheap 
construction cost. This will support the delivery of large 
numbers of sensors for qreater coveraqe of the battlespace. 
The principle of discrimination requires multiple types 
of sensings, a vide%ptic capability, reduced range and 
embedded GPS. First, sensors must be able to discriminate 
between mUltiple types of tarqets and emissions 
simultaneously to reduce the chance of a false activation. 
Second, sensors require a vide%ptical capability. This 
will enable sensors to discriminate between enemy forces, 
friendly forces and civilians. Third L the detection range of 
the sensors should be limited to SOOM or less. A reduced 
range of detection will enable precision targeting and 
destruction by cluster bomb munitions. Fourth, sensors 
128 Breuer, W. (1993). Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy 
Deception. Westport Conn ecticut, Praeger Publishing. 
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require embedded GPS technology to accurately determine the 
location of em2laced or airdropped sensors. 
The principle of secrecy requires EMP hardening, a 
camouflaqe design and the development of unclassified 
sensors. EMP hardening is necessary to prevent an enemy from 
destroyinq a qreat number of sensors using an electro 
magnetic pulse. A camouflage design will prevent an enemy 
from collectinq or destroyinq the sensors or maneuvering out 
of range of the sensors. The development of unclassified 
sensors. would enable the sensor information to be shared 
with a coalition partner and would also enable precision 
targeting without the fear that discovery of a sensor might 
compromise a cl.~ssified technology. 
Dissemination has five technical requirements. Sensors 
must process the maximum amount of data internal to the 
sensor. This will reduce the bandwidth re~irement of the 
.ensors. Encryption is required to reduce the ability of an 
enemy to spoof the sensor by intercepting or mimicking the 
sensor transmission. Burst communications should be utilized 
to reduce the ability of an enemy to intercept and locate 
the sensor. Frequency hop communication should be used to 
prevent the enemy from iamminq a sinqle fre~ency preventing 
the sensor from reporting. Finally, satellite or HF 
communications should be utilized to enable long range 
deployment and reporting by the sensors. While satellite 
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communications are generally preferred, some environments or 
terrain might mask the ability of the sensor to communicate 
with a satellite, or the cost of dedicated satellite 
channels may preclude their use. In these cases, HF 
communications may provide a low cost alternative. 
The principle of fusion re~ires that military forces 
be equipped with remote monitors which will allow them to 
access the sensor data without goinq throu~h a centralized 
facility. This would be for both land and air forces to 
support g~ound -operations and allow attack aircraft to 
"milk" the sensors for targets. This would enable sensor 
information to be rapidly fused with other sources of 
intelligence .such as photos and visual reconnaissance by air 
and ground forces. 
The £rinciQle of interroqation requires the ability to 
detect vehicle emissions and radio signals. Both would 
increase the sensor's ability to determine if a target was 
killed or survived after an attack by air or ground forces. 
The last QrinciQle is endurance. This principle 
requires a battery life span of approximately one-year. This 
would support protracted operations and reduce the 
maintenance or replacement requirements of the sensors. It 
would also reduce the cost of the sensors as they are 




Air/hand delivery capability 
Cheap construction cost 
• Discri.minati.on 
MUltiple types of discrimlnation 
Vide%ptical capability 








Max onboa-:Ed data- p-:Eoce-ss-ing-
Encryption 
Burst communications 
Frequency Hop comrmmications 
satellite/HF comrmmications 
• Fusion 
Equip forces remote monitor 
• Interrogation. 
Vehicle emission detection 
Radio signal detection capability 
• Endurance 
Battery life span of 12 months 
Justification 
Type of mission will require 
different delivery methods 
SUpports crelivery of large 
rrarnber or sensors for greater 
cove-rage 
Reduce false positives and 
enemy decoy ops 
Discriminate between 
erremT/friencrlyfcivilians 
Enarrle accurate targeting 
and . dest rttct ion by CBU 
Bnab-le- aee::Urate position 
~ti~ ~f air dropped 
senso.rs. and enable detection 
·of sensors collected/moved by 
enemy 
~re¥ent ~true::tion by 
enemy EMF ~ns 
P~e~ent e~~ from 
COl Jecting/de&troying sensors 
Enable sharing of intelligence 
and technology w/coalition 
forces 
Red:uce-·balldw-idth requirements 
Red"ce ability of enemy to 
spoof 5.en.so.I: 
Reduce ability of enemy to 
intercept and locate 
Prevent enemy from jamming 
comrmmications 
Enable long range deployment 
and reporting by sensors 
Enable rapid dissemination and 
fusion of intelligence with 
other intelliaence information 
~~~~e BD.A through detection 
of. "li"t.z:e" taJ:.g.ats 
Improve BDA 
Provide endurance for 
protracted operations, reduce 
maintenance requirements 
Table 5.1 Prescription for UGS 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Unattended ~round sensors have primary applicability in 
operations requiring near real-time detection and targeting 
of perishable tar~ets. They provide focused, tactical, 
combat information, and the granularity necessary to detect 
individual soldiers , tanks , and Scuds in a variety of 
environments. Their capabilities fill requirements in peace 
and wart contingency operations and protracted conflicts. 
UGS also support both offensive and defensive applications. 
If the US military invests nowL UGS have the potential of 
complementing or substituting for air and space systems at 
the . ta~tic_al leval. This invaatm..~ in UGS will enable the 
US military to fill the current sensor gap and achieve 
precision engagement. This is a cumulative strategy, which 
require·s a transition from the big and the few toward the 
small and the many. In this waYL success is defined by a 
quantitative measure of effectiveness (MOE). The MOE is the 
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